706 F.3d 209 (3rd Cir. 2013), 11-4206, Connelly v. Steel Valley School Dist.
|Citation:||706 F.3d 209|
|Opinion Judge:||HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.|
|Party Name:||Patrick S. CONNELLY, Appellant, v. The STEEL VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT.|
|Attorney:||Samuel J. Cordes, [Argued], Christine T. Elzer, Samuel J. Cordes & Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. William C. Andrews, Anthony G. Sanchez, [Argued], Amie A. Thompson, Andrews & Price, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant-Appellee.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||January 24, 2013|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit|
Argued Oct. 24, 2012.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
The question presented by this appeal is whether a Pennsylvania public school district violates the Constitution when it sets teacher salaries based, in part, on prior in-state teaching experience. We hold it does not.
In September 2006, the Steel Valley School District hired Patrick Connelly as a sixth grade teacher. Steel Valley pays its teachers pursuant to a salary scale based on their education and years of experience. At the time he was hired, Connelly had nine years of teaching experience— all in Maryland. Because Connelly acquired his teaching experience outside Pennsylvania, however, Steel Valley credited him with
only one year. Other new teachers with like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not at Steel Valley) received at least partial credit for each year they had taught.
Because Steel Valley gave Connelly only one year of credit, his initial annual salary was $38,023, which was substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would have received had Steel Valley given him full credit for his experience. As time passed, Connelly's initial salary determination continued to adversely affect his pay. During the 2010-11 academic year, Connelly's salary was approximately $22,000 less than it would have been had he received full credit in 2006.
In June 2011, Connelly filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania asserting two Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Connelly argued that Steel Valley's failure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal protection of the law. The District Court granted Steel Valley's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Connelly " does not state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the classification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency." Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., No. 11-851, 2011 WL 5024415, at *2 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 20, 2011). The Court dismissed Connelly's complaint with prejudice, holding that any amendment would be futile. Id. at *8. This appeal followed.
We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir.2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide " more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must allege " enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. This standard requires the plaintiff to show " more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Twombly and Iqbal require us to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly claims Steel Valley's salary scale impaired his right to travel interstate in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV (as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment) and
the Equal Protection Clause. We review both of Connelly's claims under the same standard because " the right to interstate travel finds its ‘ most forceful expression in the context of equal protection analysis.’ " Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982)(Brennan, J., concurring)).
We begin by considering which equal protection standard governs our review of Steel Valley's pay scale. The parties vigorously dispute this point because the standard of review ( i.e., rational basis review or strict scrutiny) is often outcome determinative. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-30, at 1089 (1st ed.1978) (noting strict scrutiny is a " virtual death-blow" ); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-2, at 1442-43 (2d ed. 1988) (" The traditional deference both to legislative purpose and to legislative selections among means continues ... to make the rationality requirement largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality." ). As Connelly correctly notes, Steel Valley set his salary based on a classification that paid those with in-state teaching experience more than those with out-of-state experience. He argues that because this classification " serves to penalize the exercise of his right to migrate," it should be subject to strict scrutiny. Steel Valley counters that rational basis review applies.
The state's creation of a classification is not " per se unconstitutional or automatically subject to heightened judicial scrutiny." Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir.1998). If a " classification ‘ neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.’ " Id. (quoting Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)) (alteration omitted). However, " a classification that trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage ... must meet the strict scrutiny standard, under which a law must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest." Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1266 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Connelly does not argue that Steel Valley's classification affects a suspect class, so strict scrutiny will apply only if it burdens a fundamental right. The right to interstate travel has been recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630, 638, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The Court has also noted that the right to travel has at least three components: (1) " the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State" ; (2) " the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State" ; and (3) " for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999). The parties agree that Connelly's claim implicates only the third Saenz component. Therefore, we must determine whether Steel Valley's experience-based classification penalized Connelly's fundamental right to be treated like other Pennsylvania citizens. See Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986)(" A state law implicates the right travel when ... it uses ‘ any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.’ " (quoting
In this regard, we have recognized that strict scrutiny applies only when the state creates " ‘ distinctions between newcomers and longer term residents.’ " Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1267 (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309); see also Maldonado, 157 F.3d at 181-82, 190 (finding Pennsylvania law limiting amount of welfare benefits a family could receive during its first twelve months in the state triggered strict scrutiny). In other words, strict scrutiny applies when the state conditions the receipt of certain government benefits on the duration of the recipient's residence in the state. See Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1267 (analyzing the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of residency-based distinctions). As the District Court correctly noted, in a line of cases implicating the fundamental right to...
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