ADVANTAGE CAPITAL v. City of Northfield, No. C2-02-1904

• Decision Date: 08 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. C2-02-1904, No. C6-02-1923, No. C5-02-1928.
• Citation: 664 N.W.2d 421
• Parties: ADVANTAGE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, individually and on behalf of the State of Minnesota, Petitioner, Respondent, Appellant, v. CITY OF NORTHFIELD, Appellant, Respondent, Anthony D. BECKER, et al., Respondents, Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

664 N.W.2d 421

ADVANTAGE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, individually and on behalf of the State of Minnesota, Petitioner, Respondent, Appellant, v. CITY OF NORTHFIELD, Appellant, Respondent, Anthony D. BECKER, et al., Respondents, Appellants.

Nos. C2-02-1904, C6-02-1923, C5-02-1928.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 8, 2003.

David Hvistendahl, Mary L. Hahn, Hvistendahl, Moersch & Dorsey, P.A., North-field, MN, for Advantage Capital Management.

Susan M. Sager, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, MN, for City of North-field.

Christopher J. Dietzen, Christopher J. Deike, Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., Bloomington, MN, for Anthony D. Becker, et al. Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge, SHUMAKER, Judge, and WRIGHT, Judge.

OPINION

LANSING, Judge.

This is a consolidated appeal from a series of orders in an action seeking a writ of mandamus directing the city to issue a building permit and requesting damages for failure to grant or deny the permit within the time limits prescribed by Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2002). Because the city acted on the zoning-action application within a properly noticed extension of the sixty-day limit imposed by the statute, we reverse the district court's mandamus order compelling issuance of the permit and approval of the site plan. In light of our holding, the district court's decisions on damages, immunity, intervention, dismissal of parties, and amendment to the petition have no legal impact, and we do not address the challenges to these moot issues.

FACTS

Fire destroyed a three-unit dwelling on property located at 1016 Forest Avenue in the city of Northfield in February 2001. The property owner, Advantage Capital Management, Ltd., (Advantage) decided to rebuild the dwelling. The applications for the building permit and zoning-action approval necessary for Advantage to rebuild are at issue in this appeal. The property is in an R-2 zoning district, which permits one and two-family residences. When Advantage built the dwelling in 1978, it obtained a conditional-use permit (CUP) to allow a three-unit dwelling in addition to the small cottage already on the property.

Advantage met with city officials after the fire, and, in late February 2001, the city told Advantage that it was unnecessary to reapply for a CUP, but that Advantage must comply with the R-2 district's minimum setback requirements, off-street-parking requirements, and additional regulations. About a month later, Anthony Becker and Rebecca Judge, who live directly north of Advantage's property, submitted a petition on behalf of seventeen neighboring property-owners, requesting that the city council revoke Advantage's CUP.

On April 9, 2001, the city received a building-permit application to reconstruct the dwelling from a construction firm acting on behalf of Advantage. As required by the Northfield Zoning Ordinance, the building permit was submitted with a preliminary building-and-site-development plan. Northfield, Minn., City Code § 34-808(b)(1) (2003). The building plan did not, however, include dimensional parking arrangements or a landscaping scheme as required by the zoning ordinances. See id.

The city granted Becker and Judge's request for a hearing on Advantage's CUP. The city notified Advantage in writing of its decision to hold a hearing and informed Advantage that the city would not act on the building permit until it made a decision on the CUP. Following a public hearing, the city rejected the petition to revoke the CUP.

On May 3, 2001, Advantage filed an application for zoning action requesting a site-plan review. The Design Advisory Board (DAB), by resolution, conditionally approved the site plan on May 23, 2001. The approval was conditioned on submission of a revised survey showing building location, approval of a grading-and-drainage plan, specific engineering changes to accommodate seven, nonstacked parking spaces, submission of color samples, and a revised site plan showing the required changes. Advantage submitted the revised site plan the next day. On the same day the DAB conditionally approved the site plan, Becker and Judge appealed the decision to the city council. Northfield City Code section 34-163(b) provides that DAB review runs concurrently with a zoning request, and the city notified Advantage that a building permit would not be issued until the appeal had been decided.

The city council reversed the DAB's conditional site-plan approval on June 18, 2001. The council found that the proposed configuration of two, five-bedroom apartments would be unique in the city; the increased footprint of the proposed structure, from 800 sq. ft to 3,995 sq. ft., would be disproportionate to the neighboring buildings; the configuration would require on-site parking excessive for the neighborhood, and the proposed extension of a driveway on Lincoln Street might be illegal. The council referred the plan back to the DAB for further review.

The city notified Advantage in writing on June 20, 2001, that it was extending, under Minn.Stat. § 15.99, the sixty-day deadline for final decision on the zoning-action application. On July 3, the DAB met to further consider the site plan. Advantage requested that consideration be postponed until its attorney could be present, and the DAB voted 2-1 to postpone consideration.

On July 11, 2001, Advantage petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the city to issue a building permit for failure to act within sixty days of a request related to zoning. Advantage named Becker and Judge as respondents in the mandamus action. The district court, relying on the April 9, 2001, submission of the application for a building permit as the date that triggered the sixty-day deadline, concluded that the notice of extension was untimely. The June 20, 2001, extension was, however, within sixty days of Advantage's May 3, 2001, application for zoning action to approve the site plan. The court ordered the city to issue the building permit and to approve the site plan. The court, on its own motion, determined that Becker and Judge were not proper parties to the mandamus action and dismissed them from the proceedings.

The city appealed to this court, and a special-term panel dismissed the appeal as premature because Advantage's allegation of damages had not been decided. Advantage Capital Mgmt. v. City of Northfield, No. C8-02-661 (Minn.App. May 21, 2002) (order). Upon dismissal of the appeal, Becker and Judge moved, in the district court, to intervene. The district court denied the motion to intervene as untimely and granted the city summary judgment on Advantage's claim for damages, concluding that the city was immune from damages caused by a violation of Minn.Stat. § 15.99. The city, Advantage, and Becker and Judge all appealed, and the three appeals were consolidated.

During the posthearing proceedings, at a special DAB meeting on July 24, 2001, the DAB denied the site-plan-review application and requested that new plans be submitted to address, among other concerns, the size and height of the proposed buildings.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in concluding that the sixty-day time limit in Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2002) for an agency to approve or deny a written request relating to zoning begins to run upon the agency's receipt of a building-permit application?

ANALYSIS

To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must establish that the law clearly requires the performance of the mandatory or purely ministerial act for which the writ will issue. Minn.Stat. § 586.01 (2002); McIntosh v. Davis, 441 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn.1989). Whether a petitioner has established the grounds necessary to support the writ is a question of law, which we review de novo. McIntosh, 441 N.W.2d at 118.

The district court's writ directing the city to issue Advantage's building permit and to approve the site plan is grounded solely on the city's failure to grant, deny, or extend Advantage's building-permit application within the time limits of Minn.Stat. § 15.99. Under section 15.99 "an agency must approve or deny within sixty days a written request relating to zoning[.]" Id., subd. 2. "Failure of an agency to deny a request within sixty days" in writing with stated reasons "is approval of the request." Id. "Agency" includes a city. Id., subd. 1. "An agency may extend the time limit * * * before the end of the initial sixty-day period by providing notice of the extension to the applicant." Id., subd. 3(f).

The supreme court addressed the extension provision of section 15.99 in Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, and concluded that the provisions were unambiguous. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312-13 (2001). The court characterized section 15.99 as an act "which establishes time deadlines for local governments to take action on zoning applications." Id. at 312. Advantage's mandamus petition was granted on a significantly broader interpretation of the statute's requirement that a city grant or deny a written request relating to zoning within sixty days. Advantage contends that the broader interpretation is correct because the plain meaning of "written request relating to zoning" encompasses the issuance of a building permit. Conversely, the city contends that the plain meaning of "written request relating to zoning" excludes a building permit.

To determine the meaning of a statute, we look first to the language of the statute itself. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002) (setting forth plain-meaning rule). If on its face and as applied to the facts, a statute's meaning is plain, judicial construction is neither necessary nor proper. Id.; Am. Tower, 636 N.W.2d at 312

. Courts refrain from construing statutory provisions that convey a plain meaning "in order to preserve language as an effective medium of communication from legislatures to courts." Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir.2002).

The plain-meaning rule presupposes the ordinary use of words...