Pennsylvania Medical Soc. v. Foster

• Decision Date: 29 May 1992
• Citation: 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 528,608 A.2d 633
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, Petitioner, v. Constance B. FOSTER, Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the Insurance Department; and Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 633

608 A.2d 633

147 Pa.Cmwlth. 528

PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, Petitioner, v. Constance B. FOSTER, Insurance Commissioner of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the Insurance Department;

and Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 11, 1991.

Decided April 29, 1992.

Reconsideration Denied May 29, 1992.

Robert B. Hoffman, for petitioner.

Gregory P. Miller, for respondents.

Before CRAIG, President Judge, DOYLE, COLINS, PALLADINO, McGINLEY, SMITH and PELLEGRINI, JJ.

PALLADINO, Judge.

In our original jurisdiction under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035, Petitioner Pennsylvania Medical Society (Society) has filed a motion for summary judgment based on its interpretations of the newly enacted physician billing and reimbursement provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (Law), 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7. For the following reasons, we deny summary judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 27, 1990, the Society filed a petition for review in the commonwealth court's original jurisdiction. The petition concerned the implementation of section 18 of the Act of February 7, 1990, P.L. 11, Act No. 90-6 ("Act 6") which amended section 1797 of the Law governing the amount and the manner in which a medical services provider can collect fees for the treatment of automobile accident victims. On March 30, 1990, the Society amended its petition for review to include a request for an injunction and five counts averring grounds for a declaratory judgment.

On April 19, 1990, Respondent Attorney General Ernest D. Preate, Jr. (Attorney General) filed preliminary objections to the Society's amended petition and alleged that he was not a necessary party. On April 30, 1990, Respondent Insurance Commissioner Constance B. Foster (Commissioner) also filed preliminary objections to the Society's amended petition. The preliminary objections were consolidated for resolution. By a published opinion and order of January 11, 1991, the commonwealth court (1) sustained the Attorney General's preliminary objections and dismissed the Society's amended petition with respect to the Attorney General, (2) sustained the Commissioner's preliminary objections as to count 4 of the Society's amended petition, and (3) dismissed the Commissioner's preliminary objections as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the Society's amended petition for review. Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Foster, 137 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 192, 585 A.2d 595 (1991). ¹

On May 2, 1991, the Society filed a motion for partial summary judgment on counts 2, 3, and 5 of its amended petition for review. Although the motion expressly requests judgment on counts 2, 3, and 5, the motion implicitly seeks summary judgment on all the remaining counts (counts 1, 2, 3, and 5) of the amended petition because count 1 is indisputably subsumed by count 2. ² The Society's summary judgment motion is now before us for disposition.

II. RIGHT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A grant of summary judgment pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. No. 1035(b) is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Marks v. Tasman, 527 Pa. 132, 589 A.2d 205 (1991); Boyertown Oil Co. v. Osan Manufacturing Co., 356 Pa.Superior Ct. 436, 514 A.2d 938 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 515 Pa. 617, 531 A.2d 426 (1987) (summary judgment standards apply even if summary judgment on whole case or for all the relief asked is improper); Peters Township School Authority v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 78 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 365, 467 A.2d 904 (1983); Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Association v. Thornburgh, 62 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 88, 434 A.2d 1327 (1981), aff'd, 498 Pa. 589, 450 A.2d 613 (1982) (propriety of granting summary judgment in declaratory judgment proceeding when prerequisites for obtaining summary judgment have been satisfied).

In the case before us, there do not exist any disputed material facts. The sole issue is whether the Society possesses a clear right to summary judgment as a matter of law on any or all of the three grounds advanced by the Society: (1) the direct patient billing prohibition and the balance billing prohibition of section 1797 violate substantive due process because they are not rationally related to the purpose of Act 6, (2) the direct patient billing prohibition of section 1797 of the Law violates substantive due process because it is expressed in unconstitutionally vague language, and (3) the payment limits in subsection 1797 have been misinterpreted by the Commissioner and must be interpreted as the Society urges in order to construe the language of subsection 1797 in conformity with the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. ³

III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL OVERBREADTH

First, the Society argues that section 1797 of the Law is unconstitutionally overbroad because the direct patient billing prohibition and the balance billing prohibition of section 1797 are not rationally related to the purpose of Act 6 and therefore violate the substantive due process rights of the Society's members, i.e., physicians.

"The test for substantive due process in the areas of social and economic legislation is whether the challenged law has a rational relation to a valid state objective(s)." Novak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 73 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 148, 153, 457 A.2d 610, 612 (1983); Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954). An overbroad statute violates substantive due process by depriving a person of a constitutionally protected interest through means which are not rationally related to a valid state objective because they "sweep unnecessarily broadly." Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Association of Western Pennsylvania, 453 Pa. 60, 72, 311 A.2d 634, 640 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 870, 38 L.Ed.2d 755 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Pennsylvania Medical Society.

A. Protected Interest

The Society contends that section 1797 of the Law violates physicians' substantive due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by unreasonably interfering with physicians' liberty and property interests in the practice of their profession. ⁴

"It is axiomatic that for due process rights to attach there must first be a deprivation of a property right or other similar interest" which is constitutionally protected. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Insurance Department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 137 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 299, 309 n. 7, 585 A.2d 1160, 1165 n. 7 (1991). The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution states that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that "[a]ll men ... have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending ... liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property ... and of pursuing their own happiness."

In Brady v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 79 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 608, 471 A.2d 572, appeal dismissed, 506 Pa. 83, 483 A.2d 1376 (1984), we concluded that, after a license to practice a particular profession is acquired, the licensed professional has a protected property right to practice that profession. Accord Gambone; Pennsylvania Medical Society. In Pennsylvania Chiropractic Federation v. Foster, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 465, 583 A.2d 844 (1990), and in Pennsylvania Medical Providers Association v. Foster, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 232, 582 A.2d 888 (1990), we acknowledged that the right to practice a profession is also a protected liberty right. Accord Adler; Gambone.

Accordingly, we hold that, within the scope of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Society's members (physicians) possess a protected interest in the practice of their profession. Nevertheless, the right to practice a chosen profession is subject to the lawful exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals by promulgating statutes which reasonably regulate occupations. Adler; Gambone; Pennsylvania Medical Society.

B. Valid State Objective

To constitute a lawful exercise of the state's police power, a socioeconomic statute must first be directed toward a valid state objective. Gambone; Novak.

In Pennsylvania Chiropractic Federation, we determined that "restructuring the regulation of motor vehicle insurance in the Commonwealth and reducing the cost of insurance to policy holders" was the legislative purpose of Act 6 and, consequently, of section 1797 of the Law as amended by Act 6. Id., 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 474, 583 A.2d at 848; accord Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. Furthermore, in Pennsylvania Medical Society, we reasoned that the regulation and cost reduction of motor vehicle insurance in Pennsylvania pursuant to Act 6 and amended section 1797 of the Law was a legitimate state objective consistent with the Commonwealth's police power to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare.

Therefore, we have held and continue to hold that the motor vehicle insurance regulation and cost reduction purpose of Act 6 and section 1797 of the Law, as amended by Act 6, constitute a valid state objective. However, to withstand a substantive due process challenge, a statute must seek to achieve a valid state objective by means that are rationally related to the objective. Gambone; Novak.

C. Rational Relationship to Objective

"The rational relationship standard of substantive...