Bauer v. STATE EMPLOYMENT SEC. DEPT.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 22458-9-III.,22458-9-III.
• Citation: 108 P.3d 1240,126 Wn. App. 468,126 Wash. App. 468
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Donald W. BAUER, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT, Respondent.

108 P.3d 1240

126 Wn. App. 468

126 Wash. App. 468

Donald W. BAUER, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT, Respondent.

No. 22458-9-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel Five.

March 17, 2005.

Stanley A. Kempner, Spokane, for Appellant.

Jacqueline Bolden, Office of Atty. Gen., Seattle, for Respondent.

SCHULTHEIS, J.

¶ 1 In Washington, unemployment compensation benefits may be denied to an employee who voluntarily leaves work without cause. RCW 50.20.050. Donald Bauer was terminated from his employment when he lost his commercial driver's license due to his commission of two serious traffic offenses. That does not constitute a "voluntary quit" under the statute. The statute does not provide for disqualification from benefits for a "constructive voluntary quit." We therefore reverse the decision of the commissioner of the Employment Security Department and the superior court to the contrary.

FACTS¹

¶ 2 Mr. Bauer started work as a commercial truck driver on November 22, 1989. He knew his job required him to have a commercial driver's license (CDL). He generally drove 40 to 50 hours per week and 60,000 miles a year for work. Mr. Bauer was discharged on November 20, 2002, when his CDL was suspended by the Department of Licensing and his employer had no other work for him.

¶ 3 The CDL suspension was for 60 days, pursuant to RCW 46.25.090, because of two serious traffic offenses within a three-year period while driving a commercial motor vehicle. The first offense was for speeding on February 28, 2001. While driving on Interstate 90 near Moses Lake, Mr. Bauer was under the impression that the speed limit was 65 mph. Mr. Bauer did not intend to speed; he had been following another truck and was not aware that the speed limit was lowered to 45 mph on that stretch of the highway. The second offense occurred on April 8, 2002. Mr. Bauer was driving a company vehicle in a residential area looking for a particular side street on which he needed to turn. While looking for the side street, Mr. Bauer ran a red light and hit a vehicle. He was cited for running a red light. Mr. Bauer acknowledged that both citations were his own fault, but he did not feel his actions were purposeful.

¶ 4 Mr. Bauer sought unemployment benefits on December 9, 2002. On December 19, the Employment Security Department issued a decision allowing benefits. The employer appealed. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the department's decision on March 26, 2003.

¶ 5 On April 17, 2003, the employer sought review of the decision in a petition to the commissioner of the department. On May 9, the commissioner modified the ALJ's order, holding that by Mr. Bauer's failure to maintain his license, a requisite of his job, he "effectively quit his employment" and his termination was deemed a "constructive quit." Comm'n Record (CR) at 69. Because he did not demonstrate good cause for "voluntarily quitting," Mr. Bauer was disqualified from benefits. CR at 69. The commissioner's decision was affirmed by the superior court on October 3, 2003. Mr. Bauer appeals.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD/SCOPE OF REVIEW

¶ 6 This review is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW. Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 122 Wash.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). Under the APA, the commissioner of the department is empowered to review the ALJ's decision. Id. at 404, 858 P.2d 494; RCW 50.32.080. The commissioner is the final authority for the agency's determinations on unemployment compensation. Tapper, 122 Wash.2d at 404, 858 P.2d 494. Therefore, we review the commissioner's decision modifying the ALJ's decision. Id. We sit in the same position as the superior court and apply the APA standards directly to the record. Id. at 402, 858 P.2d 494. ¶ 7 We review the commissioner's conclusions of law under the error of law standard. Cascade Nursing Servs., Ltd. v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 71 Wash.App. 23, 29, 856 P.2d 421 (1993). The case also involves the commissioner's interpretation of RCW 50.20.050. Interpreting the meaning of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Only when the court is reviewing an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is the agency's interpretation of the statute afforded deference. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 68, 77, 11 P.3d 726 (2000). No deference is accorded if the agency's interpretation conflicts with the statute. Id. This court retains the ultimate authority to interpret a statute. City of Pasco v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992). Therefore, "we may substitute our interpretation of the law for that of the agency." Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash.2d 568, 593, 90 P.3d 659 (2004).

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

¶ 8 "`[T]he fundamental object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature' which is done by `first look [ing] to the plain meaning of words used in a statute.'" Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, Fin. Dep't, 139 Wash.2d 546, 552, 988 P.2d 961 (1999) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Sweet, 138 Wash.2d 466, 477-78, 980 P.2d 1223 (1999)). "When words in a statute are plain and unambiguous, statutory construction is not necessary, and this court must apply the statute as written unless the statute evidences an intent to the contrary." Enter. Leasing, 139 Wash.2d at 552, 988 P.2d 961. "The meaning of a plain and unambiguous statute must be derived from the wording of the statute itself." State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 115, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). All of the language in the statute must be given effect so that no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999).

¶ 9 Related statutory provisions must be harmonized to effectuate a consistent statutory scheme that maintains the integrity of the respective statutes. State v. Chapman, 140 Wash.2d 436, 448, 998 P.2d 282 (2000). Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be read as complimentary. State v. Wright, 84 Wash.2d 645, 650, 529 P.2d 453 (1974). Finally, statutes should be construed to avoid unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash.2d 828, 835, 791 P.2d 897 (1990).

¶ 10 The commissioner held:

In failing to maintain his license, which was a requisite of his employment, the claimant effectively quit his employment. See, e.g., In re Peters, Empl. Sec. Comm'r Dec.2d 377 (1978). Such is akin to a constructive quit and is properly adjudicated pursuant to RCW 50.20.050. See In re Harden, Empl. Sec. Comm'r Dec.2d 843 (1994); In re Morris, Empl. Sec. Comm'r Dec. 801 (1969). The claimant has not demonstrated good cause for voluntarily quitting. Accordingly, he is subject to disqualification pursuant to RCW 50.20.050(1).

CR at 69 (emphasis added). The statute cited by the commissioner relevantly provides:

An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has left work voluntarily without good cause and thereafter for seven calendar weeks and until he or she has obtained bona fide work in employment covered by this title and earned wages in that employment equal to seven times his or her weekly benefit amount.

Former RCW 50.20.050(1) (2002). The statute does not expressly provide for a "constructive quit."

¶ 11 We first examine the plain language of former RCW 50.20.050(1). The statute disqualifies a claimant if he leaves work voluntarily without good cause.² Our courts have already addressed the plain meaning of leaving voluntarily:

"[T]he phrase `due to leaving work voluntarily' has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity; it expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment."

Vergeyle v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 28 Wash.App. 399, 402, 623 P.2d 736 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 79, 338 A.2d 237 (1975)), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 108 Wash.2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987)

.³ In other words, "[a] voluntary termination requires a showing that an employee intentionally terminated her own employment." Safeco Ins. Cos. v. Meyering, 102 Wash.2d 385, 393, 687 P.2d 195 (1984).

¶ 12 The department relies on Vergeyle to emphasize its argument that Mr. Bauer's poor driving habits were voluntary and of his own free will. But the Vergeyle court required a showing of intent to terminate the employment. Vergeyle, 28 Wash.App. at 402, 623 P.2d 736. No intent was evident here. In fact, the ALJ specifically found that one of the violations was not intentional. CR at 52 (finding of fact 4). That finding was not modified by the commissioner or challenged by the department.

¶ 13 The department implicitly argues that the legislature's use of the words "left work voluntarily" can be reasonably interpreted to include a work separation due to termination-triggering conduct. However, other statutes address benefit disqualification for work related acts or omissions in willful disregard of the employer's interest that harms the employer's business. See RCW 50.20.060 (disqualifying employees discharged or suspended for misconduct connected with his or her work); RCW 50.04.293 (defining misconduct as "an employee's act or failure to act in willful disregard of his or her employer's interest where the effect of the employee's act or failure to act is to harm the employer's business"). If the legislature intended to disqualify employees who unintentionally commit traffic infractions, it could have. "If a statute is plain and clear, we will not read into...