Fernández-Santos v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 17-2331 (FAB) related to Criminal No. 14-225 (FAB) |
| Citation | 530 F.Supp.3d 208 |
| Parties | Diego FERNÁNDEZ-SANTOS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Diego Fernández-Santos, Jesup, GA, Pro Se.
Mariana E. Bauza, United States Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Respondent.
Diego Fernández-Santos ("Fernández") is serving a 76-month term of imprisonment for drug-trafficking and unlawful firearm possession. (Crim. Docket No. 99.)1 Before the Court is Fernández's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255 (" section 2255"). (Docket No. 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the section 2255 motion is DENIED .
On February 13, 2014, federal law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Fernández's residence. (Crim. Docket No. 84.) The officers seized a firearm, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. Id. Subsequently, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Fernández with possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. sections 924(c) and 922(g)(1), respectively. (Crim. Docket. No. 1.)
Trial commenced on June 9, 2014. (Crim. Docket No. 52.) Before the United States rested, however, Fernández pled guilty to all counts in the indictment. (Crim. Docket No. 53.) He then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (Crim. Docket No. 72.) The Court denied this motion. United States v. Fernández, 136 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.P.R. 2015) (Besosa, J.). Fernández received a concurrent sentence of 16 months imprisonment as to counts one and three, and a consecutive sentence of 60 months imprisonment as to count two. (Crim. Docket. No. 110.)
The Court had previously placed Fernández on supervised release regarding a prior drug conviction. Crim. Docket No. 86 at p. 8; see Crim. No. 11-240, Docket No. 122. Because the offenses committed by Fernández in Criminal Case No. 14-255 violated the conditions of his supervised release, the Court also imposed a consecutive sentence of 24 months imprisonment for the revocation. (Crim. Docket No. 108 at p. 20.)
On appeal, Fernández asserted that the Court committed two errors. First, he argued that the consecutive sentence for the revocation of supervised release was unreasonable. United States v. Fernández-Santos, 856 F.3d 10, 20 (1st Cir. 2017). Second, Fernández purportedly pled guilty without understanding the charges set forth in the indictment. Id. at 20. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the criminal disposition in toto. Id. at 22.
On November 30, 2017, Fernández filed a pro se motion to vacate the 76-month sentence, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Civil Docket No. 1.) Fernández also moved for a "change of venue," requesting that the Court recuse itself from this proceeding. (Civil Docket No. 2.) The United States responded to both motions. (Civil Docket Nos. 14 & 15.) Fernández replied. (Civil Docket No. 17.)
Section 2255 embodies the common law writ of habeas corpus , an extraordinary remedy for "convictions that violate fundamental fairness."
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (citation and quotation omitted). Pursuant to section 2255, a prisoner in federal custody may move "to vacate, set aside or correct [his or her] sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). "[T]he statute provides for post-conviction relief in four instances, namely, if the petitioner's sentence (1) was imposed in violation of the Constitution, or (2) was imposed by a court that lacked jurisdiction, or (3) exceeded the statutory maximum, or (4) was otherwise subject to collateral attack." David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) ).
The applicable statute of limitations is one year, beginning on the date that "judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) ; see Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 100 (1st Cir. 2008) ().2 For petitioners who appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, judgment is final when certiorari is denied, or the conviction is affirmed. Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999) ). Because Fernández did not seek certiorari review, the limitations period commenced "when the time [expired] for ... contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction." Ramos-Martínez v. United States, 638 F.3d 315, 320-21 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) ).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Fernández's conviction and sentence on May 1, 2017. Fernández-Santos, 856 F.3d 10, 14. A petition for a writ of certiorari "is timely when it is filed with the [Clerk of the Supreme Court] within 90 days after entry of judgment." See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. The period of limitations began on July 30, 2017, the deadline for Fernández to seek certiorari review. See, e.g., United States v. Cheng, 392 F. Supp. 3d 141, 150 (D. Mass. 2019). The Bureau of Prisons mail service received Fernández's habeas petition on November 6, 2017. Civil Docket No. 12, Ex. 3; Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2002) (). Accordingly, the section 2255 motion is timely.
Section 2255 is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1758, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016). "[A]s a general rule, federal prisoners may not use a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to relitigate a claim that was previously rejected [by the appellate court]." Id. (citations omitted.) Moreover, "[c]ollateral relief in a § 2255 proceeding is generally unavailable if the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise the claim in a timely manner at trial or on direct appeal." Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted.) Relief for claims not raised at trial or on direct appeal is inappropriate unless the petitioner can demonstrate both (1) cause for the procedural default, and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the error asserted. Id.; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).
Generally, postconviction relief requires a "sufficient showing of fundamental unfairness." Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1994). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is, however, an exception to this rule. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003) (); see Rivera-Rivera v. United States, 844 F.3d 367, 372 (1st Cir. 2016) (). Because Fernández claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court will adjudicate the section 2255 motion on the merits. see e.g., Lasalle-Velázquez v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 188 (D.P.R. 2013) () (Fusté, J.).
Fernández is dissatisfied with trial and appellate counsel. Attorney Humberto Guzmán-Rodríguez ("Guzmán") allegedly "coerced" Fernández to plead guilty. (Civil Docket No. 1, Ex. 1 at p. 9.) On appeal, attorney José Gaztambide-Añeses ("Gaztambide") purportedly failed to raise claims pertaining to judicial participation in plea negotiations. Id. at p. 7.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions "the accused shall enjoy the right to [...] the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend VI. The principles set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), govern ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Rojas-Medina v. United States, 924 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2019). Fernández must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) that this deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court presumes that "counsel's strategy and tactics fall within the range of reasonable professional assistance." Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).
The Sixth Amendment "does not guarantee [Fernández] a letter-perfect defense or a successful defense; rather, the performance standard is that of reasonably effective assistance under the circumstances then obtaining." United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309-10 (1st Cir. 1991). The Strickland analysis is "highly demanding" and places a "heavy burden" on Fernández. Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ).
The effective assistance of counsel claim is based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (" Rule 11"). (Civil Docket No. 1, Ex. 1.) This rule prohibits the Court from participating in plea negotiations. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). According to Fernández, Guzmán acquiesced to the purported Rule 11 vio...
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