Munjoy Sporting & Athletic Club v. Dow

• Decision Date: 21 July 2000
• Citation: 755 A.2d 531,2000 ME 141
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: MUNJOY SPORTING & ATHLETIC CLUB v. Malcolm DOW, Chief of the Maine State Police.

755 A.2d 531

2000 ME 141

MUNJOY SPORTING & ATHLETIC CLUB v. Malcolm DOW, Chief of the Maine State Police.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued January 6, 2000.

Decided July 21, 2000.

Marshall J. Tinkle, Esq., (orally), David M. Hirshon, Esq., Tompkins, Clough, Hirshon & Langer, P.A., Portland, for plaintiff.

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Donald Macomber, Asst. A.G. (orally), Augusta, for defendant.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and ALEXANDER, JJ.

WATHEN, C.J.

[¶ 1] Munjoy Social and Athletic Club (Munjoy) appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Crowley, J.) denying its 80C appeal from the State Police denial in January of 1998 of Munjoy's application for beano and games of chance licenses pursuant to 17 M.R.S.A. §§ 312,¹ 331² (1983 & Supp.1999). On appeal, Munjoy argues that the State Police violated Munjoy's statutory and due process rights when it denied Munjoy's applications without a hearing, and that, even if it was not entitled to a hearing, there was insufficient evidence to support denial of the applications. Because we conclude that the State Police erred by failing to hold a hearing before denying Munjoy's applications on the basis that it is not a bona fide nonprofit organization, we vacate and remand for a hearing. Munjoy also appeals from the court's (Calkins, J.) dismissal of its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Malcolm Dow personally. Munjoy contends that the court improperly based its dismissal upon Dow's assertion of immunity, and that, even if immunity were properly raised, Dow did not enjoy immunity on the facts before the court. We disagree and affirm the dismissal.

[¶ 2] Because of the procedural posture of this case, it comes before us on the investigative record created by the State Police prior to its denial of Munjoy's license applications. It appears that Munjoy is a social club that has been in existence since 1949. The club was both a fraternal and charitable organization, meeting informally at social gatherings while also contributing money and services to charities. Membership had been on the decline until 1993, when the club experienced a resurgence, growing to at least 58 members in that year. In February of that year, the club rented facilities in Portland and applied for licenses to run beano and games of chance.³ As part of the initial application process, the State Police required Munjoy to provide minutes from two years of membership meetings, a members list, affidavits of members, and two years of bank statements for any club accounts, along with a copy of its by-laws, and its certificate of incorporation. Munjoy's applications were granted, and it was required to send a representative to a workshop that reviewed the rules and regulations governing beano and games of chance.

[¶ 3] The club ran its beano operation from its Portland location until 1995, when it expanded and leased a hall of approximately 9,600 square feet in Scarborough. Over the course of the next two years, the gaming operation grew quite large; in the first six months of 1997 alone, Munjoy grossed over a million dollars on this operation. Throughout this time, Munjoy applied for and was granted licenses by the State Police. Although it is not clear from the record before us, Munjoy appears to have been granted monthly licenses in six month blocks. The application process for these subsequent licenses differed from the initial application. Instead of providing affidavits and other documents, Munjoy was assigned a number and ordered to use that number in all subsequent applications. Again, it is not clear from the record before us, but it appears that the decisions to grant the licenses from 1993 to 1997 were based upon the information Munjoy initially submitted, along with any other evidence later added to their file.⁴

[¶ 4] In mid-1997, the State Police began an investigation into whether Munjoy was a "bona fide nonprofit organization." This investigation concluded in December of that year. Approximately a month later, the State Police denied Munjoy's applications. The State Police informed Munjoy that their investigation indicated that Munjoy "does not meet the requisite qualification of being a `bona fide nonprofit organization.'" Munjoy protested this decision and was allowed to file additional documents to supplement the State Police's investigatory record. The police issued a license for the month of February while they reviewed Munjoy's filing, but again concluded that Munjoy was not a "bona fide nonprofit organization" and therefore did not qualify for the licenses. At no point did the State Police hold a hearing on Munjoy's applications.

[¶ 5] Following the denial of its licenses, Munjoy filed the present action in Superior Court. In addition to an 80C appeal of the denial of its license applications, Munjoy also included a request for injunctive relief, a claim for the violation of Maine civil rights law, and a section 1983 claim against Chief Malcolm Dow in his personal capacity. The State Police and Dow answered the complaint, asserted qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, and moved for dismissal on Munjoy's claims for section 1983 damages and for relief under Maine civil rights law. The court granted the motion. Shortly thereafter, the court, finding that the license denials were clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record, also denied the 80C appeal and upheld the State Police determination that Munjoy was not a bona fide nonprofit corporation. Munjoy appeals from the judgment.

[¶ 6] We consider Munjoy's 80C appeal first. When the Superior Court acts in its appellate capacity pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, we review the administrative decision directly. See Maine Bankers Ass'n v. Bureau of Banking, 684 A.2d 1304, 1305-06 (Me.1996). "The standard of review is limited to whether the [governmental agency] abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record." Davric Maine Corp. v. Maine Harness Racing Comm'n, 1999 ME 99, ¶ 7, 732 A.2d 289, 293. We will vacate a decision only if

The administrative findings, inferences, or conclusions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by bias or error of law; (5) Unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.

Hale-Rice v. Maine State Retirement Sys., 1997 ME 64, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 1232, 1235.

[¶ 7] Munjoy argues that both Maine law and the United States Constitution entitle it to a hearing on its license applications. We address Munjoy's state law contentions first. Munjoy argues that its applications were renewals of existing licenses and therefore a hearing was required by the Administrative Procedures Act. Whether the Munjoy applications sought the renewal of existing licenses is a matter of statutory interpretation and therefore a question of law. See Cook v. Lisbon Sch. Comm., 682 A.2d 672, 676 (Me.1996). We review questions of law de novo. See Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 572 (Me.1995).

[¶ 8] Munjoy is correct in its argument that if its applications are for a renewal of its licenses, then it is entitled to an administrative hearing. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 10003(1) (1989). A hearing would also be required under the beano and games of chance statutes if we were to find that the denial of Munjoy's applications were a revocation of existing licenses. See 17 M.R.S.A. §§ 317-A, 343-A (Supp.1999). No hearing is required, however, if Munjoy's applications are, as the State Police contend, applications for new licenses rather than for the renewal of old licenses. The State Police have been given authority by the Legislature to administer the beano and games of chance statutes. "When the dispute involves an agency's interpretation of a statute administered by it, the agency's interpretation, although not binding on the Court, is accorded great deference and will be upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result." Maine Bankers Association,684 A.2d at 1306; Davric Maine Corp.,1999 ME 99, ¶ 7,732 A.2d at 293. Munjoy argues that the State Police have not been consistent in their interpretation of the statutes. Although, the police have consistently stated that all applications are new, Munjoy argues that the State Police practice in this area—i.e., basing its subsequent grants of licenses upon information garnered as part of Munjoy's initial application—indicates that even the State Police considered Munjoy's application a renewal.

[¶ 9] Although we agree there is a superficial inconsistency between the actions and words of the State Police, we are unable to agree that it should affect our analysis of the statute. Administrative practice cannot alter statutory language. Even if we were to accept Munjoy's contentions regarding the State Police interpretation, the statutes compel the contrary reading. In stark contrast to other statutes that explicitly mention renewal licenses,⁵ the beano and games of chance statutes make no provision for either the renewal or the reissuance of old licenses, which instead simply expire upon the completion of their term. Therefore, when the State Police denied Munjoy's applications, they neither refused to renew nor revoked an old license. Munjoy has no statutory right to a hearing under Maine law.

[¶ 10] Munjoy next argues that the failure to provide a hearing was a violation of its procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution. "The requirements of procedural due process [protect citizens against] the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Though the Constitution protects property...