Crowell v. Benson

• Citation: 45 F.2d 66
• Decision Date: 17 November 1930
• Docket Number: No. 5802.,5802.
• Parties: CROWELL, Deputy Com'r, et al. v. BENSON.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

45 F.2d 66 (1930)

CROWELL, Deputy Com'r, et al. v. BENSON.

No. 5802.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

November 17, 1930.

Alexander C. Birch, U. S. Atty., Palmer Pillans, and Alexis T. Gresham, all of Mobile, Ala. (Alex C. Birch, U. S. Atty., and Pillans, Cowley & Gresham, all of Mobile, Ala., on the brief), for appellants.

Wm. G. Caffey and Vincent F. Kilborn, both of Mobile, Ala. (Outlaw, Kilborn & Seale and Harry T. Smith & Caffey, all of Mobile, Ala., on the brief), for appellee.

Before FOSTER and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and HOLMES, District Judge.

WALKER, Circuit Judge.

On July 4, 1927, J. B. Knudsen, one of the appellants (herein referred to as the claimant), sustained personal injuries while on a derrick barge which was owned by Charles Benson, the appellee, and was then moored in the Mobile river, a navigable stream, the claimant then being on the barge for the purpose of splicing a wire cable which was part of its equipment. The claimant filed against the appellee a claim for compensation for those injuries under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 USCA § 901, et seq. In that proceeding the appellee put in issue allegations of the claimant, including the allegation that at the time the alleged injuries were sustained the claimant was an employee of appellee. After a hearing on that claim before a Deputy Commissioner under the act mentioned, one of the appellants, at which evidence was presented by the claimant and appellee, that official made an order awarding compensation to the claimant. That order, in the caption of which Knudsen was styled "Claimant" and appellee was styled "Employer," contained what was called "Findings of Fact," which included the statement: "That on the 4th day of July, 1927, the claimant above named was in the employ of the employer above named in Mobile, Alabama." Other than that statement it contained nothing as to the facts of any relationship existing between the claimant and the appellee at the time the former was injured. Thereafter appellee filed in the court below what was called a "bill of complaint" against the appellants. That pleading, after alleging the proceedings under the claim filed by the claimant and the making of the above-mentioned order, alleged "that the said award and compensation order was not in accordance with law, for the reason that said J. B. Knudsen was not at the time of said injury an employee of the complainant, nor was the matter of his claim against this complainant within the jurisdiction of the said Deputy Commissioner." That pleading contained further allegations to the effect that prior to the date of the alleged injury, and after the derrick barge had been loaned by the appellee to the claimant and/or one Beauregard Roberts, and while it was used by one or both of them for purposes in which appellee was not concerned, the claimant wrongfully cut a cable thereon, and that at the time of the alleged injury the claimant was on board the barge for the purpose of splicing that cable as an act of reparation for the damage done by cutting it, but was not there as an employee or at the instance of appellee. That pleading prayed that the enforcement of that award be enjoined, and that it be set aside. After the overruling of motions of the appellants, 33 F.(2d) 137, that appellee's bill be dismissed, which motions stated the following, among other grounds: "The facts alleged do not show that there was no competent evidence before the Deputy Commissioner to support his order sought to be enjoined," and after the appellant had filed an answer to the bill, the court entered upon a trial de novo of the issues raised, heard evidence offered by the opposing parties, consisting of testimony of witnesses examined in the presence of the court, and rendered a final decree, which contained a finding to the effect that the claimant was not in the employ of the appellee at the time the former sustained the injuries mentioned, and adjudged that the above-mentioned award was not in accordance with law, and that that award be in all things set aside. That decree contained the recital that "the respondent Crowell produced, offered and filed in evidence the record of the proceedings before him as Deputy Commissioner, but did not read same to the Court, nor did the Court read it."

It is not questioned, and is not fairly open to question, that testimony given in the presence of the court supported a finding that, at the time claimant sustained the alleged injuries, he was not an employee of the appellee. It appears from the opinion rendered by the District Judge that his action in having a trial de novo for the purpose of passing on the question whether the award made by the Deputy Commissioner was or was not "in accordance with law," with the result of not confining the evidence to be considered to that taken before the Deputy Commissioner, was influenced by his conclusions that the provision of the above-mentioned act with reference to a compensation order being passed on by a District Court was constitutionally invalid unless under that provision a court in passing on such an order properly may consider evidence other than or in addition to that heard by the official who made the order in question; and that under that provision it was permissible for the court, in passing on the challenged award of compensation, to hear and consider evidence other than or in addition to that taken before the official who made that award. Benson v. Crowell (D. C.) 33 F.(2d) 137. Three Circuit Courts of Appeals — of the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits — have reached conclusions opposed to those expressed by the District Judge, deciding that the District Court, in determining whether the award in question was or was not "in accordance with law," can consider no evidence other than that which was taken before the official who made the award of compensation, and that a challenged award must be confirmed if there was any evidence before the Deputy Commissioner supporting it. Nordhavet (Parks Case) 43 F.(2d) 505, 1930 A. M. C. 1827; Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41 F.(2d) 593; Northwestern Stevedoring Co. v. Marshall, 41 F.(2d) 28. Several District Courts have reached conclusions in harmony with those arrived at in the three just cited cases. Obrecht-Lynch Corporation v. Clark, 30 F.(2d) 144; Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co. v. Norton, 32 F.(2d) 513; Joyce v. United States Deputy Commissioner, 33 F.(2d) 218; Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Monahan, 34 F.(2d) 549; Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v. Marshall, 36 F.(2d) 814.

By the assertion and prosecution of the claim in question one individual sought to deprive another individual of property — the sum of money required to pay the compensation claimed and awarded. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has the effect of forbidding the accomplishment of that result under the claim asserted without due process of law. For the appellee to have the benefit of the due process of law to which he is entitled, he must have had, at some stage of the proceeding prescribed by the above-mentioned act for the assertion and allowance of a claim to compensation under it, a fair opportunity for submitting to a judicial tribunal, for determination upon its own independent judgment, as to both law and facts, the question whether the claim asserted is or is not allowable and enforceable. Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908; Bluefield Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 689, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176; Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24, 37-41, 49 S. Ct. 69, 73 L. Ed. 161, 62 A. L. R. 805; Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U. S. 453, 461, 28 S. Ct. 576, 52 L. Ed. 888; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938. When a contested money demand is that of one private individual against another private individual, the latter is entitled to have the question of his liability passed on by a judicial tribunal before the issue of process, in its nature final, for the enforcement of the asserted liability. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284, 15 L. Ed. 372. It is hardly consistent with the just stated propositions to hold that, as to the facts required to support its action in a case presented to it for decision, a court is restricted to a determination of the question whether an administrative official, who, as required by law, first passed on the controversy involved in the case, did or did not have before him substantial evidence to prove the facts required to support his conclusion. The claimant's injury having been sustained while he was on a vessel afloat in navigable waters, where he then was for the purpose of rendering a maritime service, the claim for compensation was within the admiralty jurisdiction, which...