Webb v. R&B Holding Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2781-CIV.,97-2781-CIV.
• Citation: 992 F.Supp. 1382
• Parties: Maybell WEBB, Plaintiff, v. R&B HOLDING COMPANY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

992 F.Supp. 1382

Maybell WEBB, Plaintiff, v. R&B HOLDING COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

No. 97-2781-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

January 21, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Leslie Holland, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Asley Kaplan, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY FINAL JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 3, 1997. Plaintiff filed a response on December 23, 1997.

Factual Background

Plaintiff filed a three count Complaint in this Court claiming that Defendant: (1) terminated her on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; (2) permitted a hostile working environment in violation of Title VII; and (3) discharged her in retaliation for exercising activity protected by Title VII.

Plaintiff, an English-speaking African-American, was employed by Defendant, a car dealership, as a title clerk. Plaintiff's department was predominantly Caucasian-Hispanic. Plaintiff alleges that she was subject to discrimination and harassment during her tenure with Defendant. Specifically, she alleges that she was "subjected to a Spanish speaking working environment," which created a hostile work environment. (Plain. Affidavit at ¶ 8). Plaintiff states in her affidavit that she complained to her manager about the Spanish speaking, but that her manager "failed to take any remedial action." (Plain. Affidavit at ¶ 8). In her deposition, however, Plaintiff states that after her complaints, her supervisor reprimanded the other clerks and that the Spanish speaking "stopped for a week," but then continued. (Plain.Dep. at p. 135). Plaintiff also claims that on one occasion she overheard a co-worker use the word "negra," although Plaintiff admits that she did not know in what context the word was used, whether the word was derogatory in nature, or whether the word was directed at her.

In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the Caucasian Spanish-speaking title clerks were not disciplined as often as she. In deposition, however, she admits that she did not know whether these employees had received as many customer and employee complaints as she or, indeed, how many times they had been disciplined. Plaintiff also alleges that another title clerk received higher wages than she. Specifically, she states in her affidavit that she received $10/hour while the other clerk received $12/hour. She states in her deposition, however, that she received $12/hour while the other clerk received around $13/hour. Finally, Plaintiff claims that she was terminated in retaliation for complaining to her superior "about the speaking of Spanish in the workplace." (Plain. Affidavit at ¶ 9).

Defendant asserts that it terminated Plaintiff because of her insubordination. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's supervisors had received several complaints about Plaintiff's rudeness from customers and employees. In one case, a customer's attorney sent a letter to Defendant complaining about Plaintiff's unwillingness to help the customer. When asked in deposition, "Do the customers ever complain that you've been rude to them," Plaintiff responded, "Yeah. They do it all the time if they want their tag or whatever they want pushed through. It happens all the time." (Plain. Dep. at p. 130). Plaintiff, however, states that the customer complaints were unjustified because she had never been rude. According to Defendant, the triggering incident of Plaintiff's termination was a confrontation with her newly appointed supervisor, Jackie Morales ("Morales"). Morales had asked Plaintiff to complete a task, to which Plaintiff responded that she "was in the middle of something" and that she would do it when she got the chance. (Plain.Dep. at p. 148). Morales then complained to her supervisor, Nidia Soberon ("Soberon"), about the incident. Soberon called Plaintiff into her office and asked her to carry out Morales's directive. According to Soberon, Plaintiff mumbled, "I'm not going to do it." Plaintiff claims that she actually stated "I'm not going to quit." Soberon terminated Plaintiff for insubordination based on her refusal to carry out the directive and her history of complaints from customers and co-workers.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only where it is shown that no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In ruling on the moving party's motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court "should `resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant' and draw `all justifiable inferences ... in his favor.'" United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Initially, the moving party bears the burden of pointing to that part of the record which shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993). To meet this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and "come forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Florida, Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir.1991). If the evidence relied on is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment. Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919. However, a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

In a Title VII case, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, thereby creating a presumption of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. If the employer satisfies this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the plaintiff must come forward with evidence that the proffered reasons are pre-textual. The plaintiff may accomplish this "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory motive more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).

Upon a motion for summary judgment where the employer has proffered business reasons, "[t]he district court must, in view of all the evidence, determine whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer's proffered `legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.'" Id. at 1538 (quoting Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir.1994)). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must demonstrate "`such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.'" Id. (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Analysis

I. Discriminatory Discharge

Defendant first asserts that Plaintiff's claim of discriminatory discharge cannot survive summary judgment. To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that: "(1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he was subjected to adverse job action; (3) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his classification more favorably; and (4) he was qualified to do the job." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.1997). Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. First, although Plaintiff conclusively asserts that she was qualified for the job, Defendant provides evidence that Plaintiff, in fact, was not qualified. Specifically, Defendant presents evidence showing that Plaintiff had been terminated from six prior dealerships, received multiple complaints from customers and co-workers, and had confrontations with her superiors.

Even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff was qualified for the job, Plaintiff still has not proffered any evidence showing that similarly situated Caucasian employees were treated more favorably than she. Although Plaintiff makes the broad allegation that her Caucasian-Hispanic co-workers were similarly situated, "[t]o make a comparison of the plaintiff's treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that [s]he and the employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects." Id.

The record discloses no evidence that the employees who were allegedly treated differently than Plaintiff were, in fact, similarly situated to her. First, Plaintiff admits that she does not know whether the other employees had received customer or co-worker complaints. Thus Plaintiff fails to show that her Caucasian...