Adamick v. Ferguson-Florissant School Dist., FERGUSON-FLORISSANT
Decision Date | 20 June 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 34286,FERGUSON-FLORISSANT,34286 |
Citation | 483 S.W.2d 629 |
Parties | Victoria ADMICK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Respondents. . Louis District, Division One |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary, Jaeckel, Keaney & Brown by Donald L. James and William L. Davis, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Flynn & Parker, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
Suit for injunction by plaintiff-teachers against the defendant school district. Each plaintiff had contracted to teach during the 1970--71 school year and the district had published a calendar specifying the days school was to be in session. The critical issue is whether the calendar is part of the teachers' contract and thus not subject to change without the teachers' consent.
For financial reasons school did not start as scheduled and the district issued a revised calendar by which there were several changes in days of school attendance. April 8 and June 10 were changed from 'non-attendance' to 'attendance' and June 11 was changed from 'non-attendance' to 'work.'
On April 5, 1971 the teachers sued to enjoin the district from holding classes on the three dates. Upon the teachers giving a $5,000 bond in compliance with § 526.070 1 the court granted a temporary restraining order which kept the district from holding classes on April 8. On May 24, however, the court dismissed the teachers' petition on the ground it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. This denied injunctive relief as to the June 10 and 11 school days and the teachers have appealed as allowed by § 512.020.
We first consider the preliminary question of mootness. Since the school days in question have passed, no effective injunctive relief can be granted. But there is still a live issue. As said, the teachers have posted a $5,000 bond and their liability thereon depends on whether their petition was properly dismissed. So the case is not moot and we will decide the issue on its merits. Compare American Pamcor, Inc. v. Klote, Mo.App., 438 S.W.2d 287(8--10).
In compliance with § 168.106 the district and each teacher had executed an 'Indefinite Contract,' the pertinent parts being:
The district sent these contract forms to the teachers on July 3, 1970 with a letter of transmittal stating:
As said, the teachers contend the original school calendar is an integral part of their contract which the district could not change unilaterally. Conversely, the district contends the contract itself is the complete agreement, that the original calendar was merely the announcement of the district's school attendance plan, and changing it by the revised calendar was but a matter of discretionary management.
The general law of contracts applies in the construction of teachers' contracts. Lynch v. Webb City School District No. 92, Mo.App., 418 S.W.2d 608(2). Under certain circumstances several documents may be read as a single contract. However, each case the teachers cite involved an actual reference on the face of the contract to a set of rules or an explanatory document which is thereby made a part of the contract. There is no such reference here. Therefore, the cases cited by the teachers are not persuasive.
The intention of the parties must govern the interpretation and construction of a contract. Lowery v. Fuller, 221 Mo.App. 495, 281 S.W. 968(1). (A contract) 'should be interpreted and read in the light of the circumstances of the parties at the time.' Fisher v. Fisher, 203 Mo.App. 45, 217 S.W. 845. The contract was mailed at a time when all parties knew there was a substantial possibility the district's voters would not pass a new tax rate and some sort of schedule disruption was likely; the letter of transmittal mentioned the financial crisis. It cannot reasonably be presumed that the school board--well aware of its precarious financial situation--intended to lock itself into a rigid attendance schedule fixed by contract.
Moreover, the contract itself states that the teacher is hired to teach 'such number of days as the board of education establishes.' If the parties intended to fix the work schedule by contract, this...
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