Adams v. National Bank of Detroit

• Decision Date: 29 September 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 93463,No. 16,16
• Citation: 508 N.W.2d 464,444 Mich. 329
• Parties: Amos ADAMS, Personal Representative of the estate of Michael Adams, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT, a National Banking Institution, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 464

508 N.W.2d 464

444 Mich. 329

Amos ADAMS, Personal Representative of the estate of Michael Adams, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT, a National Banking Institution Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 93463.

Calendar No. 16.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 4, 1993.

Decided Sept. 29, 1993.

[444 Mich. 332] Robert A. Koory, Christopher Holliday, Mark Granzotto, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Clark and Hampton by Roger F. Wardle, Janet Callahan Barnes, Farmington, MI, for defendant-appellant NBD.

Ira Burnim, Mental Health Law Project, Legal Director, Washington, DC, and Sheldon J. Stark, Royal Oak, MI, amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

LEVIN, Justice.

The question presented is whether the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act ¹ precludes the Adams estate from maintaining causes of action against the National Bank of Detroit arising out of the arrest of Michael Bret Adams.

Adams, an employee of the National Bank of Detroit, was erroneously arrested on a charge of making fraudulent withdrawals from NBD. The withdrawals had actually been made by another NBD employee, Michael Ansara Adams.

Adams was arrested after Mary Miller Mach, an NBD employee, had erroneously given the police his address and phone number. The error was discovered and the charges were dropped. Adams, nevertheless, suffered serious trauma and, approximately eight months after he was arrested, committed suicide.

The jury awarded the Adams estate $1,529,154.41 for false arrest, negligence, gross negligence, wilful and wanton misconduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury further found that there was no cause of action for malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ²

I would hold that the Adams estate may maintain an action for false imprisonment (false arrest), and join in remand to the trial court. There is, however, no separate cause of action for negligence, gross negligence, or wilful and wanton misconduct in causing Adams' false arrest. ³ I would also hold that the Adams estate may not maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ⁴

I

The workers' compensation act provides benefits for diminution or loss of earning power caused by "physical and mental injuries suffered on account of employment." ⁵

The exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation act bars recovery for physical or mental injury resulting from accident, ⁶ and does not bar claims for invasion of a worker's interest in being free from interference with other interests, such as injuries to reputation resulting from defamation. ⁷

The exclusive remedy provision does not bar a claim for defamation because "the gist of an action for defamation is injury to reputation, irrespective of any physical or mental harm." Foley v. Polaroid Corp. (Foley I ), 381 Mass. 545, 551-552, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980); ⁸ Braman v. Walthall, 215 Ark. 582 225 S.W.2d 342 (1949); Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal.App.3d 899, 192 Cal.Rptr. 286 (1983); Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah, 1991). ⁹ Similarly, the exclusive remedy provision does not bar a claim for malicious prosecution because the "essence of the tort is not physical or mental injury, but interference with the right to be free from unjustifiable litigation." ¹⁰

As with the torts of defamation and malicious prosecution, the gist of false imprisonment is not physical or mental injury. The gist of an action for false imprisonment is interference with the liberty interest. No showing of physical or mental injury is required. An intent to confine any person is sufficient, and thus an innocent or reasonable mistake of identity will not relieve the actor of liability. ¹¹

In Prosser and Keeton's words, the cause of action for false imprisonment "protects the personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement." ¹² Because "there is no relation between the kind of injuries envisioned by the Work[ers'] Compensation law and the injury" to the liberty interest that is caused by false imprisonment, the exclusive remedy provision does not bar this cause of action. ¹³

In Moore v. Federal Dep't. Stores, 33 Mich.App. 556, 559, 190 N.W.2d 262 (1971), the Court of Appeals concluded that the exclusive remedy provision did not bar a claim for false imprisonment. The Court said that "the gist of an action for false imprisonment is unlawful detention irrespective of any physical or mental harm." The Court agreed with Moore "that her humiliation, embarrassment, and deprivation of personal liberty are not the type of 'personal injury' " covered by the workers' compensation statute. ¹⁴

Nor does the exclusive remedy provision bar recovery for physical and mental injury arising out of false imprisonment. Foley v. Polaroid Corp. (Foley II ), 400 Mass. 82, 508 N.E.2d 72 (1987). In Foley II, Polaroid did not argue that the exclusive remedy provision barred a cause of action for false imprisonment, but rather contended that the plaintiff could not seek damages for physical or mental injury arising out of false imprisonment. The court rejected the argument stating that the inquiry should be "structured in terms of what claims an employee could assert against his employer in an action at law--not in terms of the injuries for which the employee could seek recompense." Id. at 93, 508 N.E.2d 72. (Emphasis in original.) ¹⁵

The workers' compensation act provides benefits for disability arising out of physical or mental injury resulting from employer failures to provide a safe work place. Recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy unless a failure to provide a safe work place constitutes an intentional tort as defined in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986), and the 1987 amendment of § 131 of the act.

A claim for false imprisonment does not implicate the safety of the work place. As with claims seeking recovery for physical, mental, or emotional injury resulting from employer discrimination in violation of civil rights acts--which are not barred by the exclusive remedy provision, Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 420 Mich. 308, 315, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984)--the "evil" at which the action for false imprisonment is aimed is different from failures to maintain work place safety, for which workers' compensation benefits are provided.

II

Collective corporate knowledge and intent are not real issues in the estate's claim for false imprisonment because an NBD employee, Mary Miller Mach, possessed the requisite state of mind to cause false imprisonment. An actor can commit an intentional tort if the actor intends to act and knows that another person will be harmed thereby. ¹⁶

More specifically, a hostile intent to invade the interests of another is not an essential element of false imprisonment. "Although intent is necessary, malice, in the sense of ill will or a desire to injure, is not. There may be liability although the defendant believed in good faith that the arrest was justified, or that the defendant was acting for the plaintiff's own good." Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 11, p. 53. ¹⁷

Even more specifically, a defendant cannot escape liability for false imprisonment on the basis of a mistake concerning the plaintiff's identity. In Prosser and Keeton's words:

"Even if intent to confine the individual is necessary, it need not be with knowledge of who the plaintiff is; and, as in the case of other intentional interferences with the person or property, an innocent, and quite reasonable mistake of identity will not avoid liability." Id.

The California Court of Appeals observed concerning intent in false imprisonment:

"We do point out, however, that, contrary to the view expressed by defendants, plaintiff was not required to allege that defendants knew plaintiff and specifically acted with the intent to have him arrested.... The doctrine of transferred intent has long been recognized to apply to the tort of false imprisonment.... Under this doctrine the intention to confine any person is a sufficient intent to render one liable to the person actually confined. It is immaterial that the actor did not know the identity of the person he intended to confine; nor does it matter that the actor intended to affect some person other than the one actually confined. Thus an allegation that the defendant intended to induce an arrest of someone would have been sufficient." ¹⁸ Du Lac v. Perma Trans Products, Inc., 103 Cal.App.3d 937, 944, 163 Cal.Rptr. 335 (1980) (emphasis in original).

In the instant case, the jury could reasonably conclude that NBD--through its employee Mary Miller Mach--intended to cause the false arrest of Michael Adams. Mach gave Adams' name to the West Bloomfield Police Department when Officer Mero called seeking information "[i]n order to arrest the suspect...." In the context in which Mary Miller Mach named Adams as the suspect, it being substantially certain that an arrest would follow from her disclosure, it is not a defense that NBD meant to cause the arrest of another Michael Adams or that NBD had no desire to confine the Michael Adams whose estate brings this action. ¹⁹

III

The Adams estate presented sufficient evidence of all the elements of false imprisonment. The elements are: an act committed with the intention of confining another, ²⁰ the act directly or indirectly results in such confinement, and the person confined is conscious of his confinement. ²¹

NBD claims that the trial court erred in submitting the false imprisonment claim to the jury because its actions were not sufficient to meet the standard for instigation of, or participation in, a false arrest, and because the confinement was incident to a valid arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant.

A person is not subject to liability for false arrest where the person merely gives information to the...