Henry by Henry v. St. John's Hosp.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 68659,68659
• Citation: 563 N.E.2d 410,138 Ill.2d 533,150 Ill.Dec. 523
• Parties: , 150 Ill.Dec. 523 Erica HENRY, by her Mother and Next Friend, Jane HENRY, Appellant, v. ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 410

563 N.E.2d 410

138 Ill.2d 533, 150 Ill.Dec. 523

Erica HENRY, by her Mother and Next Friend, Jane HENRY, Appellant, v. ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL et al., Appellees.

No. 68659.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 19, 1990.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 30, 1990.

Bruce N. Cook, Belleville, for appellant.

John Meyer, of Pierce & Meyer, Chicago, Hugh Graham III, of Graham & Graham, Springfield, and Gary M. Peplow and Karen L. Kendall, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, for appellees.

David J. Letvin and David M. Stein, of Letvin & Stein, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Murvel Pretorius, Jr., and Mary W. McDade, of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorius, Peoria, for amicus curiae Illinois Ass'n of Defense Trial Counsel.

Justice STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Erica Henry, was severely injured during her birth as a result of the negligent administration of the drug Marcaine, an anesthetic, to her mother. Plaintiff sued defendants St. John's Hospital and Dr. Shari Fitzgerald (defendants) in a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff also sued Sterling Drug, Inc., and Breon Laboratories, Inc. (Sterling-Breon), the manufacturers of the drug, in the same action for failure to properly warn about the drug and failure to contraindicate it for the usage which allegedly caused plaintiff's injuries. During the trial, Sterling-Breon filed a contribution claim against defendants, alleging that Dr. Fitzgerald had negligently administered the drug.

The circuit court of Sangamon County found as a matter of law that defendants had violated the standard of care and directed a verdict as to that issue. On the issue of causation, the jury returned a verdict against defendants and Sterling-Breon, and assessed $10 million in compensatory damages. The jury determined that defendants' pro rata share of these damages was 7%, and that Sterling-Breon was liable for 93% of the compensatory damages. (Henry v. St. John's Hospital (1987), 159 Ill.App.3d 725, 728, 111 Ill.Dec. 503, 512 N.E.2d 1044.) In a remittitur, the trial court reduced the medical-expenses portion of the award for compensatory damages and entered judgment against defendants and Sterling-Breon for $8,511,759. In addition, the jury returned a verdict against Sterling-Breon for $7 million in punitive damages. 180 Ill.App.3d 558, 561, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.

Plaintiff's mother, Jane Henry, brought a separate action on her own behalf against defendants and Sterling-Breon in which she alleged that their actions constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the mother's action was dismissed on the pleadings, she appealed. Defendants and Sterling-Breon appealed plaintiff's jury verdict. 180 Ill.App.3d at 562, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.

While both appeals were pending, plaintiff filed a petition for approval of minor plaintiff's settlement agreement with Sterling-Breon and for a good-faith finding pursuant to the Contribution Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, pars. 301 through 305). The details of the settlement are included in the appellate court opinion and need not be repeated here. (See 180 Ill.App.3d at 562-63, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.) Nevertheless, this agreement between plaintiff and Sterling-Breon provided a monetary settlement of both plaintiff's and her mother's claims against Sterling-Breon, but for a total current cash value which was much less than the amount Sterling-Breon was liable to pay plaintiff on the jury's verdict. The agreement specifically stated that plaintiff and her parents intended to pursue their claims against defendants. (180 Ill.App.3d at 562, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.) The agreement also provided for the indemnification of Sterling-Breon for any claims brought by defendants against Sterling-Breon for contribution. 180 Ill.App.3d at 563, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.

The trial court found that the settlement was in good faith, dismissed Sterling-Breon from plaintiff's action, and vacated the judgment against Sterling-Breon. (180 Ill.App.3d at 563, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.) The appellate court then affirmed the judgment against defendants. Henry, 159 Ill.App.3d at 735, 111 Ill.Dec. 503, 512 N.E.2d 1044; 180 Ill.App.3d at 563-64, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221. Plaintiff then initiated post-judgment proceedings against defendants. Defendants responded by tendering a check to plaintiff for the 7% of the judgment they were liable for, plus interest, and petitioning the trial court for entry of judgment on the jury verdict. The trial court denied defendants' motion, holding that defendants were jointly and severally liable for the entire jury verdict sum. The court then held that after the settlement, the amount of recovery had been reduced by $3.35 million, making defendants liable for the remainder of the verdict--$5.51 million in compensatory damages, $1.53 million in interest accrued up to that date, and any interest after that, accruing at a rate of $1,359 per day. 180 Ill.App.3d at 564, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.

Defendants appealed this judgment. The appellate court, in reversing the trial court's ruling, looked to the language of the Contribution Act, which provides that where two or more persons are subject to tort liability to the same person for the same injury, there is a right of contribution among them. (180 Ill.App.3d at 564, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221; Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, par. 302(a); see Rakowski v. Lucente (1984), 104 Ill.2d 317, 322, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 472 N.E.2d 791; see generally M. Polelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law 671-73 (1985) (discussing the Contribution Act).) This right of contribution exists only in favor of tortfeasors who have paid more than their pro rata share of the common liability, and recovery is limited to the amount they have paid in excess of their pro rata share. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, par. 302(b); see Houser v. Witt (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 123, 125, 66 Ill.Dec. 799, 443 N.E.2d 725.

The appellate court focused on section 2(c) of the Contribution Act, which provides that a settlement agreement, made in good faith with one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury, will not discharge any of the remaining joint tortfeasors from liability unless the agreement expressly provides for such a discharge. It further states that the settlement will reduce the amount the other tortfeasors owe by the amount stated in the settlement, or the contribution actually paid, whichever is greater. (180 Ill.App.3d at 564-65, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221, citing Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, par. 302(c).) The appellate court also noted that the Contribution Act expressly provides that a tortfeasor who settles is discharged from all liability for contribution and is not entitled to recover from any tortfeasor who is still liable (180 Ill.App.3d at 565, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221, citing Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, pars. 302(d), (e)), while it maintained that a plaintiff's ability to recover the full amount of the judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in tort for the same injury to the same person is not affected by the Contribution Act. 180 Ill.App.3d at 565, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221, citing Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 70, par. 304.

In its analysis, the appellate court first stated that the function of a court in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the statute's legislative intent. (180 Ill.App.3d at 565, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221, citing Dornfeld v. Julian (1984), 104 Ill.2d 261, 266, 84 Ill.Dec. 471, 472 N.E.2d 431.) The court then analyzed the legal precursors and legislative history of the Contribution Act, concluding that one of the main purposes of the Act was to spread the liability among joint tortfeasors in proportion to the degree each was responsible for the injured party's damages (180 Ill.App.3d at 565-67, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.) Using this as its foundation, the court interpreted the Contribution Act as providing that an injured party who has reduced liability to judgment by verdict in an amount certain and then settles with a tortfeasor who is financially able to satisfy the entire judgment, has to waive the right to enforce any portion of the judgment not corresponding to a nonsettlor's percentage of negligence against any nonsettling tortfeasors, despite the Contribution Act's maintaining an injured party's right to hold all defendants jointly and severally liable. 180 Ill.App.3d at 569-70, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.

The appellate court based much of its reasoning on Bartels v. City of Williston (N.D.1979), 276 N.W.2d 113. (180 Ill.App.3d at 568-69, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221 (the court also relied on a similar case, Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Moody (Ky.1985), 696 S.W.2d 503).) The Bartels court held that joint and several liability exists to benefit the injured party and can be waived by a settlement with a single joint tortfeasor, which serves to limit the injured party's recovery from any remaining tortfeasors to the percentage of negligence attributed to each. (180 Ill.App.3d at 569, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221, citing Bartels, 276 N.W.2d at 122.) The appellate court found a direct correlation between the statutory language cited in Bartels and the Contribution Act, holding that plaintiff waived joint and several liability and that recovery from defendants was limited to the 7% amount attributed to them by the jury. 180 Ill.App.3d at 569-70, 129 Ill.Dec. 537, 536 N.E.2d 221.

We disagree with the appellate court's analysis in the case at bar and therefore reverse. Despite the many issues plaintiff raises on appeal, we need only address the appellate court's incorrect interpretation of the Contribution Act. We hold that an injured party does not waive the right to enforce a judgment against a jointly and severally liable...