Rogers v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 14 January 1998
• Docket Number: 961279
• Parties: George G. ROGERS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

522 U.S. 252

118 S.Ct. 673

139 L.Ed.2d 686

George G. ROGERS, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 96-1279.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 5, 1997.

Decided Jan. 14, 1998.

Syllabus^*

Petitioner was charged with the knowing possession of an unregistered and unserialized firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. §5861(d) and (i) as a result of the discovery of a silencer in his truck. A silencer is included within the meaning of "firearm'' under §5845(a)(7). Petitioner repeatedly admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew that the item found in his truck was in fact a silencer. The District Court denied petitioner's request for an instruction that defined the Government's burden of establishing "knowing possession'' as proof that he had willfully and consciously possessed an item he knew to be a "firearm.'' Petitioner was convicted. Under Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608, decided after this case was submitted to the jury, the mens rea element of a violation of §5861(d) requires the Government to prove that the defendant knew that the item he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a firearm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction because the omission related to an element admitted by petitioner and, in light of his repeated admissions, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

Reported below: 94 F.3d 1519 (C.A.11 1996).

Justice STEVENS, joined by Justice THOMAS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER, concluded that the question on which this Court granted certiorari-whether failure to instruct on an element of an offense is harmless error where, at trial, the defendant admitted that element-is not fairly presented by the record, and that, accordingly, the writ must be dismissed as improvidently granted. The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the denial of petitioner's requested instruction effectively omitted an essential element of the §5861 offenses was unwarranted for two reasons. First, the tendered instruction was ambiguous. It might have been interpreted to require proof that petitioner knew that his silencer was a "firearm'' as defined by §5845(a)(7), not merely that the item possessed certain offending characteristics. Second, and more important, a fair reading of the instructions as actually given did require the jury to find that petitioner knew that he possessed a silencer. The trial judge first explained to the jury that the statute defined "firearm'' to include a silencer and then instructed that petitioner could not be found guilty without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he "knowingly possessed a "firearm,' as defined above.'' Since the term "firearm'' had been "defined above'' to include a silencer, that instruction required the jury to determine that petitioner knew that the item he possessed was a silencer. The instruction telling the jury that the Government need not prove that petitioner knew that his gun "was a "firearm' which the law requires to be registered'' is best read as merely explaining that a conviction did not require the jury to find that petitioner knew that the law required registration of the silencer. Under United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356, the Government was entitled to such an instruction. Pp. ___-___.

Justice O'CONNOR concluded that it is sufficient to dismiss the writ that the instructions tendered by the District Court were ambiguous on whether the jury was asked to find, as is required by Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608, that petitioner knew that the item he possessed was a silencer. As a result, it is at least unclear whether the question the Court intended to address in this case is squarely presented. Pp. ___-___.

STEVENS, J., announced the decision of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which SCALIA, J., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SOUTER, J., joined.

Javier H. Rubinstein, for petitioner.

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Justice STEVENS announced the decision of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice THOMAS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join.

We granted certiorari, 520 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1841, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997), to decide whether a district court's failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is harmless error where, at trial, the defendant admitted that element. Because we have concluded that the question is not fairly presented by the record, we dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.

I

Petitioner was charged with the knowing possession of an unregistered and unserialized firearm described as "a 9'' by 1 '' silencer,'' App. 6-7, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §5861(d) and (i).¹ Although he claimed that he did not know that the item was in a canvas bag found behind the driver's seat in his pickup truck when he was arrested, he candidly acknowledged that he knew it was a silencer. He repeated this admission during questioning by the police and in his testimony at trial; moreover, it was confirmed by his lawyer during argument to the jury.

Under our decision in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), the mens rea element of a violation of §5861(d) requires the Government to prove that the defendant knew that the item he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a firearm. ² It is not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew that his possession was unlawful, or that the firearm was unregistered. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971); see Staples, 511 U.S., at 609, 114 S.Ct., at 1799. Thus, in this case, petitioner's admission that he knew the item was a silencer constituted evidence sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element of the charged offenses. He nevertheless submits that his conviction is unconstitutional because, without an instruction from the trial judge defining that element of the offense, there has been no finding by the jury that each of the elements of the offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Relying on Justice SCALIA's opinion concurring in the judgment in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 267, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421-2422, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989), petitioner contends that """the question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials.''''' Brief for Petitioner 20-21 (quoting Carella, 491 U.S., at 269, 109 S.Ct., at 2422 (in turn quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614, 66 S.Ct. 402, 406, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946))).

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected petitioner's argument and affirmed his conviction. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the failure to give an instruction on an element of the offense can be harmless error if the "omission related to an element of the crime that the defendant in any case admitted,''³ and that in this case petitioner's unequivocal and repeated admissions made it clear that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of the fact that petitioner's submission relies on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as interpreted in cases like In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), it is clear that the Court of Appeals decided an important constitutional question. Given our tradition of avoiding the unnecessary or premature adjudication of such questions, see, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-583, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1364, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979), we first consider whether the trial judge failed to give the jury an adequate instruction on the mens rea element of the offense.

II

Count 2 of the indictment charged that the petitioner "knowingly'' possessed an unregistered firearm, and Count 3 charged that he "knowingly'' possessed a firearm that was not properly identified by a serial number. The trial judge denied petitioner's request for an instruction that defined the Government's burden of establishing ""knowing possession''' as proof that "the defendant willfully and consciously possessed items which he knew to be "firearms.''' App. 12. Apparently assuming that our holding in Staples required such an instruction, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge's denial "effectively omitted from the instructions an essential element of the crime charged under §5861(d).'' 94 F.3d 1519, 1524 (C.A.11 1996). For two reasons, we believe this assumption was unwarranted.

First, the tendered instruction was ambiguous. It might have been interpreted to require proof that the defendant knew that his silencer was a "firearm'' as defined by the federal statute, not merely that the item possessed certain offending characteristics. Second, and of greater importance, a fair reading of the instructions as actually given did require the jury to find that petitioner knew that he possessed a silencer.

In his objections to the instruction that the trial judge originally proposed as a definition of the §5861(d) offense charged in Count 2, petitioner complained of "a third essential element in there, that being knowledge or knowing.'' App. 78. In response, the trial judge inserted the word "knowingly'' between the words "Defendant'' and "possessed'' in the instruction defining the necessary mens rea. ⁴ In instructing the jury, the judge first explained that the statute defined the term "firearm'' to include a silencer. He then instructed the jury that the...