Abrams v. Ohio Pacific Exp.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 73730,73730
• Citation: 819 S.W.2d 338
• Parties: Richard ABRAMS, Respondent/Employee, v. OHIO PACIFIC EXPRESS, Appellant/Employer, and National American Insurance Company, Appellant/Insurer.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 338

819 S.W.2d 338

Richard ABRAMS, Respondent/Employee, v. OHIO PACIFIC EXPRESS, Appellant/Employer and National American Insurance Company, Appellant/Insurer.

No. 73730.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Nov. 19, 1991.

Richard K. Kuntze, Cape Girardeau, for appellants.

Richard G. Steele, Cape Girardeau, for respondent.

HOLSTEIN, Judge.

The employer, Ohio Pacific Express, sought review of an award of a workers' compensation claim. § 287.470. ¹ The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission dismissed the application for review as untimely pursuant to § 287.480. An appeal was taken to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District. § 287.495. This Court granted transfer after opinion. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10; Rule 83.03. The Commission's order of dismissal is reversed.

A "Temporary or Partial Award" was entered by the administrative law judge finding claimant Richard Abrams was an employee of the Ohio Pacific Express, claimant was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and claimant suffered total disability from participating in the labor market. The only issues left for future determination were whether future medical aid would be required and whether the claimant might be restored to regular work. The award was made on April 5, 1990.

An application for review dated April 25, 1990, was mailed to the Division of Workers' Compensation. Postage had been placed on the envelope by a postage meter. The date imprinted by the postage meter was April 25, 1990. The application was delivered on April 26, 1990.

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission dismissed the application because it was filed more than twenty days after the administrative law judge's award.

In relevant part, § 287.480 provides:

Any notice of appeal, application or other paper required under this law to be filed with the division or commission shall, when mailed to and received by the division or the commission, be deemed to be filed as of the date endorsed by the United States post office on the envelope or container in which such paper is received.

The issue presented on appeal is whether the date made by the postage meter is to be considered "the date endorsed by the United States post office on the envelope."

Congress has authorized the postal service to adopt regulations, as necessary, to accomplish the objectives given by statute. 39 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1988). The regulations pertinent here are found in the Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), which is made part of the Code of Federal Regulations. 39 C.F.R., § 111.1 (1990). The DMM authorizes postal customers to apply for a license to possess and use postage meters. DMM 144.14 and 144.21. The license is to be revoked if a meter is used unlawfully. DMM 144.231. The date inscribed by the meter is required to be the actual date of deposit of the mail (or the next scheduled collection day). DMM 144.471. Postmarking or cancelling of metered mail is prohibited unless the date is inaccurate. DMM 144.532. Metered mail must be examined by a postal employee for accurate dating. DMM 144.534.

From the above review of the regulations it is apparent that postal authorities license and regulate the use of postage meters and require accurate dating of metered mail. The regulatory scheme provides for routine inspection of the date on metered mail by postal employees to ensure accuracy of the date before that mail is delivered to the addressee. Those who abuse a postage meter license are subject to sanctions.

The claimant discounts the regulations, arguing that this Court should adopt a narrow construction requiring a postmark date by a postal employee after the envelope is delivered to the post office. The primary role of courts in construing statutes is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used in the statute and, if possible, give effect to that intent. Trailiner Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 783 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Mo. banc 1990). In determining legislative intent, statutory words and phrases are taken in their ordinary and usual sense. § 1.090. That meaning is generally derived from the dictionary. Indian Lake Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 813 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo. banc 1991). There is no room for construction where words are plain and admit to but one meaning. State ex rel. Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Mo. banc 1986). Where no ambiguity exists, there is no need to resort to rules of construction.

The verb "endorse" is variously defined as:

... [T]o write on the back of ... to sign one's name as payee ... to register payments and interest ... to inscribe (one's signature) ... SIGN ... to inscribe (as an official document) with a title, direction, memorandum, or explanation ... to make over to another ... to acknowledge receipt ... obs.: To load upon the back ... to express definite approval or acceptance of ... support or aid explicitly by or as if by signed statement: vouch for: UNDERWRITE ... SYN See APPROVE....

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 749 (1966).

From the above it is apparent that "endorsed" has multiple meanings. In the context of § 287.480, it possibly means the date inscribed on the envelope by an employee of the post office. It may also mean any date inscribed on the envelope that is approved and authorized by the United States post office as the date the letter was received by the post office, regardless of who caused the mark to appear on the envelope. Whether "endorsed" means "approved" or some more restrictive term is not readily apparent. Well within the range of legislative intent is a date inscribed on an envelope by a licensed postage meter, which is thereafter examined for accuracy by a postal employee and finally delivered to the addressee. The ambiguity in the statute requires resort to the rules of statutory construction.

The dissent suggests that by resort to strict rules of grammar regarding placement or absence of commas, the Court may resolve all ambiguity. As convenient as that rule of construction may seem, it is not the primary rule of construction, as suggested by the dissent. Courts in this state are reluctant to construe the intent of the legislature based solely on punctuation and grammatical construction. Application of Graham, 239 Mo.App. 1036, 199 S.W.2d 68, 75 (1946). See also Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 830 (Mo. banc 1990).

Section 287.480 is the initial step in an appeal of an award of a workers' compensation claim. Statutes that are remedial in nature are to be liberally construed so as to effect their beneficial purpose. State ex rel. LeFevre v. Stubbs, 642 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Mo. banc 1982). From the earliest cases involving workers' compensation, the right to appeal was recognized as wholly remedial. De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., et al., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640, 653 (1931). Cases should be heard and decided on their merits. To that end, statutes and rules relating to appeals, being remedial, are to be construed liberally in favor of allowing appeals to proceed. Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. banc 1983). The statute here must be construed liberally to permit a disposition of this case on the merits, rather than on technical grounds.

An equally compelling rule of construction requires the Court to presume that the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law and favors a construction that avoids unjust or unreasonable results. State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Mo. banc 1984). If the Court accepts claimant's interpretation of the statute, situations would arise where two notices might be mailed at the same time, both properly addressed and with proper postage affixed, one by postage stamps and the other by postage meter. Both envelopes would be duly processed and delivered at the same time. Because the postal regulations prohibit postmarking properly dated metered mail, the notice with postage affixed by a postage meter would be ineffective under the narrow construction suggested. Absent unambiguous language to the contrary, such an absurd, unjust and unreasonable result will not be countenanced.

Claimant relies primarily on two cases, Penn Valley Management, Inc. v. Robertson, 724 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.App.1987), and Patterson v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp., 780 S.W.2d 106 (Mo.App.1989). Of the two, only Penn Valley involved metered mail. In Penn Valley the envelope in which the notice of application for review was delivered was dated by a postage meter on September 9, 1985, which was within the time permitted for application for review. However, the envelope was delivered on September 13, 1985, which fell outside the twenty-day statutory limit. The court in Penn Valley noted the "custom and practice" of the post office not to postmark metered mail, but failed to consider the effect of the postal regulations discussed above. 724 S.W.2d at 662.

In Patterson the notice of application for review was sent by Federal Express prior to the expiration of the twenty-day period but delivered after the twenty-day period expired. 780 S.W.2d at 107. Patterson did not involve an envelope sent through the United States mail. Thus, both Penn Valley and Patterson are distinguishable.

More important than these distinctions, however, is a misstatement of the law found in both cases. One of the major premises relied on in Penn Valley was the application of a rule of strict construction to § 287.480. Applying that rule, the court construed "the date endorsed by the" post office to mean only a postmark made after the envelope has been deposited in the mail. 724 S.W.2d at 663. Patterson reiterated that the statute in question was subject to "literal and strict construction." 780 S.W.2d at 108. Both cases relied on Tabb v. McGinley, 313 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.App.1958), for that statement of the law. That reliance is misplaced.

Tabb involved...