Iribar v. Iribar, 86-2125
| Decision Date | 21 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-2125,86-2125 |
| Citation | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1764,510 So.2d 1023 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1764 Alicia Maria IRIBAR, Appellant, v. Manuel IRIBAR, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Cristina DeOliveira, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Frumkes & Greene and Cynthia Greene, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY and HUBBART, JJ.
The wife Alicia maria Iribar appeals a final judgment of marriage dissolution entered below. She claims error as to three aspects of the final judgment, namely, (1) the trial court's refusal to award her, as lump sum alimony, (a) the husband's one-half interest in the marital home and (b) an automobile; (2) the trial court's eighteen-month rehabilitative alimony award, contending that the award should have been for five years; and (3) the trial court's refusal to award her attorney's fees and costs. We affirm on the first two points, but reverse as to the third point.
First, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to award the wife the husband's one-half interest in the marital home. The trial court could have reasonably concluded, as it did, that this asset should be equally divided between the parties because (a) the marital home was the only substantial asset acquired by the parties during the marriage, (b) the marriage was a short-term one (ten years) which produced no children, and (c) the wife made no significant contribution to her husband's career, as both parties pursued their own career paths during the marriage. See Hiler v. Hiler, 442 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Bullard v. Bullard, 413 So.2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So.2d 75, 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We further see no abuse of discretion in refusing to award the wife an automobile as lump sum alimony because (a) the parties owned no automobile to be distributed to the wife, and (b) the trial court otherwise equitably distributed the assets of the marriage. See Poitier v. Poitier, 458 So.2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Maggio v. Maggio, 405 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Feldman v. Feldman, 390 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Second, we see no merit in the wife's attack on the rehabilitative alimony award. The award was strictly a bridge-the-gap type of award as the wife is presently employed, has more than adequate employment skills, and needs nothing to be "rehabilitated" to, other than to ease her transition from a married to a single status. The trial court was well within its discretion in deciding that an eighteen-month award at $1,000 a month was adequate to achieve this transition for the wife. Murray v. Murray, 374 So.2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
Third, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the wife's application for attorney's fees and costs as plainly (1) the wife was in considerable need of such an award, and (2) the husband's financial position to pay for such fees and costs was superior to the wife's inasmuch as his annual income exceeds hers by over $100,000. The trial court should, therefore, have ruled at the conclusion of the final hearing that the wife was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as requested by the wife's counsel, and, thereafter, conducted a separately noticed evidentiary hearing to determine the reasonable value of the subject attorney's fees and costs.
Fourth, we specifically disagree with the trial court's legal basis for denying the attorney's fees and costs, namely, that (a) no...
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