State v. Aragón

• Decision Date: 21 March 2022
• Docket Number: CR-20-0304-PR
• Citation: 66 Arizona Cases Digest 4,505 P.3d 657
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. Hon. Gus ARAGÓN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA, Respondent Judge, Max Fontes, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

66 Arizona Cases Digest 4

505 P.3d 657

STATE of Arizona, Petitioner,

v. Hon. Gus ARAGÓN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA, Respondent Judge,Max Fontes, Real Party in Interest.

No. CR-20-0304-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed March 21, 2022

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, John Johnson, Chief Counsel, Nicholas Klingerman (argued), Section Chief Counsel, Joshua S. Moser, Rachel Heintz, Assistant Attorneys General, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona

John D. Kaufmann (argued), John D. Kaufmann, Attorney At Law, Tucson, Attorney for Max Fontes

Mikel Steinfeld (argued), Kevin Heade, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

David L. Abney, Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association for Justice/Arizona Trial Lawyers Association

JUSTICE KING authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, and MONTGOMERY joined.

JUSTICE KING, opinion of the Court:

¶1 In this review of a special action opinion of the court of appeals, we consider what constitutes an intervening event in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on superseding cause. Because the alleged conduct of a victim of the collision in this case occurred simultaneously with the defendant's alleged criminal conduct, we hold as a matter of law that the defendant is not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In April 2018, Max Fontes was allegedly driving between seventy and ninety-five miles per hour in an area with a posted speed limit of forty-five miles per hour when he struck Angel Shelby's vehicle as Shelby was attempting to make a left-hand turn.¹ Shelby and his seven-month-old son, G.T., were not restrained, and both were ejected from the vehicle. Shelby suffered serious injuries and G.T. died. Shelby's blood tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC").² Shelby later pled guilty to driving under the influence and endangerment. Fontes was charged with manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault, and criminal damage.

¶3 Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Fontes from presenting evidence that (1) Shelby and G.T. were not restrained in their vehicle, (2) a post-collision blood analysis revealed the presence of THC in Shelby's blood, and (3) marijuana and a glass pipe were found in Shelby's vehicle after the collision. The State also sought to preclude Fontes from raising a superseding cause defense. In response, Fontes claimed he was entitled to present a superseding cause defense because Shelby's acts in failing to restrain himself and G.T., driving under the influence, and failing to yield to oncoming traffic were unforeseeable. The trial court denied the motion to preclude Fontes from raising a superseding cause defense, finding that Shelby's acts could constitute a superseding cause if the jury found they occurred, were unforeseeable, and were extraordinary or abnormal.

¶4 The State filed a petition for special action, and the court of appeals accepted jurisdiction and granted relief by vacating the trial court's order. The court of appeals explained that "an intervening cause cannot be considered a superseding cause when the defendant's conduct increases the foreseeable risk of a particular harm occurring through ... a second actor." State v. Aragón , 249 Ariz. 573, 575 ¶ 7, 473 P.3d 358, 360 (App. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Slover , 220 Ariz. 239, 244 ¶ 11, 204 P.3d 1088, 1093 (App. 2009) ). The court concluded that a superseding cause instruction was precluded here because "Fontes's speeding created the foreseeable risk that a fatal accident could occur. That Shelby's conduct increased that risk does not entitle Fontes to a superseding-cause instruction." Id. at 576 ¶ 9, 473 P.3d at 361.

¶5 We granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred by accepting special action jurisdiction and by precluding a superseding cause defense instruction for Fontes. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Superseding Cause Jury Instruction

¶6 At the trial court, the State sought to preclude Fontes from raising a superseding cause defense. Fontes claims he is entitled to present a superseding cause defense, and he seeks a jury instruction on superseding cause. This Court has made clear that "[a] party is entitled to an instruction on any theory of the case reasonably supported by the evidence." State v. Bolton , 182 Ariz. 290, 309, 896 P.2d 830, 849 (1995). We review a trial court's decision to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville , 211 Ariz. 468, 471 ¶ 8, 123 P.3d 662, 665(2005). A court abuses its discretion by giving an instruction contrary to law or unsupported by the record. See State v. Romero , 239 Ariz. 6, 9 ¶ 11, 365 P.3d 358, 361 (2016) ; Bolton , 182 Ariz. at 309, 896 P.2d at 849.

¶7 Fontes was allegedly driving well over the posted speed limit when he collided with Shelby's vehicle. Fontes concedes he contributed to the collision with Shelby's vehicle but claims his legal responsibility ended at the moment of the collision. Fontes argues Shelby's injuries and G.T.’s death occurred after the collision as a result of being ejected from Shelby's vehicle. Fontes claims that Shelby's (1) failure to use seatbelt restraints, (2) use of marijuana, and (3) failure to yield to oncoming traffic were all intervening, superseding events that broke the causal chain, thereby relieving Fontes of criminal liability. Fontes seeks a superseding cause jury instruction on this basis.

¶8 To obtain a criminal conviction against Fontes for manslaughter, aggravated assault, or criminal damage, the State must prove the element of causation. See A.R.S. § 13-203(A) (explaining when "[c]onduct is the cause of a result" for purposes of criminal liability); see also A.R.S. § 13-1103 (manslaughter); A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, -1204 (assault and aggravated assault); A.R.S. § 13-1602 (criminal damage). This includes the requirement to show that "[b]ut for the conduct the result in question would not have occurred." § 13-203(A)(1) ; see also Torres v. JAI Dining Servs. (Phx.) Inc., 252 Ariz. 28, 30–31 ¶ 11, 497 P.3d 481, 483–84 (2021) (explaining that for " ‘[a]ctual cause,’ sometimes called ‘cause in fact,’ " the "key inquiry is whether [the] deaths would not have occurred ‘but for’ [defendant's] acts," in a civil case involving negligence and dram shop liability claims).

¶9 The State must also show proximate cause, sometimes called legal cause. See § 13-203(A) ; see also State v. Lawson , 144 Ariz. 547, 559, 698 P.2d 1266, 1278 (1985) (explaining it was proper for the trial court "to give a ‘but for’ test for causation with a proximate cause instruction"; the trial court acted properly "in defining both standards to the jury"); State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 236, 801 P.2d 468, 471 (App. 1990) ; see also Torres , 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12, 497 P.3d at 484 (noting that "[p]roximate cause" is "sometimes called ‘legal cause’ "). "Proximate cause" exists if the alleged criminal act produced an injury or death "in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause." Torres , 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12, 497 P.3d at 484 (quoting Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc. , 163 Ariz. 539, 546, 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) ); see also State v. Smith , 160 Ariz. 507, 509–10, 774 P.2d 811, 813–14 (1989). We have held in the tort context that proximate causation is broken when some other intervening act is a superseding cause of an injury or death:

An intervening cause is an independent cause that occurs between a defendant's ... conduct and the final harm and is necessary in bringing about that harm. It becomes a superseding cause, which relieves the original ... actor from liability, when an intervening act of another was unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor and when, looking backward, after the event, the intervening act appears extraordinary.

Torres , 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12, 497 P.3d at 484 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Bass , 198 Ariz. 571, 576 ¶ 13, 12 P.3d 796, 801 (2000) ("Our criminal standard for superseding cause will henceforth be the same as our tort standard.").

¶10 A superseding cause relieves the original actor of liability. Torres , 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12, 497 P.3d at 484 ; see also Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am. , 147 Ariz. 160, 168, 709 P.2d 517, 525 (1985). To determine whether an event is a superseding cause of an injury or death, the threshold issue is whether it is an intervening event. Rossell , 147 Ariz. at 168–69, 709 P.2d at 525–26. If it is not an intervening event, it is not a superseding cause as a matter of law. Id. In this case, therefore, to determine whether a superseding cause jury instruction is appropriate, we must first decide whether Shelby's alleged conduct was an intervening event.

¶11 "An intervening force is defined as being one that actively operates in producing harm after the original actor's ... act or omission has been committed." Herzberg v. White , 49 Ariz. 313, 321, 66 P.2d 253 (1937) (emphasis added) (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 441 (Am. Law Inst. 1934) ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 441(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1965). Thus, an intervening event is a "later cause of independent origin." Ontiveros v. Borak , 136 Ariz. 500, 505–06, 667 P.2d 200, 205–06 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 44 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Torres , 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12, 497 P.3d at 484 ("An intervening cause is an independent cause that occurs between a defendant's ... conduct and the final harm ...."); Rossell , 147 Ariz. at 168, 709 P.2d at 525 ("An intervening cause is...