State v. Paige, No. A08-0616.
| Decision Date | 12 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-0616. |
| Citation | 765 N.W.2d 134 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Taporius Dywann PAIGE, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Considered and decided by CONNOLLY, Presiding Judge; HUDSON, Judge; and RANDALL, Judge.*
On appeal from the denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea, appellant argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to his request to discharge counsel, which resulted in the absence of adequate representation at his plea-withdrawal hearing. We agree and remand.
On February 15, 2007, appellant Taporius Dywann Paige was indicted by a Hennepin County grand jury for one count of first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2006); one count of first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2006); one count of second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(2) (2006); and two counts of drive-by shooting in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2006). Appellant was initially represented by a public defender, but appellant replaced the public defender with private counsel. While represented by private counsel, appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. The state dismissed the remaining charges.
On November 26, 2007, appellant wrote a pro se letter to the district court indicating that he wanted to be "brought back" before the district court to withdraw his plea and "fire" his private counsel. Appellant alleged that he pleaded guilty only because of his counsel's "verbal coercion and persuasion." He also claimed that his counsel "didn't do anything to help [appellant] or exonerate [his] name." In response, appellant's counsel moved the district court to withdraw as appellant's attorney.
A hearing on appellant's request to discharge counsel was held on January 3, 2008, five days before appellant was to be sentenced on the second-degree murder conviction. The district court said that the purpose of the hearing was to "understand on the record what [appellant's] wishes are" and that the court was "not hearing any motion today." Appellant attempted to state that he wanted to discharge counsel for ineffective assistance, but before appellant could finish his statement, the district court asked appellant if he had another attorney. When appellant indicated that he did not have another attorney, the district court recited to appellant Minn. Gen. R. Pract. 703, which states that "[o]nce a lawyer has filed a certificate of representation, that lawyer cannot withdraw from the case until all proceedings have been completed, except upon written order of the court pursuant to a written motion, or upon written substitution of counsel approved by the court ex parte."
The district court then told appellant that "[b]ecause of the status of these proceedings, that you have already pleaded guilty and that the sentence is scheduled, I cannot take any action today on anything unless you have another lawyer ready, willing, and able to file a certificate of representation and be substituted for [current counsel]." The district court continued, saying,
So, if you believe you have another lawyer, that would be the appropriate thing to do, or if you don't have another lawyer and you still wish to proceed along these lines, you could reapply for a public defender. But at this point there's no reason not to proceed to the sentencing which is scheduled for Tuesday, January 8.
The district court took no further action on appellant's request to discharge counsel.
Appellant did not retain another lawyer and was represented by the same private counsel at the January 8, 2008, sentencing/plea-withdrawal hearing. Appellant's counsel made no argument at the hearing and filed no motions on appellant's behalf. Instead, counsel stated,
[M]y concern is that [appellant] sent a letter to the Court ... indicating that he was going to obtain new counsel and was going to I guess discharge me as his attorney. And the basis for the new attorney was to withdraw his plea, so my hands have been tied a little bit in terms of what I can and cannot do, or what I feel comfortable with in terms of [appellant]. We've certainly had several discussions. He's indicated that he wants to withdraw his plea. As of this time no one has approached me in terms of the representation and, as I said, it's my understanding that [appellant's] basis is going to be ineffective assistance of counsel, so I'm a little bit in a difficult position in terms of what I can and can't do in this case.
The district court denied appellant's request to withdraw his plea, finding that the plea was fair and entered into voluntarily and intentionally. The district court also held that appellant had not "established any fair or just reason to allow him to withdraw his plea and no such motion [had] been filed by counsel of record."
Appellant addressed the district court prior to being sentenced, saying Well, Your Honor, you know, I was here last Thursday and I was under the impression that I was going to get an action for substitute of counsel. You only gave me two, three days to retain a new lawyer, which is very hard on a short notice and I couldn't be able to do that. I was going to ask you for a substitute of counsel and ask for just a week continuance for ... a withdrawal of my plea agreement. But I see today that, you know, everything was done before I stepped in the courtroom.
In response, the district court said,
[I]t was clear from your letter that you were considering getting a new lawyer. You did not ask for a public defender last week. And there was no limit on you getting a new lawyer and getting that person to make a motion to be substituted for [current counsel]. So there has been plenty of time. You can certainly request substitution of counsel, but you haven't specifically asked—you know, you haven't brought a private lawyer in here and you haven't specifically asked for a public defender. And even if you did, it's within my discretion to determine whether there are some exceptional circumstances and whether the demand would be timely and reasonably made.
The district court sentenced appellant to 348 months of imprisonment. This appeal follows.
I. Did the district court apply the correct legal standard to appellant's request to discharge counsel?
II. Did the district court's error in addressing appellant's motion to discharge counsel result in the absence of adequate representation at the plea-withdrawal hearing, requiring a rehearing on appellant's request to withdraw his guilty plea?
Appellant argues that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard to his request to discharge counsel. The federal and state constitutions guarantee the criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); State v. Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. 295, 298, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1970). "This right includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. at 298, 176 N.W.2d at 264 (citing Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 5, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954)). A defendant cannot demand a continuance for the purpose of delay or by "arbitrarily choosing to substitute counsel at the time of trial." State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.1977).
The district court, citing the rule governing attorney withdrawal in a criminal case, believed that it could not take action on appellant's request to discharge counsel unless appellant already had another attorney in place who was ready to file a certificate of representation and substitute for defense counsel. Appellant distinguishes between a criminal-defense attorney's request to withdraw as counsel and a criminal defendant's request to discharge counsel, asserting that the attorney-withdrawal rule applies only to the former request and not to the latter request. We agree.
The attorney-withdrawal rule describes the process by which an attorney may withdraw from representation in a criminal case, requiring written substitution of counsel to be approved by the district court before an attorney may withdraw. Minn. Gen. R. Pract. 703.1 In addressing appellant's request to discharge counsel, the district court applied the substitution-of-counsel requirement from Minn. Gen. R. Pract. 703, stating that the court could not take action on appellant's request until appellant secured substitute counsel. But nothing in the attorney-withdrawal rule addresses the process by which a criminal defendant can discharge counsel, and a criminal defendant's request to discharge counsel is not governed by the same constraints that govern attorney withdrawal in a criminal case. Notably, the attorney has a professional obligation to a client that may limit his ability to withdraw from the relationship while the client does not have a similar obligation. See generally Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b).
Instead, when a criminal defendant makes a request to discharge counsel, the district court is required to first ascertain how the defendant wishes to proceed after counsel is discharged, and then determine whether it is appropriate for the defendant to proceed as requested. For example, a criminal defendant who discharges counsel may wish to proceed pro se. If a criminal defendant requests to proceed with self-representation, a district court must determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel. State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Jones
...omitted). The court bears "the responsibility to clarify and address a defendant's request to discharge counsel." State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. App. 2009). And the court cannot deny a request for self-representation solely because the defendant is unable to be an effective lega......
-
State Of Minn. v. Patterson
...Conduct when determining whether an attorney has a conflict that implicates the constitutional right to counsel. See State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. App. 2009) (using definition provided by rules of professional conduct to determine whether trial attorney had a conflict that viol......
-
State v. Aase, A13-2200
...v. State, 477 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. 1709 at 1719). But cf. State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 140141 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that defense counsel actively represented co......
-
State v. Holifield, A15-0899
...S. Ct. 1708, 1718-19 (1980)). If a defendant establishes a conflict of interest, prejudice is "generally presumed." State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. App. 2009). Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate his ......