Troy Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Sand Lake

• Decision Date: 23 July 2020
• Docket Number: 528769
• Citation: 185 A.D.3d 1306,128 N.Y.S.3d 677
• Parties: In the Matter of TROY SAND & GRAVEL CO., INC., et al., Appellants, v. TOWN OF SAND LAKE et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of William H. Hoffay et al., Appellants, v. Town of Sand Lake et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Rifenburg Construction, Inc., Appellant, v. Town of Sand Lake et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 3.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

185 A.D.3d 1306

128 N.Y.S.3d 677

In the Matter of TROY SAND & GRAVEL CO., INC., et al., Appellants,

v.TOWN OF SAND LAKE et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.)

In the Matter of William H. Hoffay et al., Appellants,

v.Town of Sand Lake et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.)

In the Matter of Rifenburg Construction, Inc., Appellant,

v.Town of Sand Lake et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 3.)

528769

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: May 22, 2020

Decided and Entered: July 23, 2020

Gilchrist Tingley, PC, Troy (Andrew W. Gilchrist of counsel), for Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. and another, appellants.

Mandel Clemente, PC, East Greenbush (Linda A. Mandel Clemente of counsel), for William H. Hoffay and others, appellants.

Couch White, LLP, Albany (Adam J. Schultz of counsel), for Rifenburg Construction, Inc., appellant.

DuCharme Clark, LLP, Clifton Park (John B. DuCharme of counsel), for respondents.

Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Clark, Devine and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McNally Jr., J.), entered February 19, 2019 in Rensselaer County, which dismissed petitioners' applications, in three combined proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions for declaratory judgment, to review a determination of respondent Town Board of the Town of Sand Lake enacting Local Law No. 4 (2017) of the Town of Sand Lake.

In May 2017, respondent Town Board of the Town of Sand Lake adopted Local Law No. 4 (2017) of the Town of Sand Lake (hereinafter Local Law No. 4), which includes a new zoning map and revised zoning districts and allows mining on properties with existing permits. Prior to adopting the law, the Town Board held a public hearing. Public comment on the proposed zoning law was received prior to, during and after said hearing. Following the public hearing, the Town Board prepared an environmental assessment form (hereinafter EAF) and made it available for public inspection. Thereafter, the Town Board adopted a negative declaration pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA] )¹ and adopted Local Law No. 4.

Petitioner Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. owns and operates, among other things, a mining operation situated on approximately 195 acres within the Town of Sand Lake, Rensselaer County. Petitioner Bonded Concrete, Inc. owns and operates an existing commercial enterprise within the Town. Petitioners William H. Hoffay, Daniel H. Holser, Gregg Gardner and Richard Hastings are lifelong residents and taxpayers of the Town. Hoffay is also the owner and operator of petitioners Hoffay Farms, LLC and Hoffay's Harvest House, LLC, real property taxpayers in the Town. Petitioner Antfil S. Realty, LLC is a real property taxpayer in the Town. Petitioner Rifenburg Construction, Inc. holds a state mining permit and leases approximately 150 acres of property located within the Town from which it operates a mine pit.

In September 2017, Troy Sand and Bonded Concrete commenced the first combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and an action for declaratory judgment to annul the Town Board's enactment of Local Law No. 4. Troy Sand and Bonded Concrete alleged that Local Law No. 4 is internally inconsistent, was adopted in violation of law and fails to satisfy the test set forth in Berenson v. Town of New Castle , 38 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975). Hoffay, Holser, Gardner, Hastings, Hoffay Farm, Harvest House and Antfil (hereinafter collectively referred to as the taxpayer petitioners) and Rifenburg commenced the second and third combined proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions for declaratory judgment, respectively, similarly seeking to annul Local Law No. 4, claiming that it was enacted in violation of SEQRA, as well as various state and local laws. The taxpayer petitioners and Rifenburg further alleged that Local Law No. 4 is preempted as a matter of law by the Mined Land Reclamation Law (see ECL 23–2701 et seq. [hereinafter MLRL] ).

Respondents answered, opposing all relief requested and sought dismissal of the petitions/complaints. Following a combined oral argument on all three proceedings, Supreme Court dismissed the petitions/complaints. The court determined that Holser and Hastings lacked standing to challenge the Town Board's SEQRA compliance and that, in adopting Local Law No. 4, the Town Board fully complied with SEQRA. The court further found no merit to petitioners' contentions that the Town Board's actions were arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful. Petitioners appeal.

Initially, we find, contrary to Supreme Court's ruling, that Holser and Hastings have standing to challenge the Town Board's SEQRA review process. For purposes of standing, when a property owner challenges the SEQRA review process undertaken in conjunction with a zoning enactment to which its property is subject, "ownership of the subject property confers a legally cognizable interest in being assured that the Town satisfied SEQRA before taking action to rezone its land" ( Matter of Wir Assoc., LLC v. Town of Mamakating, 157 A.D.3d 1040, 1044, 69 N.Y.S.3d 130 [2018] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Matter of Mombaccus Excavating, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, N.Y., 89 A.D.3d 1209, 1210, 932 N.Y.S.2d 551 [2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 808, 2012 WL 539188 [2012] ). "[S]tanding should be liberally constructed so that land use disputes are settled on their own merits rather than by preclusive, restrictive standing rules. To that end, the allegations contained in a petition are deemed to be true and are construed in the light most favorable to the petitioner" ( Matter of Town of Coeymans v. City of Albany, 284 A.D.2d 830, 833, 728 N.Y.S.2d 797 [2001] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 602, 735 N.Y.S.2d 491, 760 N.E.2d 1287 [2001] ). Holser and Hastings have demonstrated that they reside in the Town and own property therein. It is not necessary to assert "proof of special damage or in-fact injury" ( Matter of Sun–Brite Car Wash v. Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 N.Y.2d 406, 413, 515 N.Y.S.2d 418, 508 N.E.2d 130 [1987] ), nor do they have to state a noneconomic environmental harm. All that is necessary for standing is to demonstrate ownership of property subject to the rezoning ordinance (see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 87 N.Y.2d 668, 687, 642 N.Y.S.2d 164, 664 N.E.2d 1226 [1996] ; Matter of Wir Assoc., LLC v. Town of Mamakating, 157 A.D.3d at 1044, 69 N.Y.S.3d 130 ).

Turning to the substantive arguments, the taxpayer petitioners assert that Local Law No. 4 must be declared null and void because it was adopted in the absence of a valid comprehensive plan, as the plan used by the Town Board was outdated and effectively invalid. They also contend that Local Law No. 4 lessens diversity of housing options, eliminates affordable housing options, and imposes substantial burdens on existing farms. Petitioners in all three proceedings argue that the zoning map attendant to the text of Local Law No. 4 is unclear and confusing, and that Local Law No. 4 must be annulled as it is inconsistent and incomprehensible.

"A municipality is free to alter its zoning regulations, but must do so in a manner that comports with its comprehensive plan" ( Matter of Wir Assoc., LLC v. Town of Mamakating, 157 A.D.3d at 1042–1043, 69 N.Y.S.3d 130 [citations omitted]; see Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469–470, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 235 N.E.2d 897 [1968] ; Greenport Group, LLC v. Town Bd. of the Town of Southold, 167 A.D.3d 575, 579, 90 N.Y.S.3d 188 [2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 910, 2019 WL 2623972 [2019] ). "A town's zoning determination is entitled to a strong presumption of validity; therefore, one who challenges such a determination bears a heavy burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the determination was arbitrary and unreasonable or otherwise unlawful" ( Matter of Birchwood Neighborhood Assn. v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Colonie, 112 A.D.3d 1184, 1185, 977 N.Y.S.2d 454 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). "Even if the validity of a provision is fairly debatable, [a municipality's] judgment as to its necessity must control" ( Matter of Bonacker Prop., LLC v. Village of E. Hampton Bd. of Trustees, 168 A.D.3d 928, 930, 93 N.Y.S.3d 328 [2019] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 904, 2019 WL 2041632 [2019] ). "Thus, when a [petitioner] fails to establish a clear conflict with the comprehensive plan, the zoning classification must be upheld" ( Matter of Youngewirth v. Town of Ramapo Town Bd., 155 A.D.3d 755, 759, 65 N.Y.S.3d 540 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). "All that is required is that the court be able to satisfy itself, based upon a review of all available evidence, that such plan in fact exists and that the municipality is acting in the public interest in furtherance thereof" ( Matter of Skenesborough Stone v. Village of Whitehall, 254 A.D.2d 664, 666, 679 N.Y.S.2d 727 [1998] [emphasis added and citations omitted], appeal dismissed 95 N.Y.2d 902, 716 N.Y.S.2d 641, 739 N.E.2d 1146 [2000] ).

The Town Board adopted the present Comprehensive Plan in 2006 (hereinafter the plan). In the process of so doing, the Town prepared a generic environmental impact statement (hereinafter GEIS). The plan recommended periodic review and, to that end, the Town appointed a committee that was charged with regularly reviewing the plan. In 2015, the Town sought to formally update the plan and, in June 2015, sought a grant from the state to allow it to do so. However, as of September 2015, the committee determined that the vision statement and objectives of the plan "remained relevant." The plan was never revoked or determined obsolete by the Town and remained in place throughout the enactment of ...