A.A. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re V.A.)

• Decision Date: 18 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 02S04–1602–JT–93.,02S04–1602–JT–93.
• Citation: 51 N.E.3d 1140
• Parties: In re the Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship of V.A. (Minor Child), and A.A. (Father), Appellant (Respondent below), v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee (Petitioner below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

51 N.E.3d 1140

In re the Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship of V.A. (Minor Child), and A.A. (Father), Appellant (Respondent below)

v.Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee (Petitioner below).

No. 02S04–1602–JT–93.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 18, 2016.

Gregory L. Fumarolo, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert J. Henke, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 02A04–1405–JT–233

RUCKER

, Justice.

In a joint proceeding the trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their daughter concluding there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal will not be remedied and that termination is in the child's best interests. Determining the evidence in this case does not clearly and convincingly support termination of Father's parental rights, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2012, S.A. (“Mother”) and A.A. (“Father”) (sometimes referred to as “Parents”) were married and lived together raising their then-two-year-old daughter, V.A. In July 2012, Mother contacted the Allen County office of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) expressing concerns of being overwhelmed in caring for V.A. (sometimes referred to as “Child”). DCS involvement revealed that Mother had untreated mental health issues that prevented her from properly caring for her child. At the time, Mother was V.A.'s primary caretaker while Father was at work. After several weeks of working with the parents, DCS eventually removed V.A. from the home of Mother and Father and placed her into foster care. At a December 3, 2012 fact-finding hearing, the trial court determined that Mother suffered from schizo-effective disorder.¹ V.A. was adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) and a dispositional hearing was held. The dispositional decree included a Parent Participation Plan for Father and Mother with the goal of reunification. V.A. remained in foster care under the dispositional decree while Parents worked towards reunification. At a July 31, 2013 permanency hearing, the trial court adopted DCS' petition to change the Plan to termination of parental rights. On April 28, 2014, following a four-day termination hearing,² the trial court issued a joint Order terminating the parental rights of both Father and Mother.

Father appealed challenging the trial court's conclusion that “there is a reasonable probability the conditions necessitating V.A.'s removal will not be remedied.” Br. of Appellant at 10. Father also challenged “any finding or inference made by the trial court which determined that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of V.A.” Id Lastly, he contended “the State failed to prove that termination was in the best interests of the child....” Id. at 7. In a Memorandum Decision the Court of Appeals rejected Father's claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment. See In re V.A., No. 02A04–1405–JT–233

, at *11–14, 2014 WL 7236538 (Ind.Ct.App. Dec. 18, 2014). We now grant Father's transfer petition and reverse the judgment of the trial court.³ Additional facts are set forth below as necessary.

Standard of Review

In reviewing whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate “we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind.2010)

. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give “due regard” to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (quoting Tr. Rule 52(A) ). “We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.2005). In order “to determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132.

Discussion

I.

Indiana Code section 31–35–2–4(b)(2)

provides that a petition to terminate parental rights of a child in need of services must allege:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31–34–21–5.6

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a

threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

The State is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind.2009)

. This is a higher burden than establishing a mere preponderance. Id. at n. 1. As this Court has previously explained:

In ordinary civil actions a fact in issue is ... sufficiently proved by a preponderance of evidence. However, clear and convincing proof is a standard frequently imposed in civil cases where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims which have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals to prove willful, wrongful and unlawful acts to justify an exceptional judicial remedy....

Estate of Reasor v, Putnam Cnty., 635 N.E.2d 153, 159–60 (Ind.1994)

(omissions in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 360 (Ind.1982) (quotation omitted)); accord

J.C.C. v. State, 897 N.E.2d 931, 934–35 (Ind.2008). This heightened standard is of particular import within the context of termination proceedings because “the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind.2014) (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) ).

“[T]he parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Neal v. DeKalb Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind.2003)

(quotation omitted). And a parent's interest in the upbringing of his or her child is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality op.). Therefore, the certainty of a trial court's decision to terminate a parent's parental rights to his or her child is paramount. As the United States Supreme Court has elaborated:

When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it. “If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation.... A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.”

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)

(quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) ). That is not to say that a reviewing court may reverse a trial court's judgment based on a belief that the parent-child relationship should be preserved and support that determination by rummaging through the record to obtain evidence that may support the denial of a petition to terminate. To be sure, on review our analysis is centered on the findings of fact and conclusions of law determined by the trial court. See

In re I. A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132. Nevertheless, in following the Supreme Court's admonition to apply a heightened standard of proof in termination cases, we must be mindful that “a standard of proof loses much of its value if a reviewing court does not apply sufficient scrutiny to enforce it.” Karen A. Wyle, Fundamental Versus Deferential: Appellate Review of Terminations of Parental Rights, 86 Ind. L.J. Supp. 29, 37 (2011)

. And where the trial court's judgment demonstrates clear error our appellate authority permits us to reverse. See Tr. R. 52(A) (“On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury ... the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”).

II.

The trial court determined DCS proved that the requirements of Indiana Code section 31–35–2–4(b)(2)(B)(i)

—that there is a reasonable probability that reasons that brought about the child's placement outside the home will not be remedied—was satisfied. The trial court also found that termination was in...