Juarez v. People
| Decision Date | 10 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 17SC815 |
| Citation | 457 P.3d 560 |
| Parties | Alfredo JUAREZ, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, John Plimpton, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 Juarez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. With regard to his challenge to the effectiveness of his counsel, the district court found both that defense counsel adequately advised his client concerning the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty to misdemeanor drug possession and that, in any event, there was no reasonable probability Juarez would not have taken the plea. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that counsel’s advice fell within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, but as a result of that finding, the appellate court considered it unnecessary to address the question whether counsel’s performance prejudiced Juarez.
¶2 Because Juarez conceded he was advised and understood that the misdemeanor offense to which he pleaded guilty would make him "deportable," defense counsel’s advice concerning the immigration consequences of his plea correctly informed him of the controlling law and therefore did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required for effective assistance concerning immigration advice. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.
¶3 In April 2012, Alfredo Juarez pleaded guilty to one class 1 misdemeanor count of possessing a schedule V controlled substance, in exchange for the dismissal of a charge of felony possession. As stipulated in the plea agreement, he received a sentence to two years of drug court probation. At the time of his offense and plea, the defendant was a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
¶4 A month after his sentencing, the defendant violated the conditions of his probation, received a suspended two-day jail sentence, and two weeks later, after violating the conditions of that suspension, served those two days in jail. After he received an additional three-day jail sentence for again violating his probation, federal Immigration Customs and Enforcement ("ICE") officers began removal proceedings. The defendant was eventually deported to Mexico.
¶5 In October 2012 and January 2013, the defendant filed motions for postconviction relief, challenging the effectiveness of his plea counsel’s representation and, as a result, the constitutional validity of his guilty plea. Over a period of three days, the district court heard these motions, including the testimony of the defendant, taken by video over the internet; the testimony of his plea counsel; and the testimony of an immigration attorney retained by him in 2011, prior to his acceptance of the plea agreement. Following that hearing, the court made findings and conclusions and denied the motions. The hearing revealed the following pertinent facts.
¶6 The defendant was charged with a felony following the discovery of cocaine on his person. After nearly a year of continuances, granted for the specific purpose of allowing him to address potential immigration issues prior to accepting any plea agreement, the defendant finally agreed to plead guilty to class 1 misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance in exchange for the dismissal of his felony charge. Prior to the court’s acceptance of the plea, defense counsel made a record that he had spoken to two immigration attorneys, advised the defendant to contact an immigration attorney himself after providing him with several names, and clearly informed the defendant that the misdemeanor offered by the prosecution was the equivalent of a felony under federal immigration law.
¶7 At the postconviction hearing, defense counsel further testified that on a call with him and the defendant, an immigration attorney explained that the plea offer was not acceptable because it would likely get him deported, and that the immigration attorney followed up the call with a letter, reiterating that the proposed plea would probably result in deportation. Counsel further testified that he consulted another immigration attorney who gave largely the same advice, and that he communicated this response to the defendant, who understood that deportation was the probable outcome of accepting the plea.
¶8 The defendant himself also testified that in the process of renewing his lawful permanent resident status, his own immigration counsel had informed him that the plea could make him deportable. The defendant further testified that he spoke to a second immigration attorney, who also informed him that the plea "would" make him deportable. The defendant specifically conceded that although no one told him that accepting the agreement and pleading guilty would "automatically" make him deportable or that he actually "was going to get deported," nevertheless he understood that pleading guilty to the misdemeanor "would" make him "deportable."
¶9 The district court reasoned that any distinction between being automatically or mandatorily deportable and simply being deportable was illusory and in fact that being so advised would have created a misleading impression of the probability of deportation. Similarly, it found that the defendant regretted his plea only after he violated his probation and was deported and therefore there was no merit in his assertion that had he been told he would "automatically" be deported he would not have accepted the plea agreement. After agreeing that the defendant was adequately advised, the court of appeals found it unnecessary to opine concerning the likelihood that but for inadequate advice, the defendant would have rejected the plea offer.
¶10 For the waiver of fundamental rights inherent in any guilty plea to be effective, a pleading defendant must understand, among other things, the direct consequences of his plea. Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (); People v. Birdsong , 958 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. 1998) (). In addition, before pleading guilty to a crime, a defendant is entitled to advice from his counsel that falls within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (). Although it appears well settled that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant sua sponte of potential federal deportation consequences, People v. Pozo , 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987), defense counsel’s obligations and the adequacy of his advice concerning the deportation consequences of his client’s acceptance of a guilty plea have long been the subject of debate in both state and federal law, compare People v. Soriano , 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 333–36 (1987) (), and People v. Pozo , 712 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Colo. App. 1985) (), rev’d , 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987), and People v. Padilla, 151 Ill.App.3d 297, 104 Ill.Dec. 522, 502 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (1986) (), with Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1972) (), and State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960, 962 (Fla. 1987) (), superseded by rule as stated in State v. De Abreu , 613 So. 2d 453, 453 (Fla. 1993).
¶11 More than thirty years ago, in Pozo , this court addressed a challenge to the effectiveness of counsel for failing to advise of possible deportation consequences, but unlike the intermediate appellate court considering the question before us, we expressly declined to determine whether any such duty existed. 746 P.2d at 527. Instead, relying heavily on then-existing federal law that permitted a sentencing court to prevent deportation by recommending against it, we found that the potential deportation consequences of guilty pleas in criminal proceedings brought against alien defendants were material to critical phases of such proceedings. Id. at 528–29.
Rather than imposing a duty on counsel to advise specifically of deportation consequences, we relied on the more fundamental principle that attorneys must inform themselves of material legal principles that may significantly impact the particular circumstances of their clients. Id. at 529–30. In the absence of an existing adequate record, we therefore remanded for a determination whether defense counsel had reason to know of Pozo’s alien status but nevertheless failed to conduct appropriate research into federal immigration...
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People v. Figueroa-Lemus
...straightforward," it required counsel to provide correct advice. Id. at 369, 130 S.Ct. 1473. In Juarez v. People , 2020 CO 8, ¶¶ 17–18, 457 P.3d 560, 564, we recently considered this requirement of Padilla , and interpreted it to be that where federal law makes a person pleading guilty to a......