Abrams-Rodkey v. Summit Cty. Children Serv.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 22358.,22358.
• Citation: 836 N.E.2d 1,163 Ohio App.3d 1,2005 Ohio 4359
• Parties: ABRAMS-RODKEY et al., Appellants, v. SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 1

836 N.E.2d 1

163 Ohio App.3d 1

2005-Ohio-4359

ABRAMS-RODKEY et al., Appellants, v. SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES et al., Appellees.

No. 22358.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County.

Decided August 24, 2005.

Lawrence W. Vuillemin and Alison M. Breaux, for appellant.

Keith Prytal, for appellee Summit County Children Services Board.

Jim Petro, Ohio Attorney General, and Laurel Blum Mazorow, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Department of Job and Family Services.

SLABY, Presiding Judge.

{¶ 1} Appellants, union employees of Summit County Children Services, appeal the decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion to introduce new evidence and affirming the decision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board denying their claims for unemployment compensation. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

{¶ 2} Appellants in this case are members of Communication Workers of America, Local 4546 who were employees of Summit County Children Services ("SCCS"). Appellants conducted a work stoppage upon the expiration of their collective-bargaining agreement, and the instant action arose in regard to their claims for unemployment-compensation benefits for the period of time that they did not work. SCCS has approximately 500 employees. Of those employees, between 290 and 370 are members of the union.

{¶ 3} The union had a collective-bargaining labor agreement with SCCS that was effective from April 1, 2000, until March 31, 2003. The agreement was given an automatic 90-day extension through June 29, 2003. Following the expiration of the first extension, the parties agreed to a second extension of the agreement through July 13, 2003. Numerous negotiation sessions were held between the union and SCCS between January 30, 2003, and July 13, 2003. The parties were unable to come to an agreement before midnight of July 13, 2003. On July 14, 2003, after having presented SCCS with a notice of intent to strike or picket, numerous union members did not show up to work. Approximately 230 union members then filed claims for unemployment-compensation benefits.

{¶ 4} On August 4, 2003, pursuant to R.C. 4141.283, a consolidated administrative hearing was held in relation to the claims for unemployment-compensation benefits advanced by the estimated 230 union members. On August 14, 2003, a hearing officer from the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services' Unemployment Compensation Division held that appellants were unemployed due to a labor dispute other than a lockout and thus were not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to R.C. 4141.29.

{¶ 5} Appellants appealed the administrative decision to the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, which denied their request on January 8, 2004. Appellants then appealed to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Appellants asked the trial court to reverse the determination of the Unemployment Review Commission disallowing their appeal and sought the court's permission to introduce new evidence for a de novo review. The trial court upheld the decision of the Unemployment Review Commission and denied appellants' motion to introduce new evidence. Appellants now appeal, asserting two assignments of error for our review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

The lower court erred in failing to reverse the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission as it was unlawful, unreasonable, and/or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 6} In their first assignment of error, appellants maintain that the trial court erred by upholding the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. Specifically, appellants claim that the decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, and against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court erred in affirming it. We disagree.

{¶ 7} A reviewing court must uphold the decision of the commission (or review board) unless that decision was "unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence." Simon v. Lake Geauga Printing Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 41, 45, 23 O.O.3d 57, 430 N.E.2d 468. Furthermore, "[a] reviewing court can not usurp the function of the triers of fact by substituting its judgment for theirs. `The decision of purely factual questions is primarily within the province of the referee and the board of review.'" Id., quoting Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach (1947), 148 Ohio St. 511, 518, 36 O.O. 167, 76 N.E.2d 79. The Supreme Court has noted that "while appellate courts are not permitted to make factual findings or to determine the credibility of witnesses, they do have the duty to determine whether the board's decision is supported by the evidence in the record." Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 696, 653 N.E.2d 1207, citing Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 19 OBR 12, 482 N.E.2d 587. Therefore, we must uphold the commission's decision unless we find that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In determining whether the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must defer to the agency's findings of fact so long as they are supported by credible proof.

{¶ 8} When evaluating whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil case, the standard of review is the same as in the criminal context. In re Ozmun (Apr. 14, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 18983, 1999 WL 225847, at 3. That is, we review the record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the court "clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed." State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717.

{¶ 9} In the case at hand, the issue is whether the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission that appellants engaged in a labor dispute other than a lockout was unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. R.C. 4141.29(D) provides:

[N]o individual may * * * be paid benefits under the following conditions:

For any week with respect to which the director finds that:

The individual's unemployment was due to a labor dispute other than a lockout at any factory, establishment, or other premises located in this or any other state and owned or operated by the employer by which the individual is or was last employed; and for so long as the individual's unemployment is due to such labor dispute.

{¶ 10} The Supreme Court has defined a "lockout" as "a cessation of the furnishing of work to employees or a withholding of work from them in an effort to get for the employer more desirable terms." Anderson v. Union Camp Corp. (Oct. 18, 1996), 5th Dist. No. 96AP030024, 1996 WL 752927, at 5, quoting Bays v. Shenango (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 132, 133, 559 N.E.2d 740. A lockout occurs when "the conduct of the employer in laying down terms must lead to unemployment inevitably in the sense that the employees could not reasonably be expected to accept the terms and, in reason, there was no alternative for them but to leave their work." Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey (1958), 168 Ohio St. 351, 355, 7 O.O.2d 119, 155 N.E.2d 202.

{¶ 11} The Ohio Supreme Court adopted a status quo test to determine whether a lockout occurred when a collective-bargaining agreement expired. It stated:

[W]hen the contract (the collective bargaining agreement) has in fact expired and a new agreement has not yet been negotiated, the sole test under * * * the Unemployment Compensation Law * * * of whether the work stoppage is the responsibility of the employer or the employees is reduced to the following: Have the employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert a work stoppage pending the final settlement of the contract negotiations; and has the employer agreed to permit work to continue for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment pending further negotiations? If the employer refuses to so extend the expiring contract and maintain the status quo, then the resulting work stoppage constitutes a `lockout' and the disqualification of unemployment compensation benefits in the case of a `stoppage of work because of a labor dispute' does not apply.

Bays, 53 Ohio St.3d 132, 134-135, 559 N.E.2d 740, quoting Erie Forge & Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. (1960), 400 Pa. 440, 443-445, 163 A.2d 91.

{¶ 12} The review board in this case found that the union had failed to maintain the status quo. We find that its finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and thus, we affirm.

{¶ 13} The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: the union and SCCS were attempting to negotiate a new contract. The previous contract expired at midnight on July 13, 2003. At the time the previous contract had expired, the union and SCCS had not come to an agreement regarding a new contract. On July 14, 2003, approximately 230 union workers failed to show up to work.

{¶ 14} The issue in this case is which side, the union or the employer, failed to maintain the status quo after the expiration of the previous contract. Each side argues that the other was at fault for failing to maintain the status quo. Along with a proposal for a new contract, SCCS furnished the union with a written statement, which is at issue in this appeal. The statement provides as follows: "Effective at 11:59 today, all previous and existing offers made by the Agency to the Union are completely withdrawn and any and all tentative agreements previously entered into are null and void." Pointing to the above statement, the union claims that it was, essentially, locked out as any offers made by SCCS, including offers for continued employment, were made...