Ranken v. Patton

• Decision Date: 31 October 1877
• Citation: 65 Mo. 378
• Parties: RANKEN ET AL., APPELLANTS v. PATTON ET AL.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

65 Mo. 378

RANKEN ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.PATTON ET AL.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1877.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

The case was tried at special term, before HON. JAMES J. LINDLEY, one of the judges.

Hitchcock, Lubke & Player for appellants.

Appellants submit the following as the correct propositions of law applicable to this case, and the proof appearing in the record, together with some of the many decisions supporting the same:

(A.) This deed cannot be permitted to stand in equity if it appear--

a. That the beneficiaries thereunder had in fact occupied towards the donor a relation quasi parental or otherwise intimate or confidential, if by reason of such relation they had in fact acquired or might have acquired control or strong personal influence over her; and this principle applies in every case or description of intercourse where from the facts in proof it appears that such relation existed, and that such influence was or might be obtained by reason of the same; unless the beneficiaries under said deed shall have fully satisfied the court beyond all doubt or suspicion, that such relation between said parties had not only in name but in fact completely ceased, so that the donor was able to act and did act in the premises with absolute freedom from any such influence, and perfectly free, independent and unbiased; and, unless also, they shall have proved, beyond all doubt or suspicion, that the donor in making such alleged gift was in fact completely informed of the extent of her interest in the property affected or disposed of by such conveyance, and did both intelligently and voluntarily part with the same upon the fullest deliberation and under circumstances which completely satisfy the court of the most abundant good faith on the part of the donee. And even though the donor, at the time of the gift, had attained her legal majority, yet if the intimate relations in question, continued up to the time in question, or even if such relations (having previously been of a quasiparental character) had but recently terminated, then, also, the foregoing doctrine applies in full force: Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 476; S. C. 50 Mo. 211; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 496; Yosti v. Laughran, 49 Mo. 598; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Vesey 300; S. C. 3 Wh. & T. L. C. Eq. 119, 123; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beavan 299; Gale v. Wells, 12 Barb. 84; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 267; Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 240; Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C. Rep. 397, 400, approved8 How. 201; Fish v. Miller, 1 Hoffm. Ch. 270; Gaither v. Gaither, 20 Ga. 721; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 523; Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. R. 419; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 474; Furnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 234; Wood v. Downes, 18 Vesey 127; Maitland v. Irving, 15 Simon 437; Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Price 169; Mellish v. Mellish, 1 Sim. & Stu. 145; Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sen. 547; Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 138; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 258, 307, 308, 311, 313, 317, 320, 323; Richardson v. Linney, 7 B. Monr. 573.

(B.) Furthermore, in weighing the evidence to which the foregoing propositions are to be applied, the court will adopt and act upon the following principles established in cases such as below cited:

1. That the existence, (either at the time of the alleged gift, or at a recent previous period,) of such a relation between the donor and donees as above supposed being proved, the invariable presumption of law is that the act of bounty under such circumstances was procured by fraud or undue influence; that such presumption arises from the mere relation of the parties without further proof. Butler v. Haskell, 4 Dessaussure 704; Harvey v. Mount, 8 Beav. 452; Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190; Gaither v. Gaither, 20 Ga. 721; Sears v. Shafer, 1 Barbour (N. Y.) 417; Griffiths v. Robins, 3 Mad. 105; Richardson v. Linney, 7 B. Monr. 573; Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 371.

2. That such presumption having once arisen by the mere proof of such relations between the parties as above stated, the court will view the whole transaction with “an almost invincible jealousy,” and will require of the defendants “clear and distinct evidence,” which shall completely “overthrow and repel the presumption which the law so raises.” Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 297; Dawson v. Massey, 1 Ball & B. 232; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 502; Aylward v. Kearney 2 Ball & B. 478; 1 Story's Eq. Ju. §§ 319--20, and cases cited. It must be shown not merely that the person likely to be influenced fully understood the act he was performing, but also that his consent to perform that act was not obtained by reason of the influence possessed by the person receiving the benefit. Per Romilly, M. R. in Hoghton v. Hoghton 15 Bev. 299.

3. That such evidence must in all cases be furnished by the beneficiary; ordinary rules of evidence as to the burden of proof being reversed by the rule of equity, which presumes fraud from the existence of confidential relations between the parties and benefit to the party having or who may have influence over the other. 1 Story Eq. Jur. § 311; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 300; S. C. 3 Wh. & T. L. C. Eq. 119; Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190; Greenfield's estate, 14 Pa. St. 489; Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick. 115.

4. That in addition to the presumption of fraud or undue influence so raised by the law from the mere relation of the parties, the court will take notice of other circumstances as in themselves furnishing additional presumption of fraud or undue influence, and as “intensifying” the presumption of fraud arising from the relation of the parties.

Among these circumstances are--

a. Improvidence in the transaction or unreasonableness in the act or amount of the gift, all things considered. 1 Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 118, 119, and cases cited; Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wms. 321; Evans v. Llewellyn, 1 Cox 340; Buffalow v. Buffalow, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 252; Harvey v. Mount, 8 Beav. 439; Blackie v. Clark, 15 Beav. 600; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Myl. & Cr. 273; 3 Wh. & T. L. C. Eq. p. 122.

b. The non-intervention of a disinterested third party or professional adviser for the protection of the donor and in a manner wholly independent of the donees; a fortiori if it appear that the donor, whether from ignorance or inexperience or because of her previous or existing relations with the donees was unlikely to act with perfect freedom and independence in default of such aid. Revett v. Harvey, 1 Sim. & Stu. 502; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 243-4; Sears v. Shafer, 1 Barbour (N. Y.) 415; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Myl. & Cr. 273; Dawson v. Massey, 1 Ball & Beat. 235; Griffiths v. Robins, 3 Mad. Ch. 105; Buffalow v. Buffalow, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 253.

c. The fact that at the time of the alleged gift the donor was a member of the family of the donees and in daily intercourse with them; a fortiori if there be any evidence tending to show that the donees in the least degree took advantage of such family intercourse or the opportunity it afforded. Harvey v. Mount, 8 Beav. 447; Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 558; Aylward v. Kearney, 2 Ball & B. 478; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Vesey 297.

d. A belief or impression on the mind of the donor that she was under some moral obligation (other than the spontaneous impulse of affection or gratitude) so to benefit the donees, it also appearing that such belief affected her conduct while no such obligation really existed; a fortiori if such belief or impression was either caused or encouraged by the donees or by others to their advantage with their knowledge and connivance or consent. Taylor v. Taylor, 8 Howard 199; Sears v. Shafer, 2 Selden 268; Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C. Rep. 400; Boney v. Hollingsworth, 23 Ala. 700.

e. Failure on the part of the donees (it appearing that they could have done so) to take in good faith such steps as were requisite to completely inform the donor of the actual extent of the interests affected or surrendered by her gift and of the complete effect and consequences of her proposed bounty; and also to remove from her mind any such mistaken impression of obligation as above referred to if the same to their knowledge existed. Kay v. Smith, 21 Beav. 522; Fish v. Miller, 1 Hoffm. Ch. 270; Dally v. Wonham, 33 Beav. 154.

f. Evidence tending to show that the donor in making the alleged gift was in fact influenced by the hope of securing from the donees ulterior advantage already due to herself from the donees and in their power, and which they withheld.

(C.) Independently of the above, if even in the absence of any proof of actual fraud, the gift should appear to have been made under circumstances of improvidence or under circumstances of surprise in the sense of those terms respectively, which is recognized and declared by courts of equity, then without reference to the question of actual fraud the gift cannot stand. 1 Stor. Eq. Jur. §§ 117-120, and cases cited; Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wms. 321; Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav. 56; Evans v. Llewellyn, 1 Cox, 340.

(D.) Further, even had the plaintiffs wholly failed on the proof to establish either actual or constructive fraud or undue influence against the defendants Mary and Sarah Patton personally (which failure appellants deny), yet on the proof made of the actual improvidence and ignorance of the (real) plaintiff in making the gift, and of the constructive fraud established as against Thomas R. Patton by his own letters in evidence, the actual donees cannot be permitted in equity to profit by a wrong so committed for their benefit and with their knowledge; and this on grounds of public policy. Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. sen. 627; Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cowen 578; Harris v. Delamar, 3 Iredell Eq. 221; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 249; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 256; 3 White & T. L. C. Eq. 151.

Sam. Reber for respondents.

The case may be considered under two heads:

1. Duress and fraud in fact.

2. Fraud in law, or constructive fraud.

I. The petition makes numerous and...