Leavitt v. Swain

• Decision Date: 06 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 25233.,25233.
• Citation: 991 P.2d 349,133 Idaho 624
• Parties: Allen LEAVITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary E. SWAIN, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

991 P.2d 349

133 Idaho 624

Allen LEAVITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary E. SWAIN, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 25233.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 1999 Term.

December 6, 1999.

Hepworth, Lezamiz & Hohnhorst, Boise, for appellant. John J. Janis argued.

Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Boise, for respondent. Mark S. Prusynski argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

This is a review of a decision from the Court of Appeals involving an automobile accident. The plaintiff was injured when his vehicle collided with the defendant's vehicle. Following trial, the jury found the plaintiff to be 25% negligent and the defendant to be 75% negligent. The plaintiff filed various post-trial motions, all of which were denied. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that there was no basis for the jury's finding that the plaintiff had been at fault. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and assigned 100% of the fault to the defendant. The defendant now seeks review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. We affirm the decision of the district court in part and reverse in part, and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of January 1, 1994, two vehicles collided on an icy section of Middleton Road near Caldwell. Just prior to the accident, plaintiff Allen Leavitt had been traveling south, and defendant Mary Swain had been traveling north. The accident, which was essentially head-on, severely damaged both vehicles. In addition, Leavitt claimed to be permanently disabled due to the accident.

Leavitt sued Swain to recover for his injuries, requesting compensation for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of past and future earning capacity. In his pleadings, Leavitt claimed that Swain had been negligent in the operation of her vehicle at the time of the accident. After denying Leavitt's motion for partial summary judgment, the case went to trial. At trial, Leavitt testified that Swain's vehicle began fishtailing prior to the accident. This testimony was supported by the testimony of Kara O'Dell, a passenger in Leavitt's car at the time of the accident. Mary Swain also testified that her vehicle had begun sliding on the ice prior to the accident, but that she did not know if she had crossed the centerline.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned special verdicts finding that Swain had been 75% negligent in causing the accident and that Leavitt had been 25% negligent. The jury awarded Leavitt $37,300 in damages which were modified in accordance with his level of negligence. The award was further reduced by the amounts already paid by Swain's insurance company prior to trial. On May 31, 1996, the district court entered judgment on the verdict, leaving Leavitt with a final judgment of $20,975.

Following the judgment on the verdict, Leavitt made post-trial motions, among which were motions for j.n.o.v., new trial, and additur in lieu of a new trial. These motions were based, in part, on Leavitt's claim that one of the jurors had brought extraneous information to the jury deliberations. After all of these motions were denied, Leavitt appealed.

The Court of Appeals issued its decision on August 7, 1998. It reversed the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the district court's denial of Leavitt's motion for j.n.o.v. was in error. It reasoned that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to allow the jury to conclude that Leavitt had been 25% negligent, and thus, the jury's verdict on that issue was set aside.

Next, the Court of Appeals held that Leavitt's motion for a new trial should be remanded to allow the district court to create its own assessment of the damages so that it could then determine if the jury's verdict was the result of passion or prejudice. The Court of Appeals also found that statements made by defense counsel in closing arguments did not warrant a new trial.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the investigation into the allegation of juror misconduct was not sufficient, and that the investigation should be broadened; or in the alternative, that a new trial on damages should be held as an appropriate remedy. Finally, the Court of Appeals declined to hear the issue of the Rule 68 offer of judgment because the court had already determined that the assignment of 25% liability to Leavitt was improper.

On October 20, 1998, Swain filed a petition for review, seeking a review of the Court of Appeals' decision relating to the issue of Leavitt's liability. On December 31, 1998, this Court granted review of all the issues presented on appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court does not merely review the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Rather, this Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the decision of the district court. Northland Ins. Co. v. Boise's Best Autos & Repairs, 131 Idaho 432, 433, 958 P.2d 589, 590 (1998). However, this Court does give serious consideration to the decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. Ordinarily, when this Court decides to grant review, this Court will hear all the issues presented to the Court of Appeals. Sato v. Schossberger, 117 Idaho 771, 774, 792 P.2d 336, 339 (1990).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Properly Denied Leavitt's Motion For Directed Verdict, Motion For J.N.O.V. And Motion For A New Trial.

1. Leavitt's Motions For Directed Verdict And J.N.O.V. Were Properly Denied.

Leavitt contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where all of the witnesses agreed that Swain caused the accident by crossing the centerline. Swain counters that she never admitted to crossing the centerline, and that the evidence is inconclusive.

In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion for j.n.o.v. or a directed verdict, this Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court when originally hearing the motion. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). When a court reviews a motion for j.n.o.v. under I.R.C.P. 50(b), the motion is treated as a delayed motion for a directed verdict and applies the same standard for both. Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. When ruling on a motion for j.n.o.v. the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943 P.2d 912, 921 (1997).

"Upon a motion for JNOV, the moving party ... admits the truth of all the adverse evidence and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." Id. at 496, 943 P.2d at 922. It is not a question of no evidence on the side of the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could find for the non-moving party. Quick, 111 Idaho at 763, 727 P.2d at 1191. This Court will not make a finding of substantial evidence in favor of the non-moving party if it concludes "that there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached." Id. at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. In deciding a motion for j.n.o.v. the trial court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses. Instead, it must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Lanham, 130 Idaho at 496, 943 P.2d at 922.

In this case, the district court identified several areas where the evidence, if construed in light most favorable to Swain, could lead to different verdicts by reasonable juries. The court and the jury heard evidence that Leavitt knew the road was icy and yet still traveled at 35 miles per hour. Additionally, there was evidence that Leavitt hit his brakes on the ice prior to impact, that there was debris in both lanes of travel, and that Swain never admitted that she crossed the centerline.

This evidence, while circumstantial and hardly dispositive, must be construed in favor of Swain and the jury verdict. Construing the evidence thus, could lead to the conclusion that Leavitt had been 25% negligent. Conflicting circumstantial evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for j.n.o.v. Juarez v. Aardema, 128 Idaho 687, 694, 918 P.2d 271, 278 (1996). Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision denying Leavitt's motion for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

2. Leavitt's Motion For A New Trial Was Properly Denied.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred when it failed to grant Leavitt's motion for a new trial on damages. However, upon review of the record, it is clear that Leavitt did not base his motion for a new trial on the jury's inadequate award of damages. Rule 59(a)(5) (grounds for new trial on inadequate damages) was neither argued nor even cited to the district court in Leavitt's motion for a new trial.

Leavitt's motion for a new trial included several citations to Rule 59(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the grounds for new trials. Among these were: 59(a)(1), irregularity in the proceedings; 59(a)(2), misconduct of the jury; and 59(a)(7), error in law occurring after the trial.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) is the appropriate section for requesting a new trial based on "[e]xcessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Id.

This Court has held that when a motion for a new trial is made under Rule 59(a), failure to specify which subsection is fatal to the motion. Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350, 352 (1991) ("Because the plaintiff failed to allege grounds for a new trial with particularity, the trial court properly denied the motion for a new trial and we affirm the denial."). Because Leavitt failed to cite the correct subsection of Rule 59(a) the decision of the district court denying Leavitt's motion for a new trial is affirmed.

B. The...