Samakaab v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., AC 39067

• Decision Date: 07 November 2017
• Docket Number: AC 39067
• Citation: 178 Conn.App. 52,173 A.3d 1004
• Parties: Hasan SAMAKAAB v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

178 Conn.App. 52

173 A.3d 1004

Hasan SAMAKAAB

v.DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

AC 39067

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 5, 2017

Officially released November 7, 2017

Hasan Samakaab, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Carolyn Ennis, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Ann E. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

DiPentima, C.J., and Alvord and Pellegrino, Js.

PER CURIAM.

In this employment discrimination action, the plaintiff, Hasan Samakaab, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the Department of Social Services. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly held that insufficient facts were presented to support a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record and the trial court's opinion reveal the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is employed as an eligibility services specialist by the defendant. On September 5, 2013, the plaintiff interviewed for a promotion to the position of eligibility services supervisor. On the basis of the plaintiff's responses during his interview, he was no longer considered for the eligibility services supervisor position. On December 26, 2014, the plaintiff filed the operative complaint against the defendant in Superior Court. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a promotion because of his age, sex, national origin, and his prior opposition to unlawful employment practices in violation of General Statutes § 46a–60 of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a–51 et seq. Following the close of discovery, on November 9, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's complaint. On March 10, 2016, the court, Scholl, J., issued a memorandum of decision rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court found that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, principally his self-serving affidavit and deposition testimony, did not support a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the plaintiff had been discriminated against in the denial of a promotion, or retaliated against because he had engaged in a protected activity.

Upon examination of the record on appeal and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Because the court's memorandum of decision thoroughly addresses the arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt its well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. See Samakaab v. Dept. of Social Services, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–15–6056335–S, 2016 WL 1397516 (March 10, 2016) (reprinted in 178 Conn.App. 52, 173 A.3d 1004). It would serve no useful purpose for this court to engage in any further discussion. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Hemingway, 297 Conn. 317, 321, 2 A.3d 857 (2010) ; Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn.App. 459, 462, 154 A.3d 1093 (2017).

The judgment is affirmed.

APPENDIX

HASAN SAMAKAAB

v.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES^*

Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford

File No. CV–15–6056335S

Memorandum filed March 10, 2016

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Motion granted.

Katrena Engstrom, for the plaintiff.

Carolynn Ennis, assistant attorney general, for the defendant.

Opinion

SCHOLL, J.

INTRODUCTION

This an action by the plaintiff, Hasan Samakaab, pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a–60 et seq., against his employer, the defendant state of Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS). The plaintiff claims that he was denied a promotion to the position of eligibility services supervisor on December 1, 2013, because of his age, sex, Somalian descent, and his prior opposition to unlawful employment practices.

The defendant has moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims because he cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, in any event, the decision not to promote him was made for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason. In support of its position, the defendant submitted portions of the plaintiff's deposition; exhibits to the deposition, which included: the plaintiff's affidavit of illegal discrimination provided to the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, the job description for eligibility supervisor, a letter to the commissioner of DSS signed by the plaintiff as well as others; the affidavit of Astread Ferron–Poole, the director of administration for DSS; and the affidavit of Lisa Wells, social services operations manager for DSS. The plaintiff submitted a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as well as his affidavit; his deposition; the letter to the commissioner also submitted by the defendant; his responses to interrogatories; and letters and memos of recommendation and appreciation.

DISCUSSION

"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. ... Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact [however] a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. ... It is not enough ... for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. ... Mere assertions of fact, whether contained in a complaint or in a brief, are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]. ... As a general rule, then, [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is filed and supported by affidavits and other documents, an adverse party, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by ... [the rules of practice], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, and if he does not so respond, summary judgment shall be entered against him. ... Requiring the nonmovant to produce such evidence does not shift the burden of proof. Rather, it ensures that the nonmovant has not raised a specious issue for the sole purpose of forcing the case to trial. ... [H]owever, one important exception exists ... to the general rule that a party opposing summary judgment must provide evidentiary support for its opposition .... On a motion by [the] defendant for summary judgment the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint .... It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial. ... Accordingly, [w]hen documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558, 593–95, 113 A.3d 932 (2015).

Section 46a–60 provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability

, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness ... (4) For any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under section 46a–82, 46a–83 or 46a–84 ...."

"The framework for the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion in an employment discrimination case is well established. [ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ] and subsequent decisions have established an allocation of the burden of production and an order of presentation of proof ... in discriminatory-treatment cases. ... First, the [complainant] must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. ... In order to establish a prima facie case, the complainant must prove that: (1) he is in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. ... Once the complainant establishes a prima facie case, the employer then must produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action. ... This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment. ... After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, and the defendant has produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, [t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. ...