Davric Maine Corp. v. Harness Rac. Com'n

• Citation: 1999 ME 99,732 A.2d 289
• Parties: DAVRIC MAINE CORPORATION, et al. v. MAINE HARNESS RACING COMMISSION, et al.
• Decision Date: 29 June 1999
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

732 A.2d 289

1999 ME 99

DAVRIC MAINE CORPORATION, et al. v. MAINE HARNESS RACING COMMISSION, et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 3, 1999.

Decided June 29, 1999.

Edward S. MacColl, (orally), Thompson, Bull, Furey, Bass & MacColl, LLC, P.A., Portland, (for Davric Maine Corp.), Daniel R. Warren, (orally), Jones & Warren, PA, Scarborough, (for Maine Alliance of Harness Horsemen), for plaintiffs.

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Susan Sapraco, Asst. Atty. Gen., (orally), Patrick M. Downey, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, (for Maine Harness Racing Commission), Craig J. Rancourt, (orally), Biddeford, (for Maine Harness Horsemen's Association), for defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and CALKINS, JJ.

WATHEN, C.J.

[¶ 1] Davric Maine Corporation, the owner and operator of Scarborough Downs racetrack, and the Maine Alliance of Harness Horsemen and Women appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Brennan, J.) affirming a decision of the Maine Harness Racing Commission. Plaintiffs argue that the court erred in failing to vacate the Commission's certification of election results selecting the Maine Harness Horsemen's Association (MHHA) as the exclusive bargaining agent for harness horse owners, trainers, and drivers at Scarborough Downs. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

[¶ 2] Maine's harness racing law requires the Commission to conduct and certify elections biannually to determine "the exclusive bargaining agent to represent licensed harness horse owners, trainers and drivers at each racetrack within that racing segment." 8 M.R.S.A. § 285-A(2) (Supp.1998). Specifically, the statute sets forth the following requirements for the election procedure:

During each January preceding such an election, the commission, in consultation with the racetracks within each racing segment and in consultation with the existing representatives of licensed harness horse owners, trainers and drivers within that racing segment shall prepare a list of eligible voters within each racing segment. During February of each year for which elections are to be held, the commission shall prepare and forward to each eligible voter within each racing segment a ballot for the election of the exclusive bargaining agent within that racing segment. The ballot must include the name of any incorporated entity that during the preceding January has requested in writing to have its name included on the ballot for that racing segment. Eligible voters for each racing segment are entitled to vote in the election held for that racing segment either by returning the commission's official mailed ballot to the commission no later than the following February 28th or by appearing and voting in person, by secret ballot, at the public polling conducted pursuant to subsection 3.

Id.

[¶ 3] In December 1997 and January 1998, both the Alliance and the MHHA informed the Commission that they wished to be candidates in the Scarborough Downs segment of the elections. A ballot was printed by the Commission's staff and mailed to eligible voters in February 1998, incorrectly identifying the Alliance as the "Maine Alliance Horsemen's Association." The Alliance requested immediate corrective measures.

[¶ 4] The Commission subsequently created and mailed a second ballot, correctly identifying the Alliance. The second ballot instructed:

PLEASE DESTROY THE BALLOT MAILED ON FEBRUARY 11, 1998. USE ONLY THE ENCLOSED BALLOT FOR VOTING IN THE SCARBOROUGH DOWNS SEGMENT.

THOSE BALLOTS RECEIVED FOR THE SCARBOROUGH DOWNS BARGAINING AGENT SEGMENT WITH THE INCORRECT ORGANIZATIONS NAMES WILL BE DESTROYED.

YOU MUST PRINT AND SIGN YOUR NAME ON THE BACK OF THE SELF ADDRESSED STAMPED ENVELOPE. FAILURE TO DO THIS WILL INVALIDATE YOUR BALLOT.

The ballot instructions stated that the deadline for receipt of ballots returned by mail was March 4, 1998, at 5:00 pm. In conjunction with the ballot mailing and pursuant to the statute, the Commission also conducted public polling, allowing all eligible voters to cast ballots in person at Scarborough Downs on March 7.

[¶ 5] All ballots received by mail by the March 4 deadline and all ballots cast in person on March 7 were tallied with the following results, as recorded in a memorandum generated by the Commission staff:

210 acceptable votes were counted. The vote was 113 for the Maine Harness Horsemen's Association. The vote was 97 for the Maine Alliance for Horsemen and Horsewomen.

233 votes were cast and 23 were disallowed in the following breakdown.

15 were not identifiable

2 arrived after 5:00 p.m. on March 4, 1998 at the Commission Office.

2 were handed to Henry ... before the poles on March 7, 1998

2 had sticker labels

2 had Nancy Simpson's name on the envelopes

[¶ 6] As stated in its printed agenda, the Commission planned to certify the election results at its April 2 meeting. Although no recording was made of that portion of the meeting pertaining to the certification of the election results, the Commission certified the MHHA as the winner of the election. Plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court from the Commission's certification of the election pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The Superior Court affirmed and plaintiffs now appeal to this Court.

[¶ 7] When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court and receives no additional evidence, we review directly the record developed before the administrative agency. See Lewiston Raceway, Inc. v. Maine State Harness Racing Comm'n, 593 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1991). "The standard of review is `limited to whether the [governmental agency] abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record.'" Id. (quoting Robinson v. Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement Sys., 523 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Me.1987)). The administrative agency's "interpretation of a statute administered by it, while not conclusive or binding on this court, will be given great deference and should be upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result." Town of Madison v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 231, 234 (Me.1996).

[¶ 8] Plaintiffs initially argue that the Commission's failure to tape record its meeting was an error that required the case to be remanded. Plaintiffs further contend that even if the Commission did not err by failing to tape record the meeting, the record was insufficient for judicial review and the court should have remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 11006(1)(D) (1989).

[¶ 9] The Administrative Procedures Act requires an agency to record any hearing in an "adjudicatory proceeding." 5 M.R.S.A. § 9059(2) (1989). The APA defines "adjudicatory proceeding" as "any proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific persons are required by constitutional law or statute to be determined after an opportunity for hearing." 5 M.R.S.A. § 8002(1) (1989).

[¶ 10] The harness racing statute provides the Commission with a simple rule for the certification of election results: "If one entity receives more than 50% of the total ballots cast under subsections 2 and 3 for election of an exclusive bargaining agent within a racing segment, that bargaining agent shall be certified by the commission as the exclusive bargaining agent within that segment." 8 M.R.S.A. § 285-A(4) (Supp.1998) (emphasis added).¹ Although neither the APA nor the harness racing statute define "certify" or "certification," to "certify" is "[t]o confirm formally as true, accurate, or genuine, esp. in writing." Webster's II: New Riverside University Dictionary 245 (1984). "Certification" is generally defined as the "formal assertion in writing of some fact." Black's Law Dictionary 155 (6th ed.1991).

[¶ 11] The Commission meeting was not an "adjudicatory proceeding" because the certification was not the "determination of legal rights, duties or privileges" of a party required to be determined only "after an opportunity for fair hearing." It was simply the confirmation of the results of an election: the election itself defined the rights and duties of the candidates. Although the Commission allowed individuals to speak at the meeting, the Commission was not required to do so nor did it regard such statements as formal testimony. Because the Commission's certification was not an adjudicatory proceeding, it was not subject to the APA's hearing requirement. Moreover, the ballots, staff memorandum, and other documents in the administrative record provide a sufficient basis for judicial review of the certification. Therefore, the Superior Court did not err in declining to remand the case.

[¶ 12] Plaintiffs next argue that irregularities in the election process violated the statute and deprived them of constitutional rights. First, plaintiffs contend that the Commission violated the statute by scheduling the public polling at Scarborough Downs in March 1998. The statute specifies that the election be held at each racetrack "on one of the first 3 live race dates assigned to the track within the calendar year," 8 M.R.S.A. § 285-A(3), yet the first three dates at Scarborough Downs in 1998 were in January. Similarly, plaintiffs argue that the Commission violated the statute by counting all mailed ballots received by 5:00 pm on March 4 despite the statute's...