Abrams & Fox, Inc. v. Briney

• Decision Date: 29 May 1974
• Citation: 114 Cal.Rptr. 328,39 Cal.App.3d 604
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ABRAMS & FOX, INC., a law corporation and Martin L. Abrams, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Joanne S. BRINEY and Allan K. Briney, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 41868.

Page 328

114 Cal.Rptr. 328

39 Cal.App.3d 604

ABRAMS & FOX, INC., a law corporation and Martin L. Abrams, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Joanne S. BRINEY and Allan K. Briney, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 41868.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

May 29, 1974.

Abrams, Fox & Gibson and Harry D. Fox, El Monte, for plaintiffs and appellants.

E. Robert Lemkin, Fullerton, for defendants and respondents.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Abrams & Fox, Inc., a law corporation, and Martin L. Abrams appeal from a judgment entered for defendant Allan K. Briney when plaintiffs declined to amend their complaint following the trial court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer with leave to amend.

According to the allegations of the first amended complaint plaintiffs entered an oral agreement on July 14, 1970, with Joanne S. Briney (Wife) to provide legal representation for her in marriage dissolution proceedings against defendant Allan K. Briney (Husband). Under the agreement Wife agreed to pay costs and reasonable compensation for legal services rendered, less any amounts paid by Husband on account of attorney fees and court costs pursuant to court order or otherwise. Plaintiffs represented Wife in the contested proceedings in the trial court, which resulted in a final judgment of dissolution on June 23, 1971, and continued to represent Wife in the Court of Appeal until January 25, 1972, when Wife discharged plaintiffs as her attorneys without cause. The reasonable value of services rendered by plaintiffs as of January 25, 1972, was $9,025 and plaintiffs advanced costs of $510.35 on behalf of Wife. Pursuant to court order plaintiffs received from defendant Allan K. Briney a net sum of $2,486 and plaintiffs received $350 from Wife, leaving the sum of $6,699.35 due, owing and unpaid from Wife.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Husband and Wife to recover the $6,699.35 based upon the following causes of action stated in the first amended complaint:

First cause of action (against Wife): breach of contract.

Second cause of action (against Wife): account stated.

Third cause of action (against Wife): quantum meruit.

Fourth cause of action (against Husband and unnamed Doe defendants): for inducing termination of contract.

Fifth cause of action (against Husband and unnamed Doe defendants): conspiracy to induce termination of contract. ¹

This appeal does not concern the first three causes of action against Wife, and hereinafter we refer to Husband as defendant. Defendant filed a demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action of the first amended complaint which was sustained by the trial court with leave to amend. Judgment was granted for defendant when plaintiffs declined to amend, and it is that judgment which concerns us here.

As to the fourth cause of action it was alleged that on or about October 12, 1971, defendant (and unnamed Does) with knowledge of the contract between Wife and plaintiffs wrongfully, improperly and unjustifiably induced Wife to terminate the contract. Defendant induced such breach to further his own monetary interests 'for the specific purpose of denying plaintiffs . . . their opportunity to obtain an order for reasonable attorney fees against defendant . . . in the Appellate Courts' and with the additional object of denying Wife the marital rights to which she was entitled. Defendant was earning in excess of $10,000 per month, whereas Wife, who 'subsequent to the dissolution of marriage wished to remain . . . defendant's wife,' was without property or estate to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and was in need of psychiatric and medical treatment for emotional problems. Defendant wrongfully and unjustifiably caused Wife to discharge plaintiffs by threatening to disregard Wife as the object of his love and affection and threatening to refuse any and all reconciliation efforts unless Wife discharged plaintiffs. By reason of defendant's wrongful and unjustified conduct and as a proximate result thereof plaintiffs were discharged and suffered damage in the sum of $6,699.35.

In the fifth cause of action it was alleged that defendant and the unnamed Does conspired to perform the acts referred to in the fourth cause of action.

The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action on the grounds that (1) there is no liability for inducing a breach of contract where the breach is caused by the exercise of an absolute right; (2) there is no liability for inducing a breach of an attorney's contract in the absence of a contingent fee contract; (3) there is no liability for inducing a breach of an attorney's contract in a dissolution or divorce case; and (4) there is no civil action for conspiracy to commit a recognized tort unless the wrongful act itself is committed.

We have concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

It is well established that an action will lie for the intentional interference by a third person with a contractual relationship either by unlawful means or by means otherwise lawful when there is a lack of sufficient justification for such interference. (Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 35, 112 P.2d 631; Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 205, 14 Cal.Rptr. 294, 363 P.2d 310.) The elements of this cause of action are (1) that a valid contract existed between the plaintiff and another party; (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the contract and intended to induce a breach thereof; (3) that the contract was breached; (4) as a proximate result of the defendant's wrongful or unjustified conduct; (5) resulting in damage to the plaintiff. (Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 189, 331 P.2d 689; Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club, 7 Cal.App.3d 968, 975, 86 Cal.Rptr. 885; Charles C. Chapman Building Co. v. California Mart, 2 Cal.App.3d 846, 853, 82 Cal.Rptr. 830.) In the instant case plaintiffs adequately alleged each of these elements.

Defendant argues that because Wife had an absolute right to discharge her attorney at will and without cause (Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784, 790, 791, 100 Cal.Rptr. 385, 494 P.2d 9) defendant cannot be liable for wrongfully or unjustifiably inducing her to do so. This argument is without merit. The rule was laid down in Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 39, 172 P.2d 867, 870, that '(r)ecognizing that the fact that a contract is 'at the will of the parties, respectively does not make it one at the will of others,' (citation) the great majority of the cases have held that unjustifiable interference with contracts terminable at will is actionable.' That rule has been followed on many occasions. (See, e.g., Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., Supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 188, 331 P.2d 689; Romano v. Wilbur Ellis & Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 670, 673, 186 P.2d 1012; Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal.App.2d 390, 393, 6 Cal.Rptr. 171; Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal.App.2d 63, 65, 60 Cal.Rptr. 110.)

General principles regarding tortious interference with contractual relations are applicable to interference with attorney-client relations. (See cases collected in annotation, 26...