State v. King

• Decision Date: 28 February 2023
• Docket Number: SC 20588
• Citation: 346 Conn. 238,288 A.3d 995
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Wayne A. KING
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

346 Conn. 238

288 A.3d 995

STATE of Connecticut

v.Wayne A. KING

SC 20588

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 9, 2022

Officially Released February 28, 2023

Joshua R. Goodbaum, assigned counsel, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Nathan J. Buchok, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Maureen Platt, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Keller, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

As one feature of Connecticut's public policy aimed at deterring drunken driving and punishing intoxicated drivers, General Statutes § 14-227a (g)¹ provides enhanced sentences for those convicted multiple times of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or both. When a defendant's convictions all occur in Connecticut, applying this enhancement is straightforward. Applying the enhancement when a prior conviction occurred in a different state can present a greater challenge if that state's statutes define the crime of driving while intoxicated differently than Connecticut does under § 14-227a (a). The General Assembly has determined that a sentence enhancement under § 14-227a (g) should apply when the out-of-state conviction's "essential elements ... are ... substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of" § 14-227a (a), which criminalizes "the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content." General Statutes § 14-227a (a).

This certified appeal requires that we determine whether, upon his conviction in this state for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, in violation of § 14-227a (a), the trial court properly enhanced the sentence of the defendant, Wayne A. King, based on his two prior convictions in Florida for driving under the influence in violation of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court's judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of violating § 14-227a (a). On appeal before this court, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the elements of Florida's driving under the influence statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193, which he previously had been convicted of violating twice, were substantially the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) for enhancement purposes under § 14-227a (g) because, he contends, the phrase "actual physical control" under § 316.193 (1) criminalizes a broader range of conduct than does the term "operating" under § 14-227a (a). To decide this question, we first must address an issue we have not confronted before: the meaning of the phrase in § 14-227a (g) that provides an enhancement for "any offense the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section ...." We conclude that this phrase means that the basic and necessary parts of the out-of-state statute, including the actus reus, mens rea, and causation, must be the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) to a considerable degree. Applying this definition to the claim at issue, we conclude that the essential elements of § 14-227a (a) and § 316.193 are substantially the same. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Court's judgment.

I

The Appellate Court's opinion contains an accurate statement of the facts that the jury reasonably could have found, along with the relevant procedural history that informs our review of the defendant's claim. We summarize both briefly. "On April 1, 2016, the Naugatuck police pulled over the defendant's vehicle. The defendant smelled of alcohol, so the police transported him to the police station where [he] agreed to take a Breathalyzer test. The defendant's blood alcohol content registered at 0.1801 percent and then at 0.1785 percent, both of which [are] above the legal limit [of 0.08 percent]. The defendant thereafter was charged with a violation of § 14-227a (a) (1) and (2). Following a guilty verdict returned by the jury, the state proceeded on a part B information, which the defendant elected to have tried to the court, charging the defendant with being a third time offender, pursuant to § 14-227a (g), [based on] two prior convictions in the state of Florida. Despite the defendant's objections on various grounds, the court found that the state had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant twice had been convicted of driving under the influence in Florida and that the essential elements of the Florida statute ... were substantially the same as the essential elements of § 14-227a (a). Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to three years of imprisonment, execution suspended after eighteen months, twelve months of which [were] mandatory, followed by three years of probation." (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted.) State v. King , 204 Conn. App. 1, 4–5, 251 A.3d 79 (2021).

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court should not have sentenced him as a third time offender because the essential elements of operating under the influence in Connecticut are not substantially the same as in Florida.² Id., at 3–4, 251 A.3d 79.

The Appellate Court held that the two statutes were substantially the same and affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id., at 13–24, 25, 251 A.3d 79. The defendant then petitioned for certification to appeal to this court, which we granted, limited to the issue of whether "the elements of the Florida offenses of which the defendant previously had been convicted were substantially the same as the elements of ... § 14-227a (a) for enhancement purposes under § 14-227a (g) (3) ?" State v. King , 336 Conn. 947, 947, 251 A.3d 78 (2021).

As he did in the Appellate Court, the defendant claims before this court that the elements of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 are not substantially the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) because the use of the phrase "actual physical control" under § 316.193 (1) criminalizes broader conduct than the term "operating" under § 14-227a (a). See footnote 8 of this opinion. He therefore argues that the trial court could not use his Florida convictions under § 316.193 to enhance his Connecticut sentence pursuant to § 14-227a (g) (3).

In support of this claim, the defendant argues that, for the essential elements of both statutes to be substantially the same, they must be "the same in substance" and that, under this definition, the element of "actual physical control" in Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 (1) does not satisfy the requirements of § 14-227a (g). Specifically, he claims that, unlike the element of "operating" under § 14-227a (a), § 316.193 criminalizes the mere possibility of operation, including merely being seated in the vehicle's driver's seat while intoxicated. The state counters that the phrase "substantially the same" refers to the degree of similarity between the essential elements and that, under this definition, the elements of "actual physical control" in Florida and "operating" in Connecticut are substantially the same based on how our relevant case law has defined those phrases. We agree with the state.

The defendant's claim is premised on the proper meaning of the phrase contained in § 14-227a (g), "the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) ...." As the phrase "determined by the court" in § 14-227a (g) suggests, "[t]he issue of whether the elements of the [Florida] and Connecticut statutes under which the defendant was convicted [are] substantially the same [under § 14-227a (g) ] calls for the comparison and interpretation of those statutes, which [also] is a question of law [subject to plenary review]." State v. Commins , 276 Conn. 503, 513, 886 A.2d 824 (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson , 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). General Statutes § 1-2z guides our construction of § 14-227a (g), directing "us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. ... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety , 300 Conn. 144, 150, 12 A.3d 948 (2011).

We conclude that the phrase in § 14-227a (g), "the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a)," means that the basic and necessary parts of the crime, including the actus reus, mens rea, and causation, must be the same to a considerable degree. Applying this definition to the elements of § 14-227a (a) and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193, we determine that the essential elements of these statutes are, in fact, substantially the same.

II

Pursuant to § 14-227a (a), a "person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both" by "operat[ing] a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of [ § 14-227a ], ‘elevated blood alcohol content’ means a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight ...." Subsection (g) of § 14-227a provides penalties for a first offense as well as...