84 Hawai'i 407, Keanini v. Akiba

• Decision Date: 12 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 18770,18770
• Citation: 935 P.2d 122
• Parties: 84 Hawai'i 407 Larry K. KEANINI, Sr., Claimant-Appellant, v. Lorraine H. AKIBA, Director of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawai'i, 1 and Trans Hawaiian, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

Page 122

935 P.2d 122

84 Hawai'i 407

Larry K. KEANINI, Sr., Claimant-Appellant, v. Lorraine H. AKIBA, Director of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawai'i, ¹ and Trans Hawaiian, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18770.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

March 12, 1997.

Certiorari Denied April 4, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

A bus driver was discharged from his job after having his driver's license suspended for three months for driving his personal automobile without no-fault insurance. His claim for unemployment benefits was denied under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 383-30(1) (1993), which provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he or she left work voluntarily without good cause. The claims examiner construed the bus driver's voluntary act of driving without insurance, which subsequently resulted in the driver's discharge, as amounting to a leaving of work voluntarily without good cause. Consequently, the claims examiner disqualified the driver from receiving unemployment benefits. The denial of benefits was affirmed in an administrative appeal and by the circuit court.

This decision holds that for an employee to be the moving party in the termination of an employment relationship and thus have "left work voluntarily," he or she must have had the intent to terminate the employment relationship. The undisputed facts of this case indicate that the employee did not leave work voluntarily, but rather, was involuntarily discharged.

We further hold that under HRS § 383-30(1), the "constructive voluntary leaving" doctrine cannot be applied to deny unemployment benefits to an employee who, without the intent to leave his job, engages in a voluntary antecedent act, not constituting misconduct connected with work, that ultimately causes his discharge.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court denying the driver unemployment benefits. We remand the case to the circuit court, with instructions that it likewise remand the case to the appeals officer of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations for a determination of whether the driver was discharged for misconduct connected with work and thus disqualified for unemployment benefits pursuant to HRS § 383-30(2) (1993).

Mark Wangberg (Tom Parrish with him on the briefs, Legal Aid Society of Hawai'i), Wailuku, Maui, for claimant-appellant.

Frances E.H. Lum (Wilfredo Tungol with her on the brief, Deputy Attorneys General, State of Hawai'i), Honolulu, for defendant-appellee Director of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawai'i.

Before BURNS, C.J., and WATANABE and KIRIMITSU, JJ.

KIRIMITSU, Judge.

In this unemployment benefits dispute, claimant-appellant Larry K. Keanini, Sr. (Claimant) appeals from the Second Circuit Court's February 10, 1995 judgment, which denied Claimant unemployment benefits on the basis that Claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause. Claimant argues that: (1) the decision disqualifying Claimant improperly narrows the protective coverage of Hawai'i's unemployment laws; and (2) the decision is affected by an error of law regarding penalties for drivers of uninsured vehicles. We conclude that the appeals officer of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) erred by applying the wrong test for determining when an employee has voluntarily left work. We further conclude that Claimant did not voluntarily leave his work, but rather, was discharged. Therefore, we vacate the February 10, 1995 judgment of the circuit court denying Claimant unemployment benefits. We remand the case to the circuit court, with instructions that it likewise remand the case to the appeals officer of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations for a determination of whether Claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work and thus disqualified for unemployment benefits pursuant to HRS § 383-30(2) (1993).

I. BACKGROUND

Claimant was employed as a bus driver for Trans Hawaiian, Inc. (Employer) from July 11, 1986 to July 22, 1993. In May 1993, while off duty, Claimant was stopped and cited for, among other charges, driving his car without no-fault insurance coverage. Claimant was subsequently convicted and his driver's license was suspended for three months, effective July 23, 1993.

On July 23, 1993, Claimant informed Employer that his license had been suspended. Since his driver's license was necessary for his job as a bus driver, Claimant volunteered to perform any other duties that Employer might have available. Employer did not, however, assign Claimant any duties after July 22, 1993. One month after being informed that Claimant's license was suspended, Employer sent a letter to Claimant stating that he was terminated from employment "effective immediately."

Claimant subsequently filed for unemployment benefits. The DLIR denied his application on the basis that Claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause. Claimant filed a request for Reconsideration and Appeal. After a hearing, the appeals officer of the DLIR (Appeals Officer) issued a decision affirming the denial of benefits. Claimant next appealed to the Second Circuit Court, which also affirmed the denial of benefits. Claimant then filed the present appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appeal of a decision made by the circuit court upon its review of an agency's decision is a secondary appeal. The standard of review is one in which this court must determine whether the circuit court was right or wrong in its decision, applying the standards set forth in Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14(g) (1993) ² to the agency's decision. University of Hawai'i Professional Assembly v. Tomasu, 79 Hawai'i 154, 157, 900 P.2d 161, 164 (1995). Hence, the agency's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Agsalud, 65 Haw. 146, 148, 648 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1982); HRS § 91-14(g)(5) (1993). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 392, 894 P.2d 80, 89 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, an agency's legal conclusions are freely reviewable. Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., 77 Hawai'i 100, 102-03, 881 P.2d 1246, 1248-49 (1994). Hence, an agency's statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claimant's First Argument

Claimant first argues that the Appeals Officer was wrong in concluding that Claimant was disqualified from unemployment benefits on the basis that he left work voluntarily without good cause. We agree.

1. The Appeals Officer's Decision

Claimant's disqualification was based on HRS § 383-30(1) (1993), which provides that an individual shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits "for any week in which the individual has left his [or her] work voluntarily without good cause." Id. Additionally, under Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 12-5-47(b), which was promulgated to implement HRS § 383-30(1), a "separation is a voluntary leaving or quitting when the facts and circumstances demonstrate that a claimant is the 'moving party' in the termination of an employment relationship."

The Appeals Officer's November 4, 1993 decision included, among others, the following findings:

The claimant was aware that he was required to have a valid driver's license to maintain his employment with employer as a bus driver. Claimant was also aware that he needed car insurance in order to have a valid driver's license and that failure to maintain this insurance coverage could and would result in the loss of his valid driver's license. Despite this knowledge, claimant continued to operate his private vehicle without insurance, was arrested, convicted and consequently suffered the suspension of his driver's license. Claimant needed this license to continue operating the employer's vehicles and, with the loss of this license, employer had no other work for claimant as the company was undergoing a reduction in force. Claimant's voluntary actions lead [sic] to his license suspension, which resulted in the termination of his employment.

Based upon the above findings, the Appeals Officer concluded:

The claimant, therefore, was the "moving party" in the termination of his employment relationship and voluntarily quit his job when his license was suspended.... Accordingly, the Appeals Officer finds that claimant voluntarily quit his job without good cause.

Hence, Claimant was denied unemployment benefits pursuant to HRS § 383-30(1).

The issue, then, is whether the Appeals Officer was correct in determining that Claimant was the moving party in the termination of his employment relationship and thus voluntarily left his job without good cause. The DLIR confirmed in oral argument that the Appeals Officer utilized the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving ³ to come to her conclusion that Claimant was the moving party and thus voluntarily left his job. However, no Hawai'i appellate case has clearly addressed the issue of whether the doctrine is recognized in our jurisdiction. ⁴ Further, the circuit courts have disagreed on whether to apply the doctrine. ⁵ Hence, our review of the Appeals Officer's decision requires that we decide the viability of the doctrine in Hawai'i. ⁶ 2. The Doctrine of Constructive

Voluntary Leaving

We begin our analysis with a brief explanation of the doctrine of "constructive voluntary leaving." The doctrine is generally understood to be a concept whereby an employee who acts in a way which might result in his discharge, and does in fact result in his discharge, is deemed to have left his employment without good cause--thereby losing the right to claim unemployment benefits. Echols v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm., 380 Mich....