Aubry v. Gadbois

• Citation: 50 Cal.App.3d 470,123 Cal.Rptr. 365
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 05 August 1975
• Parties: Ernest L. AUBRY, as a resident taxpayer and citizen of Los Angeles, Califoria, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of the County of Los Angeles, California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Honorable Richard BADBOIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 45029.

Page 365

123 Cal.Rptr. 365

50 Cal.App.3d 470

Ernest L. AUBRY, as a resident taxpayer and citizen of Los Angeles, Califoria, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of the County of Los Angeles, California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Honorable Richard BADBOIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 45029.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Aug. 5, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1975.

Hearing Denied Oct. 30, 1975.

Ernest L. Aubry, in pro per.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, by John P. Farrell, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents Gadbois, Kenyon and Cabell.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

The issue in this case is whether a juvenile charged with the commission of a crime is entitled to bail on the same conditions as an adult similarly charged.

Plaintiff Ernest L. Aubry, in a taxpayer's action brought against the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court, one other juvenile court judge, all the commissioners and referees working in juvenile court, and the Chief Probation Officer of Los Angeles County, attempts to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds and to obtain declaratory relief with respect to prehearing detention of juveniles. The trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Stated in eight causes of action, plaintiff's complaint boils down to this: A juvenile charged under Welfare and Institutions Code, sections 601 or 602, ¹ can be detained for 15 judicial days before a hearing on the offense is held, while an adult charged with the same offense is entitled to bail pending his trial; the prehearing detention of such juveniles is illegal and involves an unlawful expenditure of public funds.

The core of plaintiff's complaint are sections 635 and 636 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 635 provides, as relevant, that after a minor is taken into custody, the 'court will examine such minor . . . and, unless it appears that such minor has violated an order of the juvenile court or has escaped from the commitment of the juvenile court Or that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of such minor or the person or property of another that he be detained or that such minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall make its order releasing such minor from custody.' (Italics added.) ²

Section 636 states the grounds for detention affirmatively and permits the court to 'make its order that such minor be detained in the juvenile hall or other suitable place . . . for a period not to exceed 15 judicial days . . ..' (See also, section 657.) ³ The California Constitution, article 1, section 12 provides that a 'person', and Penal Code sections 1270 and 1271 provides that a 'defendant,' unless charged with a capital offense is entitled to bail. (See In re Boyle, 11 Cal.3d 165, 168--169, 113 Cal.Rptr. 99, 520 P.2d 723.) There is no 'public safety' exception; the 'purpose of bail is to assure the defendant's attendance in court when his presence is required, . . ..' (In re Underwood, 9 Cal.3d 345, 348, 107 Cal.Rptr. 401, 403, 508 P.2d 721, 723.)

In contrast, Welfare and Institutions Code sections 635 and 636 authorize detention on the grounds 'that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of such minor or the person or property of another that he be detained . . ..'

Plaintiff contends, first, that the California Constitution and the Penal Code provisions authorizing bail apply to juveniles; second, that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the juvenile the right to bail; and third, that the United States and California constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection prohibit denying the juvenile bail on the same terms that would be applied to an adult criminal defendant.

It has been held that a juvenile is not entitled to bail under either article 1, section 12--then, section 6--of the California Constitution or the Penal Code. (In re Magnuson, 110 Cal.App.2d 73, 74, 242 P.2d 362. ⁴ Such a right cannot be found in the juvenile court act, which explicitly authorizes prehearing detention. (In re Castro, 243 Cal.App.2d 402, 412, 52 Cal.Rptr. 469.) The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution confers a right to bail on no one, whether adult or juvenile. (In re Underwood, supra, 9 Cal.3d 345, 349, 107 Cal.Rptr. 401, 508 P.2d 721.)

Plaintiff's final contention is that the absence of a bail provision in the juvenile court law denies the detained juvenile due process, equal protection, or both. However, not all distinctions in the treatment of juveniles and of adults have been found to be unconstitutional: 'In recent years the courts, while preserving the beneficial aspects of the juvenile process, have held that certain procedural protections must be observed in order to guarantee the fundamental fairness of juvenile proceedings. (Citations.) Gault, (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527) Winship (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368) and the other decisions which insure such procedural fairness in juvenile proceedings do not, however, suggest a surrender of the salutory protections of the juvenile court system.' (T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 767, 775, 94 Cal.Rptr. 813, 817, 484 P.2d 981, 985. See also, Leroy T. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 12 Cal.3d 434, 439, 115 Cal.Rptr. 761, 525 P.2d 665.) ⁵

Whether the possibility of detention without opportunity to post bail for 15 judicial days is, taken in context, ⁶ unconstitutional has not been squarely decided in this state. (See Rivera v. Freeman (9 Cir. 1972) 469 F.2d 1159, 1165.)

Nevertheless, we believe that our Supreme Court in In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d 16, 26, at footnote 17, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, at 40, 473 P.2d 737, at 747, has indicated its belief that the absence of a system of bail is not unconstitutional:

'The California Juvenile Court Law, as properly administered, provides an adequate system for the prehearing release of juveniles without the requirement of posting bail. (Citations.) Hence, we decline to consider whether juveniles are constitutionally entitled to bail. (Citations.) In Gault the United States Supreme Court declared that 'whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.' But the court observed: 'we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the prejudicial stages of the juvenile process . . .' and did not consider whether a child is entitled to bail. (Citation.) The Juvenile Court Law and section 635, as properly construed, do not permit the detention of juveniles for the protection of society in situations in which an adult would be entitled to bail pending trial. Section 635, however, does provide ample authority for the detention of children for their own protection (citation); to superimpose a provision for bail in the Juvenile Court would cause unexplored difficulties for most juveniles, particularly those who are indigent. (Citation.)'

Plaintiff points out that In re William M. carefully stated that 'section 635, as properly construed, (does) not permit the detention of juveniles for the protection of society,' and that In re Underwood, supra, 9 Cal.3d 345, 348, 107 Cal.Rptr. 401, 508 P.2d 721, held that there is no 'public safety' exception to the right to bail.

However, although many procedural protections afforded adult offenders have been extended to juvenile offenders (see, E.g., Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 532, 541, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 357, 362 (double jeopardy prohibition)), the purpose of juvenile court proceedings still is 'the protection and benefit' of minors. (In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 456, 75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296.)

It is not unreasonable to assume, then, that our Supreme Court, in impliedly rejecting a right to bail or prehearing release in In re William M., concluded that in situations where 'the person or property of another' requires protection, the minor may be detained because the same acts that threaten society also threaten the minor, whose protection...