Young & Jones v. Hiawatha Gin & Mfg. Co., 417.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1927
• Docket Number: No. 417.,417.
• Citation: 17 F.2d 193
• Parties: YOUNG & JONES v. HIAWATHA GIN & MFG. CO. and five other cases.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

17 F.2d 193 (1927)

YOUNG & JONES v. HIAWATHA GIN & MFG. CO. and five other cases.

No. 417.

District Court, S. D. Mississippi. W. D.

January 22, 1927.

R. B. Anderson, of Port Gibson, Miss., and Brunini & Hirsh, of Vicksburg, Miss., for plaintiffs.

Watkins, Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, Miss., for defendant.

HOLMES, District Judge.

The court has before it for consideration six separate motions to remand to the state court six suits at law filed by six different plaintiffs in the circuit court of Caliborne county, Miss., which have been removed here on petition of the Hiawatha Gin & Manufacturing Company, the identical defendant in each case. The amounts involved run from $210, the alleged value of 2 bales of cotton destroyed by fire, to $2,900, the value claimed for 29 bales so destroyed, as alleged, by the negligence of the defendant, while said cotton was stored in a public warehouse operated by the defendant.

From the identical declarations of the plaintiffs we find that on the 5th and 6th of October, 1925, the defendant was engaged in the business of operating a warehouse, known as a United States bonded warehouse, and licensed under the United States Warehouse Act (Comp. St. § 8747l et seq.) to store cotton and collect charges therefor; that plaintiffs delivered cotton to defendant and received the following receipt for each bale:

"The one bale of cotton described herein, stored in the above-named warehouse, for which this receipt is issued subject to the United States Warehouse Act, the regulations for cotton warehouses thereunder, and the terms of this contract."

The declaration then contains the following allegation:

"And plaintiffs further aver that, upon delivery to defendant of said cotton as aforesaid, the said defendant then and there agreed that it would safely keep and take care of the said cotton, and that it would be guilty of no negligence in the storing and keeping of the same, and it then and there became and was the duty of the defendant safely to store and keep the said cotton, and to refrain from acts of negligence in the storage and preservation of said cotton, but, notwithstanding said duty respecting said cotton so owed by the defendant, defendant negligently suffered the same to be destroyed by fire on the 11th day of October, 1925; that such negligence consisted in the following acts, to wit:"

Six specific acts of negligence are alleged: (1) Not having sufficient watchmen; (2) failure of such watchmen as were left to attend to their proper duties; (3) failure to remove a portion of the cotton after fire was discovered; (4) failure to maintain a proper sprinkling apparatus and sufficient water protection; (5) storing cotton so as to close exits; (6) maintaining a wire fence, which prevented removal of cotton.

The contention of the defendant in support of jurisdiction in this court is that the suits arise under a law regulating commerce. If this is true, under paragraph 8 of section 24 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 991) the District Court has original jurisdiction, regardless of the amounts in controversy, and therefore the motions should be overruled.

In order to determine whether the cases so arise — that is, whether they grow out of federal legislation — we must look to the allegations of the plaintiffs' own declarations, which are the same in all the cases. If such an inspection reveals a clear and substantial suit or controversy over the validity, construction, or effect of a law regulating commerce, which will be defeated or sustained, according to the construction given such law, then it may be fairly said that the suits arise under a law regulating commerce. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738-822, 6 L. Ed. 204; Gold Washing & Water Company v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199-201, 24 L. Ed. 656; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. Ed. 648; White v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 307, 5 S. Ct. 923, 962, 29 L. Ed. 199; Railroad Company v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135-139, 26 L. Ed. 96; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608-611, 22 S. Ct. 493, 46 L. Ed. 713; Macon Grocery Company v. Atlantic Coast Line, 215 U. S. 501, 506, 30 S. Ct. 184, 54 L. Ed. 300; First National Bank v. Williams, 252 U. S. 504, 40 S. Ct. 372, 64 L. Ed. 690.

If the plaintiff in good faith sets up a federal question as a basis of his claim, then this court has jurisdiction. It is immaterial that other questions are also involved. New Orleans, M. & T. R. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 26 L. Ed. 96. Neither does it make any difference that in the end the case is determined upon some other issue. City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 166 U. S. 557, 562, 17 S. Ct. 653, 41 L. Ed. 1114.

"If the plaintiff really makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress, there is jurisdiction, whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad. Thus in Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 68 22 S. Ct. 585, 46 L. Ed. 808, it was pointed out that, while the certificate inquired whether a federal question was involved upon the pleadings, and while the counsel had argued the merits of the case, the function of this court `is restricted to the inquiry whether, upon the allegations of the bill of complaint, assuming them to be true in point of fact, a federal question is disclosed, so as to give the circuit court jurisdiction in a suit between citizens of the same state.'" The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. S. 25, 26, 33 S. Ct. 410, 412 (57 L. Ed. 716).

In Southern Railway Company v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 36 S. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 836, it is said that the question as to responsibility under a bill of lading issued with reference to an interstate shipment is none the less a federal one because it must be resolved by the application of general principles of the common law. In Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 42 S. Ct. 164, 66 L. Ed. 325, it is held that, where a federal court takes jurisdiction on account of the presence of a federal question, it may rest its judgment upon any law, state or federal, which will enable it to dispose effectually of the case.

In Lewis on Removal, p. 207, the rule is announced that: "If the same facts show a right of action created or given by a state law, as well as one arising under a law of the United States, it is for the court to determine under which statute the action is maintainable, if at all, and if one construction of the federal statute would sustain, and another construction would defeat, a recovery under that statute, the action would be one arising under a law of the United States, and therefore of federal cognizance."

That the United States Warehouse Act is one regulating commerce is not denied, nor is its constitutionality assailed. It is contended that the...