McClure v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 31 October 1880
• Citation: 72 Mo. 314
• Parties: MCCLURE, Appellant, v. LEWIS.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

72 Mo. 314

MCCLURE, Appellant,

v.LEWIS.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1880.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

REVERS

Cline, Jamison & Day for appellant.

All contracts between guardian and ward, which are avorable to the guardian and injurious to the ward, are presumptively void. Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465; Yosti v. Laughran, 49 Mo. 594, Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483; Ranken v. Patton, 65 Mo. 378; Perry on Trusts, § 195; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 199; Espey v. Lake, 10 Hare 260. This principle applies to all cases where there is weakness and confidence on the one side, and strength, position and abuse of confidence on the other. Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio St. 484, 509; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188, 192; Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare 540; Story's Eq., §§ 312, 332; Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 350; Evans v. Llewellin, 1 Cox's Chan. Cas. 333; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266, 278; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Dessau. 651.

While mere inadequacy of consideration money is not in itself sufficient to set aside a bargain, yet, when there is other evidence of fraud or undue influence, this also becomes evidence of such wrong dealing, and is entitled to consideration. Baker v. Monk, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 691; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Dessau. 651; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. 530; Bunch v. Hurst, 3 Dessau. 273; Dunnage v. White, 1 Swanst. 137; Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 418; Dally v. Wonham, 33 Beav. 154.

Dryden & Dryden for respondent, argued that there was nothing in the evidence tending in the remotest degree to prove either actual fraud, or constructive fraud--examining in detail the following questions: 1. Had the plaintiff intrusted her business and property to defendant, as alleged in the bill, or did any relation of trust or confidence exist between them? 2. Had the plaintiff's mind become so impaired as to render her incapable of taking care of her affairs, or of understanding the nature or value of her property? 3. Had the defendant acquired a controlling influence over the mind or will of the plaintiff? 4. Were the deed and lease brought about by constraint or undue influence of the defendant over the mind and will of the plaintiff, or were they the result of the free and unrestrained exercise of the plaintiff's will? 5. Were the two instruments made without consideration as alleged? Or were they made upon a valuable consideration, and did the plaintiff know and understand the nature of the business she was engaged in when making them?

If it were possible from the evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the deed and lease were procured by the improper means charged, yet, nevertheless the plaintiff by reason of laches would not be entitled to equitable relief. Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio 69, 73, 74; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 62; Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 22 How. 391; Gilbert v. Hunnewell, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 289; Herrin v. Libbey, 36 Me. 350; DeArmand v. Phillips, Walk. Ch. (Mich.) 199; Lacey v. McMillen, 9 B. Mon. 525; Ayers v. Mitchell, 3 S. & M. 683; Davis v. James, 4 J. J. Marsh. 8; Lawrence v. Dale, 3 John. Ch. 23; Landrum v. Union Bank, 63 Mo. 56.

He who asks equity must do equity. This rule requires that upon the rescission of a contract, whether for fraud or for other cause, the party disaffirming the contract must return whatever he has received upon it. Masson v. Bovet, supra; Tisdale v. Buckmore, 33 Me. 461; Herrin v. Libbey, 36 Me. 350. The bill is faulty in not offering to do equity.

Where a party who seeks to set aside a transaction on the ground of fraud has so dealt with the property as to render it impossible to place the other party in statu quo, equity will not relieve. Anglesey v. Annesley, 1 Bro. P. C. 289; King v. Hamlet, 2 Mylne & Keen 481; Lacey v. McMillen, 9 B. Mon. 523. The defendant was induced by the solicitations of the plaintiff to expend large sums in improving the property. Without the return of these with interest, the parties could not be placed in statu quo.

HENRY, J.

Lewis is the husband of a niece of the plaintiff, who, after the death of her two brothers, went to live with Lewis and his wife, on a farm in St. Louis county. She had, for many years, been in very delicate health. Her brother John died in the spring, and her brother Francis in the fall, of 1871. She and these brothers, neither of whom had ever married, had lived together for many years, in great love and harmony, and their death seriously affected her, and aggravated the complication of diseases of which she had long been a sufferer. After she went to live with defendant, and while there, she was a great part of the time bed-ridden. Mrs. Gordon, an older sister, mother of Mrs. Lewis, also resided with Lewis, and occupied an adjoining room to that of the plaintiff. The plaintiff owned a tract of 122 78-100 acres of land in St. Louis county, and a valuable lot in the city, of the value of about $16,000. Early in January, 1872, about three months after the death of her brother Francis, she executed a deed, conveying to the defendant all of the above property, reserving to herself a life estate, for the consideration of love and affection, and at the same time leased to the defendant for her life, the entire property at $400 per annum.

This suit was to set aside said conveyance and lease, plaintiff alleging that they were procured through fraud and undue influence. The facts relied upon to establish the allegations, and which were established by the evidence, were, that she was and had been greatly afflicted for a number of years, in consequence of which, together with the recent death of her brothers, betwixt whom and herself there was a very warm attachment, her mind was seriously impaired. While the evidence does not prove that she was insane, or an imbecile, it very conclusively establishes an impairment of the intellectual powers, as a result of long continued bodily ailments, and after the death of her brothers, a condition of mind bordering on insanity, continuing to the time of the execution of the deed and lease. The business of executing the deed and lease was hurried through by the defendant, after her consent to make them was obtained, without the knowledge of any of her friends, even the sister who occupied an adjoining room being kept in ignorance of the transaction, and instead of the attorneys who had always been employed by her brothers to transact their legal business, and whom on a former occasion, she had employed in her own business, the defendant had the papers prepared by a very competent lawyer, but a stranger to the plaintiff, and one whom defendant himself had never employed before, and whose office was in the same building with that of Messrs. Cline, Jamison & Day, the attorneys of plaintiff's brothers while they lived. It is evident from the testimony of Mr. Babcock, who prepared the nveyance, that he thought there was something wrong in the transaction. He does not say so expressly, but he took unusual precautions to inform Miss McClure of the contents of the deed by reading it to her slowly and distinctly, when he well knew it was no part of his duty to do so, if it was her voluntary act, and she was in a condition to perform it. It was not at all incumbent upon him to explain, or even read it to her, unless she requested it. She was taken from a sick bed, as she and her sister both testify, at an inclement season of the year, a distance of ten or twelve miles, to execute the conveyance. Mr. Babcock testifies that the defendant had previously come to his office and requested him to prepare the papers, stating that the plaintiff was then able to attend to the business, but that he did not know how long she would be able to do so; was in a hurry to close up the business, and said plaintiff was also anxious on the subject. Mr. Lewis, in his testimony, contradicts Mr. Babcock, but he has a very considerable interest in the controversy, while Mr. Babcock has none whatever.

While there was no technical relation of trust between the parties, a relation of intimacy and kindred was established between the plaintiff and Lewis and his wife, which enabled the latter, if so disposed, to influence the plaintiff, who lived in their house as one of the family, and was greatly dependent upon them for society and comfort, and attached to Mrs. Lewis more than to any other of her relatives. Lewis and his wife were very kind to plaintiff, and however sincere and disinterested their kindness, it was calculated to and did give them an influence over her possessed by no one else. Mrs. Lewis says in her testimony that she first made the proposition to convey to him the property. She says on the contrary, that one evening, after the lamp was lit in her room, her niece, Mary Emily Lewis, wife of defendant, came in, put her hand on plaintiff's head, and, kissing her, said: “Aunt, I am very grateful for what I hear you are going to do for me.” I said “what Mary?” She said “I hear you are going to give me your property.” I said, “why?” She said “she heard it.” Mr. Lewis testifies that the first he ever knew of Miss McClure wanting to make any disposition of the property, was through his wife. Miss McClure is not contradicted but rather corroborated on this point by this testimony. If any one had informed Mrs. Lewis that her aunt intended to convey the property to her, that person's testimony on the subject would have been important, and in the absence of such evidence, it is a reasonable inference that the subject was not mentioned or talked of by Miss McClure to or with any one except Lewis and his wife. Here, then, an old lady, fifty-two years of age, a confirmed invalid, broken down with disease in body and mind, gloomy and hysterical, is induced by a young man in the enjoyment o health, his mental faculties unimpaired, to convey to him, in hot haste, a tract of land and a valuable city lot, all she possessed, for a sum of money not exceeding one-eighth of...