L & L Enters. v. Arellano (In re Arellano)

Decision Date18 February 2015
Docket NumberNo. S–14–0164.,S–14–0164.
Citation2015 WY 21,344 P.3d 249
PartiesIn the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Mario ARELLANO, an Employee of L & L Enterprises. L & L Enterprises, Appellant (Respondent), v. Mario Arellano, Appellee (Petitioner).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Representing Appellant: F. Scott Peasley of Peasley Law Office, Douglas, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Peter J. Timbers of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant L & L Enterprises challenges a district court order requiring the Wyoming Division of Workers' Compensation to award benefits to its former employee, Appellee Mario Arellano. After he was injured on the job and made a worker's compensation claim, Mr. Arellano turned out to be an alien who was not authorized to be or work in the United States. L & L urges us to find that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) was correct in denying him benefits, asserting that he is not an “employee” as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–14–102(a)(vii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) and that he is not entitled to benefits because he fraudulently obtained his employment by providing false documentation.

[¶ 2] We find that the district court was correct in concluding the OAH's action was not in accordance with the law and in awarding benefits. We therefore affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] 1. Was the OAH's order denying worker's compensation benefits for Arellano, because he did not meet the definition of “employee” under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, in accordance with the law?

2. Do Arellano's misrepresentations in providing false documentation and information to secure employment vitiate any right to receive benefits under the Act?

FACTS

[¶ 4] Arellano sought employment with L & L, which required him to complete a Form I–9 and provide two forms of identification.1

Arellano filled out the employee portion of the I–9, attesting under penalty of perjury that he was a citizen or national of the United States.2 He also provided a New Mexico driver's license and a social security card that L & L examined to confirm his identity and citizenship.

[¶ 5] After being employed for roughly four months, Arellano hurt his lower back on the job, and soon thereafter completed a Wyoming Report of Injury. The Wyoming Division of Workers' Compensation issued a Final Determination Regarding Compensability in which it denied Arellano's claim for coverage, determining that it could not approve payment of the claimed benefits because: (1) it had not received requested medical documentation to support the claim that a work-related injury had occurred; (2) the incident did not meet the definition of an injury in the workers' compensation statutes; and (3) it had not received requested information to prove residency and authorization to work in the United States.

[¶ 6] Arellano challenged the Division's decision by appealing to the Office of Administrative Hearings. A contested case hearing was held, and Arellano admitted that his social security card was a fake he bought on the street from someone. He also admitted that the information on the Form I–9 was therefore false, that he was a citizen of Mexico, and that he “didn't know” if he had permission to work in the United States.

[¶ 7] After a hearing, the OAH hearing examiner assigned to the case issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, in which he held that Arellano met his burden of establishing that he suffered a low back injury during the course and scope of his employment. However, the examiner held that he had failed to establish that he was a covered “employee” as defined under Wyoming's workers' compensation statutes. The examiner found that L & L did in fact reasonably believe that Arellano was a citizen who could lawfully work in this country. Nonetheless, he found “it hard to believe the Wyoming Legislature intended to provide coverage when fraud has been committed” and that “an employer's ‘reasonable belief’ must be based upon valid information....” He therefore denied benefits.

[¶ 8] Arellano petitioned the district court for review of the OAH decision. The court reversed the OAH, finding that its denial of Arellano's claim for “workers' compensation benefits was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” It reasoned that the workers' compensation statute's definition of a covered employee, “by its clear and unambiguous terms, requires only that an employer reasonably believe that, based upon the documents in its possession at the date of hire and at the date of the injury, the employee is authorized to work in the United States.” Applying this interpretation to the OAH findings of fact, the district court determined that Arellano had met his burden of proving each of the elements of his worker's compensation claim, and particularly that he was in fact an employee for workers' compensation purposes.

[¶ 9] L & L timely perfected this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10] “On appeal from a district court order on petition for review of an administrative agency ruling, we review the case as though it came directly to this Court from the agency and give no deference to the district court's decision.” In re Hartmann, 2015 WY 1, ¶ 19, 342 P.3d 377, 382 (Wyo.2015). This Court's review of agency action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16–3–114(c) (LexisNexis 2013), which provides in pertinent part:

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

...

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;....

We review questions of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo. In re Hartmann, ¶ 19, 342 P.3d at 382 ; State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Clements, 2014 WY 68, ¶ 7, 326 P.3d 177, 179 (Wyo.2014).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] L & L's primary argument tracks the OAH examiner's reasoning that the statutory definition of “employee” for workers' compensation benefits does not encompass illegal aliens who submit false documents and information to secure employment. L & L contends that a fake social security card does not qualify as a “document,” and that its belief that Arellano was entitled to work in this country cannot be reasonable because it was based on admittedly false information.

[¶ 12] L & L also argues that Arellano's fraudulent conduct is an independent basis to deprive him of benefits. It claims that the fraud not only led it to hire him, but that any award of benefits was also the result of that fraud, because if it had not employed him, he would have had no arguable claim for workers' compensation benefits.

“Employee” within the meaning of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act

[¶ 13] We must interpret § 27–14–102(a)(vii) to determine whether Arellano is a covered “employee” as defined by that statute. Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 20, 50 P.3d 323, 329 (Wyo.2002) ([O]ur job is to give effect to the most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the statute, given its design and purpose.”). In interpreting statutes, our objective is to determine the legislature's intent. State ex rel. W. Park Hosp. Dist. v. Skoric, 2014 WY 41, ¶ 10, 321 P.3d 334, 338 (Wyo.2014). We must look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words utilized while considering their arrangement and connection with each other, “for when the words are clear and unambiguous, there is a peril that a court may impermissibly substitute its own views if any attempt is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by the legislature.” Id.

[¶ 14] When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in it, and we will not resort to rules of statutory construction. Id., ¶ 11, 321 P.3d at 338. “A statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability.” In re Estate of Scherer, 2014 WY 129, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 129, 133 (Wyo.2014) (citation omitted). “Conversely, a statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.” Id.

[¶ 15] A claimant seeking workers' compensation benefits must prove all of the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 33, ¶ 21, 321 P.3d 318, 323 (Wyo.2014). As part of that burden, the claimant must prove he is a covered employee as defined by the Act, which defines the term “employee” to include

any person engaged in any extrahazardous employment under any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and includes legally employed minors, aliens authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services, and aliens whom the employer reasonably believes, at the date of hire and the date of injury based upon documentation in the employer's possession, to be authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–14–102(a)(vii) (emphasis added). The highlighted portion was added by the legislature in 2005.3 See 2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 185, § 2.

[¶ 16] We find the language of § 27–14–102(a)(vii) to be clear, unambiguous and straightforward. It plainly requires only that an employer reasonably believe, based upon “documen...

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