State v. Clifford

• Decision Date: 22 October 1892
• Parties: STATE v. CLIFFORD.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

86 Iowa 550

53 N.W. 299

STATE

v.CLIFFORD.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 22, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Shelby county; WALTER I. SMITH, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for the crime of larceny from a building in the nighttime, and was convicted of simple larceny. He appeals.Byers & Lockwood, for appellant.

John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., and Thos. A. Cheshire, for the State.

KINNE, J.

1. The defendant and one Fillmore were indicted for stealing from the barn of Axline & Smith, in the nighttime, 26 bushels of clover seed, of the value of $125. The court permitted a witness named Cuppy to testify in rebuttal on part of the state as to statements made by the defendant in his examination before the grand jury. It appears that while the defendant was under arrest and in the county jail, charged with the commission of the very crime for which he was afterwards indicted and tried, the foreman of the grand jury, then in session, had the sheriff of the county bring defendant before said body, where he was examined under oath as to his supposed connection with the alleged larceny. It does not appear that the defendant was informed as to his rights, or of the effect of the answers he might give, or as to the fact as to whether or not such answers could afterwards be used against him. No minutes of his testimony were taken by the grand jury. We may properly assume that he testified under oath, without being informed as to his rights, or the effect of his testimony, or the possibility of its use against him thereafter. It is contended that his statements so made before the grand jury were not voluntary, and hence inadmissible against him upon the trial. The course of procedure pursued by the grand jury with reference to the examination of this witness was unprecedented, and, to our minds, wholly unjustifiable from any point of view. They had no right to compel the defendant, then in custody, and charged with the commission of the crime inquired about, to give testimony before them. To put him under oath, under such circumstances, without advising him of his rights, was attempting to take an unfair advantage of his situation, to his prejudice. A statement so procured could in no proper sense be said to be voluntarily made. A confession or statement, to have been voluntarily made, must proceed “from the spontaneous suggestion of the party's own mind, free from the influence of any extraneous disturbing cause.” “If made under oath by the party charged, upon a judicial inquiry as to the crime, it [the confession] is rejected, as not being voluntary.” People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 395. The law is well settled that when a person is compelled to answer questions under oath, put to him by a committing magistrate, touching his supposed connection with the crime then being investigated, and of which he stands accused, his statements are not admissible against him. 3 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 488; Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 668, 669; State v. Mathews, 66 N. C. 106;People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384;People v. Mondon, 103 N. Y. 211, 8 N. E. Rep. 496. And it is said that, unless the defendant comprehended his rights fully, and is informed by the court or examining body that his refusal to answer the questions propounded to him could not prejudice his case, or be construed as an evidence of his guilt, any responsive confessions implicating him in the crime charged must be regarded as involuntary, and hence inadmissible. Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 668, 669; State v. Rorie, 74 N. C. 148; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 225, 226, and notes. The same rule would apply as to examinations had, as in this case, before a grand jury. Some of the states by statute require magistrates conducting such examinations to admonish the prisoner as to the effect of his answer and his right to refuse to answer, but it is believed that the general rule of law is as above stated, even in the absence of such a statute.

Counsel for the state contend that the evidence was admissible, and cite Code, § 4285; State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa, 11;State v. Row, 81 Iowa, 138, 46 N. W. Rep. 872; and some Indiana cases. The statute referred to provides that a member of the grand jury may be compelled to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before such jury, to ascertain if it be consistent with that given by him before the court. It cannot be said that this statute had the effect of making the testimony given before the grand jury, under oath and involuntarily, by one at the time charged with the very crime then being inquired about, and who, when so examined, was under arrest therefor, competent on a trial of the party under indictment for such crime. Counsel have cited no case so holding, and we find none. We see no reason for holding that the legislature, in enacting the statute referred to, intended to abrogate the universal rule of law that involuntary admissions in confession...