Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 24 December 1958
• Docket Number: No. 35546,35546
• Citation: 168 Ohio St. 351,155 N.E.2d 202
• Parties: , 7 O.O.2d 119 ZANESVILLE RAPID TRANSIT, INC., Appellant, v. BAILEY et al.; Bureau of Unemployment Compensation et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 351

168 Ohio St. 351

155 N.E.2d 202, 7 O.O.2d 119

ZANESVILLE RAPID TRANSIT, INC., Appellant, v. BAILEY et al.; Bureau of Unemployment Compensation et al., Appellees.

No. 35546.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 24, 1958.

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Muskingum County.

Schwenker, Teaford, Brothers & Solsberry, Columbus, and Meyer, Johnson & Kincaid, Zanesville, for appellant.

William Saxbe, Atty. Gen., Eugene P. Everhart and John W. Hardwick, Columbus, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Section 4141.29, Revised Code, so far as pertinent to this appeal, reads as follows:

'(C) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual:

* * *

* * *

'(2) Lost his employment or has left his employment by reason of a labor dispute other than a lockout at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was employed, as long as such labor dispute continues * * *.'

As stated in the decision of the referee, 'there is no doubt that a labor dispute existed in the instant case, nor has there been any attempt by the parties to contend otherwise.'

The determinative question is whether, in this case, there was 'a labor dispute other than a lockout.'

Were we concerned only with a question of fact, we would be disposed, as was the majority of the Court of Appeals, to leave undisturbed the 'conclusions of fact' found by the referee and the Board of Review. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach, 148 Ohio St. 511, 76 N.E.2d 79. The controlling facts in this case, however, are all stipulated. It remains only to determine whether, as a matter of law, under all the admitted facts of this case a 'lockout' existed.

A lockout has been defined as a cessation of the furnishing of work to employees or a withholding of work from them in an effort to get for the employer more desirable terms. Iron Molders' Union No. 125 of Milwaukee, Wis. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 7 Cir., 166 F. 45, 52, 91 C.C.A. 631, 20 L.R.A., N.S., 315; 25 Words and Phrases, Lockout, p. 566; 33 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 189, Section 65.

Such a definition does not circumscribe all the manifestations of an alleged lockout situation. It does not, of course, confine a lockout to an actual physical closing of the place of employment. See Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929.

A detailed discussion of the term may be found in Almada v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 137 Conn. 380, 77 A.2d 765, 771, where the court said:

'The imposition by the employer of changes in working conditions or wages, even though they deprive the employees of some advantage they already possess, does not necessarily constitute a lockout. Changes in the terms of employment might still be such that under all the circumstances the employees would be expected in reason to accept them rather than quit work. To constitute a lockout * * * the conditions of further employment announced by the employer must be such that the employees could not reasonably be expected to accept them and they must manifest a purpose on the part of the employer to coerce his employees into accepting them or some other terms. * * *

'* * * The point is that, in order to constitute a lockout, the conduct of the employer in laying down terms must lead to unemployment inevitably in the sense that the employees could not reasonably be expected...