Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg

• Decision Date: 08 May 1945
• Parties: ACACIA MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. FEINBERG et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

318 Mass. 246

61 N.E.2d 122

ACACIA MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

v.FEINBERG et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 8, 1945.

Bill by Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Company against Goldie Sedar Feinberg and the trustees of the Feinberg estate, a voluntary association, to require defendants to interplead in order to determine their rights as claimants to proceeds of a life policy. Judgment for the defendant Goldie Sedar Feinberg, and the trustees appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; D. T. O'Connell, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DOLAN, RONAN, WILKINS, and SPALDING, JJ.

H. M. Pakulski, of Boston, for Archibald I. Feinberg and others.

H. Bergson, of Boston, for Goldie Sedar Feinberg.

DOLAN, Justice.

This is a bill to require the defendant Goldie Sedar Feinberg, and other defendants described as trustees of the ‘Feinberg Estate,’ a voluntary association, to interplead in order to determine their rights in the proceeds of a policy of life insurance issued by the plaintiff. When the case was here before, 317 Mass. 8, 56 N.E.2d 914, exceptions of the defendant Goldie were sustained and the final decree that had been entered in favor of the defendant trustees was reversed, and it was ordered that the case stand for further proceedings in the Superior Court. In accordance with an interlocutory decree entered by the judge, the plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the insurer, paid the amount due on the policy into court, and after further proceedings the judge entered a final decree adjudging that the defendant Goldie (the wife of the insured and the beneficiary named in the policy) was entitled to the proceeds of the policy and ordering payment thereof by the clerk of the court accordingly. The defendant trustees appealed.

The evidence is reported and the judge, upon being requested to report the material facts found by him, adopted as such all the facts previously found by him in a ‘Memorandum of Findings and Order for Decree.’ This was a sufficient compliance with G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 23. See Birnbaum v. Pamoukis, 301 Mass. 559, 562, 17 N.E.2d 885.

Material facts found by the judge and those we find ourselves may be summed up as follows: Benjamin Feinberg, the husband of the defendant Goldie, died July 17, 1943. A policy of insurance upon his life in the amount of $5,000 issued by the insurer on March 1, 1927, became payable upon his death. The defendant Goldie was named as beneficiary in the policy under which the insured had reserved the right to change the beneficiary. The policy contained a provision that the insured ‘may change any beneficiary not irrevocable designated * * * provided that no such designation or change shall be effective unless made in writing to the Association and endorsed hereon by the Association prior to the time when this policy shall become payable.’ The ‘Feinberg Estate’ is an association of relatives ‘in direct or collateral descent from the grandmother’ of the insured. It was formed in 1916, the general purposes being to provide relief by loans of money or gifts to relatives who might be in financial distress, and to promote social relations among the relatives. In August, 1942, the insured took steps to have the name of the beneficiary changed from that of his wife to ‘Feinberg Estate.’ At that time he conferred with the manager of the Boston office of the insurer, disclosed his intention to change the beneficiary, and acting upon the manager's advice sought unsuccessfully to secure possession of the policy which was held by his wife. On December 4, 1942, he filed an affidavit with the insurer setting forth that he had made demand on his wife for the return of the policy and that he wished to have the name of the beneficiary changed from that of his wife as before set forth, but that his wife refused to deliver the policy to him. The affidavit was made in accordance with the advice and at the direction of the insurer's manager, who, however, did not receive and file it with any purpose to waive the requirements of the policy.¹ On the same day, acting through an attorney at law who had assisted him in preparing that affidavit, he made written demand upon his wife for the return of the policy. His wife by a writing signed by her attorney refused to return it, claiming ownership thereof. On or about December 4, the insured had consulted his attorney and discussed with him the subject of bringing a bill in equity to compel the surrender of the policy. A retaining fee was suggested by the attorney, but it was not paid by the insured. A few days later the insured arranged for a conference with his three sons at which he asked them to aid him in persuading his wife, their mother, to surrender the policy to him. They refused to do so, expressing the view...