Adams v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 22 May 2018
• Docket Number: AC 40272
• Citation: 189 A.3d 629,182 Conn.App. 165
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Nicholas ADAMS v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

182 Conn.App. 165

189 A.3d 629

Nicholas ADAMS

v.COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

AC 40272

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 22, 2018

Officially released May 22, 2018

Jonathan Ross Sills, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Christine Jean–Louis, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Alvord, Keller and Bishop, Js.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Nicholas Adams, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), dismissing his appeal from the decision of the commissioner to suspend his motor vehicle operator's license, pursuant to General Statutes § 14–227b,¹ for forty-five days and requiring an ignition interlock device in his motor vehicle for one year. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that (1) he was operating a motor vehicle; (2) he refused to submit to chemical testing; and (3) the police had probable cause to arrest him for operating under the influence in violation of General Statutes § 14–227a.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On May 14, 2016, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with operating under the influence of liquor or drugs in violation of § 14–227a.³ The plaintiff submitted to a Breathalyzer test, but refused a urine test. As a result of this refusal, and in accordance with § 14–227b, the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license was suspended by the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) for forty-five days, effective June 13, 2016, and he was required to install and maintain an ignition interlock device in his vehicle for one year thereafter.

Subsequently, the plaintiff requested, and was granted, an administrative hearing to contest the license suspension. The administrative hearing was held on June 8, 2016, before a department hearing officer, acting on behalf of the commissioner. The hearing officer rendered a decision the same day as the hearing, ordering the suspension of the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license or operating privilege for forty-five days and the installation of an ignition interlock device for one year thereafter.

On June 17, 2016, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4–183, challenging the findings of the hearing officer that (1) there was probable cause to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both; (2) he refused to submit to a chemical testing or analysis; and (3) he was operating the motor vehicle. A one day trial took place before the court on December 1, 2016. On March 7, 2017, the court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and rendered judgment in favor of the commissioner. This appeal followed.

Having carefully reviewed the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and applicable law, we find no error in the trial court's determination. Accordingly, we adopt the well reasoned and clearly articulated decision of the trial court, en toto, as the opinion of this court. See Adams v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–16–6033742–S (March 7, 2017) (reprinted at 182 Conn. App. 169); see also Samakaab v. Dept. of Social Services , 178 Conn. App. 52, 54, 173 A.3d 1004 (2017).

The judgment is affirmed.

APPENDIX

NICHOLAS ADAMS v . COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES^*

Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain

File No. CV–16–6033742–S

Memorandum filed March 7, 2017

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on plaintiff's appeal from decision by defendant suspending the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license. Appeal dismissed .

Jonathan Ross Sills , for the plaintiff.

Drew S. Graham , assistant attorney general, for the defendant.

Opinion

HUDDLESTON, J. The plaintiff, Nicholas Adams, appeals from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) suspending his driver's license for forty-five days and requiring him to install and maintain an ignition interlock device for one year for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The plaintiff asserts that the hearing officer violated his right to due process, that the record lacks substantial evidence that he was operating a motor vehicle, that there was no probable cause for his arrest, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he refused a urine test. Most of these claims were not asserted in the hearing and therefore are not properly before the court. Even if they had been properly preserved, the plaintiff's claims are not supported by the record. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At about 4:44 a.m. on May 14, 2016, the Stonington police were dispatched to investigate a report that a motor vehicle had struck a telephone pole and then left the scene. Officer Ryan Armstrong immediately responded and began checking the area. He came upon two vehicles on Pawcatuck Avenue. One was a disabled vehicle with significant front end damage consistent with hitting a telephone pole. The other was operated by a witness who had followed the first vehicle after the accident occurred. Armstrong approached the vehicle with front end damage. The plaintiff was standing outside it. Armstrong asked whether he needed medical assistance, and he stated that he did not. When Armstrong asked what had happened, the plaintiff stated that he struck a traffic cone in the roadway when he turned from Mechanic Street onto Clark Street. He denied having hit the telephone pole on Mechanic Street even after Armstrong remarked that a traffic cone would not cause the damage to his vehicle that was evident. Armstrong asked the plaintiff why he had fled the accident scene, and he replied that he had attempted to stop but his brakes had malfunctioned. Armstrong observed that the location of the accident was about a half mile from the location where the plaintiff's car was found with several stretches of uphill grades between the two locations. Armstrong asked the plaintiff when the accident occurred. He replied that it happened at approximately 4:45 a.m. Supp. Return of Record¹ (ROR), A–44, narrative, pp. 1–2.

Armstrong observed that the plaintiff appeared very drowsy, with droopy eyelids

. His movements were very slow and he spoke in a low, raspy voice. Armstrong told the plaintiff that he was going to conduct field sobriety tests, and the plaintiff "immediately volunteered" to take a Breathalyzer test. The plaintiff denied having used alcohol or drugs of any kind. ROR, A–44, narrative, p. 2.

Armstrong administered three standardized field sobriety tests. In administering the horizontal gaze nystagmus test

, Armstrong noted that the pupils of the plaintiff's eyes were constricted, which Armstrong recognized as a sign of narcotic use. After the plaintiff failed all three sobriety tests, Armstrong placed him under arrest and transported him to the police station. ROR, A–44, narrative, pp. 2–4.

Before leaving the scene, Armstrong spoke with the witness, who said she was sitting in her residence when she heard a loud crash and the power went out. She looked outside her window and saw the plaintiff's vehicle traveling down Pawcatuck Avenue. She followed his vehicle. When it stopped and she made contact with the plaintiff, he asked her not to notify the police. ROR, A–44, narrative, p. 4.

At the police station, the plaintiff was advised of his Miranda rights² and offered the opportunity to contact an attorney, which he declined. He denied alcohol or drug use and elected to submit to a breath test. The first sample, taken at 5:50 a.m., showed a 0.000 percent blood alcohol content. Armstrong then asked the plaintiff to provide a urine sample. The plaintiff said he wanted to speak with an attorney. After several failed attempts to reach an attorney, he spoke with a family member and then elected to refuse to provide a urine sample. ROR, A–44, narrative, p. 4.

After the breath test, the plaintiff stated that he was having difficulty breathing and complained of chest pains. An ambulance responded to the booking room, examined the plaintiff, and suggested that he be transported to the hospital for further evaluation. He refused transport to the hospital. ROR, A–44, narrative, p. 5.

The plaintiff was charged with operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14–227a and with other motor vehicle violations. Id. The Department of Motor Vehicles (department) thereafter notified the plaintiff that his license would be suspended for forty-five days, and he would be required to install and maintain an ignition interlock device in his vehicle. ROR, Item 1. The plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on June 8, 2016. The plaintiff appeared with counsel. At the hearing, the A–44 form, with attached reports, was introduced as an exhibit without objection. ROR, transcript, p. 2. The plaintiff's counsel commented that the copy of the A–44 he had received before the hearing had not been notarized, but he acknowledged that the copy introduced into evidence was notarized. ROR, transcript, pp. 3–4. He argued to the hearing officer that "they have not proven operation; number one. And number two, they can't prove the time of operation as to whether it was if in two hours or not." ROR, transcript, p. 4. He argued that his client had been disoriented by the collision and that his client was cooperating with the police. Despite evidence that the plaintiff had refused transport to a hospital, his attorney asserted that the plaintiff had to go to the hospital and commented that there were no hospital records of a "drug tox." ROR, transcript, pp. 4–5. The plaintiff then testified that when he was at the police station, he was not able to reach his lawyer by telephone and did not recall speaking to any family...