Bell v. Board of Education

• Decision Date: 26 October 1999
• Docket Number: (AC 18207)
• Citation: 739 A.2d 321,55 Conn. App. 400
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: ELIZABETH BELL ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF WEST HAVEN ET AL.

55 Conn. App. 400

739 A.2d 321

ELIZABETH BELL ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF WEST HAVEN ET AL.

(AC 18207)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 23, 1999.

Officially released October 26, 1999.

Lavery, Landau and Spear, JS.

John R. Williams, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Floyd J. Dugas, for the appellees (defendants).

Patrice McCarthy and Joan Libby filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.

Opinion

LANDAU, J.

The plaintiffs¹ appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of the defendants'² motion to strike the nine counts of the plaintiffs' complaint. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the court improperly granted the motion to strike. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse it in part.

The complaint alleges educational malpractice,³ negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, counts one through three allege educational malpractice, counts four through six allege negligence, and counts seven through nine allege intentional infliction of emotional distress.⁴ In their motion to strike, the defendants argued that the first six counts of the complaint fail to set forth a legally cognizable cause of action. Specifically, the defendants argued that the first six counts concerning negligence⁵ and educational malpractice essentially state a claim for educational malpractice, a claim our Supreme Court declined to recognize in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).⁶ Furthermore, the defendants argued in their motion to strike that the plaintiffs, in the last three counts of their complaint, do not allege conduct that is sufficiently outrageous to survive the motion to strike, and that a mere conclusion is insufficient, as a matter of law, to set out a legally sufficient cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

For purposes of this appeal, we take as true the following facts alleged in the complaint. See Sassone v. Lepore, 226 Conn. 773, 780, 629 A.2d 357 (1993). During the school years of September, 1994, through June, 1995, and September, 1995, through June, 1996, the defendant board of education of the city of West Haven budgeted funds for curriculum development, but expended those funds for other purposes and had no standardized curriculum for elementary schools. During that time, the defendant Ellen Fenty-Morrison was the principal at the Alma E. Pagels School (Pagels School) and the instructional leader there. As such, Fenty-Morrison set and controlled the educational policies at the school and imposed on the children a teaching method (responsive classroom method) that the Northeast Foundation for Children, which also employs Fenty-Morrison, sold to them. This method, implemented by Fenty-Morrison, emphasizes social skills at the expense of discipline and academics. Fenty-Morrison has stated publicly that she "does not believe in rewarding academic excellence," and she imposed this philosophy at the school during the 1994 through 1996 school years.

The plaintiffs further allege that during those school years, the Pagels School was the only public school in West Haven subjected to the entire responsive classroom method. Furthermore, during these school years, the defendants encouraged, created and tolerated an atmosphere of chaos, disruptiveness and violence at the school so that the children were exposed on a daily basis to so much physical and verbal violence that it became a place of fear. As such, learning at the school could not and did not take place in any meaningful sense. As a result, the plaintiffs' minor children were deprived of an education comparable to that available to other children of their age attending different elementary schools in West Haven and elsewhere in Connecticut. "The standard of review for granting a motion to strike is well settled. In an appeal from a judgment following the granting of a motion to strike, we must take as true the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint and must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Sassone v. Lepore, [supra, 226 Conn. 780]; Michaud v. Wawruck, 209 Conn. 407, 408, 551 A.2d 738 (1988). Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 822, 676 A.2d 357 (1996). A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded. See Practice Book § [10-39]. A determination regarding the legal sufficiency of a claim is, therefore, a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Accordingly, our review is plenary. Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 232, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S. Ct. 1106, 137 L. Ed.2d 308 (1997). Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 68, 700 A.2d 655 (1997). If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.... Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 33 n.4, 675 A.2d 852 (1996).... Knight v. F. L. Roberts & Co., 241 Conn. 466, 470-71, 696 A.2d 1249 (1997).... Pamela B. v. Merit, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Emerick v. Kuhn, 52 Conn. App. 724, 728-29, 737 A.2d 456, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 929, 738 A.2d 653 (1999).

I

The plaintiffs first assert that the trial court improperly granted the motion to strike as to their educational malpractice claim.⁷ We disagree. The plaintiffs argued in opposition to the defendants' motion to strike the counts of the complaint alleging educational malpractice that because our Supreme Court in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 574, recognized certain exceptional circumstances in which it would entertain such causes of action, that court did not apply the jurisprudential reservations about requiring courts to make determinations of educational reasonableness, which the defendants claimed militated against recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice. The plaintiffs argued (1) that the reservations constituted dicta only and (2) that, because the Gupta court indicated that there were two exceptional situations in which it would entertain such litigation, it would be inappropriate to strike their educational malpractice claims at this early stage. The trial court rejected those arguments and granted the defendants' motion to strike.

In Gupta, our Supreme Court joined the vast majority of states that have rejected educational malpractice claims sounding in tort.⁸ Specifically, the court noted, albeit in dicta, that a claim for educational malpractice "raise[s] questions concerning the reasonableness of conduct by educational institutions in providing particular educational services to students—questions that must be answered by reference to principles of duty, standards of care, and reasonable conduct associated with the law of torts. Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). Because these tort principles are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the academic environment, courts have almost universally held that claims of educational malpractice are not cognizable. Among other problems for adjudication, these claims involve the judiciary in the awkward tasks of defining what constitutes a reasonable educational program and of deciding whether that standard has been breached. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) (finding no conceivable workability of a rule of care against which [teachers'] alleged conduct may be measured). In entertaining such claims, moreover, courts are required not merely to make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies ... but, more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of these policies. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, [47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 590-91.⁹

The Gupta court stated that the "jurisprudential considerations that shed doubt on the viability of the tort of educational malpractice also inform our analysis of a contract claim based on inadequate educational services." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 591. The court noted, however, that a cause of action for institutional breach of contract for educational services exists in at least two situations. Id., 592. "The first would be exemplified by a showing that the educational program failed in some fundamental respect, as by not offering any of the courses necessary to obtain certification in a particular field. See Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 452, 725 P.2d 155 (1986); Ross v. Creighton University, [957 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1992)]. The second would arise if the educational institution failed to fulfill a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program. See, e.g., Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, supra, 868 P.2d 399; Paladino v. Adelphi University, [89 App. Div.2d 85, 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982)]." Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 592-93.

The plaintiffs argue that the allegations of this case fit within the first exception. The plaintiffs, however, incorrectly interpret Gupta. In Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 590-91, our Supreme Court joined the vast majority of other states that have rejected the tort of educational malpractice. See footnote 6. The court did not recognize any exceptions in the context of the tort of educational malpractice, but instead clearly articulated that the two narrow exceptions that it set forth applied in the breach of contract context. In the present matter, the plaintiffs'...