Kilauea Neighborhood Ass'n v. Land Use Com'n of State of Hawaii

• Decision Date: 11 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 11884,11884
• Citation: 7 Haw.App. 227,751 P.2d 1031
• Parties: KILAUEA NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The LAND USE COMMISSION OF the STATE OF HAWAII, Foster Petroleum Corporation, the State of Hawaii Department of Planning and Economic Development, the County of Kauai Planning Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

Page 1031

751 P.2d 1031

7 Haw.App. 227

KILAUEA NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The LAND USE COMMISSION OF the STATE OF HAWAII, Foster Petroleum Corporation, the State of Hawaii Department of Planning and Economic Development, the County of Kauai Planning Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11884.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

March 11, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The standard of review of an administrative agency's decision is the same for both the circuit court and the appellate court.

2. An agency's findings of fact are reviewable for clear error, while its conclusions of law are freely reviewable.

3. The question whether an agency's determination is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is a question of law.

4. An agency's findings are not clearly erroneous and will be upheld if supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, unless the reviewing court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.

5. An agency's decision carries a presumption of validity, and the appellant has the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that the decision is invalid because it is unreasonable and unjust in its consequences.

6. An agency's findings must be sufficient to allow the reviewing court to track the steps by which the agency reached its decision.

7. Under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 205-4(g), the Land Use Commission is required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when acting upon a petition for reclassification.

8. As a general rule, mere recapitulations of evidence do not constitute findings of fact.

9. Where an administrative agency's findings indicate that the agency complied with the statutory provisions regarding the consideration and observance of statutory policies and criteria governing its decision and the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the agency's decision will not be overturned.

10. Judicial review of an administrative agency's decision is confined to the record of the agency's proceedings.

11. Under HRS § 91-14(e), a court in reviewing an agency decision has the discretion to order the agency to take additional evidence. The decision to order the agency to do so or not is a discretionary one and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse.

Donald H. Wilson (Steven A. Levine, with him on briefs), Lihue, for plaintiff-appellant.

Clinton I. Shiraishi (Shiraishi & Yamada, of counsel), Lihue, Kauai, for Foster Petroleum.

Benjamin M. Matsubara (Edsel M. Yamada, with him on briefs; Ukishima, Matsubara, Lee & Kotake, of counsel), Honolulu, for Land Use Comn.

Everett S. Kaneshige, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for Dept. of Planning and Economic Development.

Lorna A. Nishimitsu, Deputy Co. Atty., Lihue, Kauai, for Kauai County.

Before BURNS, C.J., HEEN, J., and Circuit Judge PHILIP T. CHUN in place of Associate Judge TANAKA, excused.

HEEN, Judge.

Appellant Kilauea Neighborhood Association (Kilauea) appeals from the November 14, 1986 circuit court judgment which affirms Defendant State of Hawaii Land Use Commission's (LUC) December 2, 1985 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order (Decision), reclassifying 15 acres of land in Kilauea, Kauai, from agricultural to urban. ¹

Kilauea contends that the circuit court erred (1) in holding that the findings of fact of the LUC were not clearly erroneous; and (2) in denying its motion for leave to present additional evidence. We affirm.

I.

On July 9, 1984, Appellee Foster Petroleum Corporation (Foster) filed a petition pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 205-4 (1976) with the LUC to reclassify approximately 28 acres of land in Kilauea from agricultural to urban. Foster proposes to develop the land for light industrial use. The property covered by the application consists of a parcel of approximately 25 acres (Site One) and a smaller separate 3-acre parcel (Site Two) which was proposed as a buffer zone between Site One and the town of Kilauea. Kilauea was allowed to intervene in the proceedings.

The Decision, which approved reclassification for only 15 acres in Site One, and denied reclassification for the remainder of Site One and all of Site Two, consists of 41 numbered findings of fact and a section titled "Conclusions of Law" containing two unnumbered paragraphs.

Kilauea appealed to the fifth circuit court and there filed a motion for leave to present additional evidence to the LUC. The motion was denied and the circuit court affirmed the Decision. Kilauea appealed.

II.

The standard of review of an administrative agency's decision is set forth in HRS § 91-14 (1985). Our review of the circuit court judgment regarding the agency's decision is governed by the same standards. Protect Ala Wai Skyline v. Land Use and Control, 6 Haw.App. 540, 735 P.2d 950 (1987). An agency's findings of fact are reviewable for clear error, while its conclusions of law are freely reviewable. Id. The question whether an agency's determination is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is a question of law. Thus, the accuracy of the label affixed by the agency is freely reviewable by reviewing courts. See Molokoa Village Development Co., Ltd. v. Kauai Electric Co., Ltd., 60 Haw. 582, 593 P.2d 375 (1979). An agency's findings are not clearly erroneous and will be upheld if supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, In re Application of Kaanapali Water Corp., 5 Haw.App. 71, 678 P.2d 584 (1984), unless the reviewing court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Agsalud, 65 Haw. 146, 648 P.2d 1107 (1982). Our review is further subject to the principle that an agency's decision carries a presumption of validity, and the appellant has the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that the decision is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. Williams v. Hawaii Housing Authority, 5 Haw.App. 325, 690 P.2d 285 (1984). An agency's findings must be sufficient to allow the reviewing court to track the steps by which the agency reached its decision. See Nani Koolau Co. v. K & M Construction, Inc., 5 Haw.App. 137, 681 P.2d 580 (1984).

The question here is whether the LUC's findings of fact and conclusions of law indicate that the Decision meets the requirements of HRS chapter 205 (1976). ²

We must determine, first, precisely what findings of fact are required to be made by the LUC.

III.

HRS § 205-4 (1976) sets forth the procedures to be followed in amending district boundaries. Under § 205-4(g), the LUC is required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when acting upon a petition for reclassification. HRS § 205-4(h) provides:

(h) No amendment of a land use district boundary shall be approved unless the commission finds upon the clear preponderance of the evidence that the proposed boundary is reasonable, not violative of section 205-2 and consistent with the interim policies and criteria established pursuant to section 205-16.1, or any state plan enacted by the legislature which plan shall supersede any interim guidance policies. ³ [Footnote added.]

Pending enactment of the state plan, the legislature adopted an interim land use guidance policy in HRS § 205-16.1 (Supp.1984), and provided that in making any land use district boundary changes the LUC "shall observe and comply" with those policies. ⁴ The interim policies established in § 205-16.1 are:

(1) Land use amendment shall be approved only as reasonably necessary to accommodate growth and development, provided there are no significant adverse effects upon agricultural, natural, environmental, recreational, scenic, historic, or other resources of the area.

(2) Lands to be reclassified as an urban district shall have adequate public services and facilities or as can be so provided at reasonable costs to the petitioner.

(3) Maximum use shall be made of existing services and facilities, and scattered urban development shall be avoided.

(4) Urban districts shall be contiguous to an existing urban district or shall constitute all or a part of a self-contained urban center.

(5) Preference shall be given to amendment petitions which will provide permanent employment, or needed housing accessible to existing or proposed employment centers, or assist in providing a balanced housing supply for all economic and social groups.

(6) In establishing the boundaries of the districts in each county, the commission shall give consideration to the general plan of the county.

(7) Insofar as practicable conservation lands shall not be reclassified as urban lands.

(8) The commission is encouraged to reclassify urban lands which are incompatible with the interim statewide land use guidance policy or are not developed in a timely manner. ⁵ [Footnote added.]

Thus, § 205-4(h) emphatically directs the LUC that in order to make a boundary change it must specifically find that the change is reasonable, is not violative of the provisions of § 205-2, and is consistent with the policies and criteria in § 205-16.1. Clearly those findings are essential and fundamental to the Decision. Additionally, in order to allow this court to track the steps by which the LUC reached its finding that a land use boundary amendment complies with the provisions of § 205-16.1, we deem it necessary for the LUC to make findings on the pertinent criteria established there. Such findings are subsidiary findings of basic facts and are necessary to support the ultimate finding that the criteria of § 205-16.1 have been met. Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board v. United Public Workers, 66 Haw. 461, 667 P.2d 783 (1983).

In our view, § 205-4(h)'s requirement that the LUC find that the reclassification is not violative of § 205-2 presents a different situation. The provisions of HRS § 205-2 are far more general in nature and do not lend themselves to the more precise findings required to show compliance with §...