Aio v. Hamada

• Decision Date: 03 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 8663,8663
• Citation: 664 P.2d 727,66 Haw. 401
• Parties: , 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2135, 11 Ed. Law Rep. 1064 Jerelene M. AIO, Paula Chambers, Deborah M.C. Chu, Ann K. Corum, Van E. Corum, Jr., Sharon Dumas, Harry M. Greenwood, III, Florence M. Hayslip, Donald Frederick Jensen, Joanne C. Kapahua, Harold W. Kuha, Linda M. McLean, and E. Paul Vosburgh, Appellants, v. Mack H. HAMADA, John E. Milligan, and James K. Clark, members of the State of Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board; and Hawaii State Teachers Association, NEA, Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 727

664 P.2d 727

66 Haw. 401, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2135,

11 Ed. Law Rep. 1064

Jerelene M. AIO, Paula Chambers, Deborah M.C. Chu, Ann K Corum, Van E. Corum, Jr., Sharon Dumas, Harry M. Greenwood III, Florence M. Hayslip, Donald Frederick Jensen, Joanne C Kapahua, Harold W. Kuha, Linda M. McLean, and E. Paul Vosburgh, Appellants, v. Mack H. HAMADA, John E. Milligan, and James K. Clark members of the State of Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board; and Hawaii State Teachers Association, NEA, Appellees.

No. 8663.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

June 3, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the clearly erroneous standard of review articulated in HRS § 91-14(g), a reviewing court will not disturb agency findings and conclusions unless the court is left, after examining the record, with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

2. In order to preserve the function of administrative agencies in discharging their delegated duties and the function of courts in reviewing agency determinations, a presumption of validity is accorded to decisions of administrative bodies acting within their sphere of expertise.

3. This court has recognized the wisdom of a well established rule of statutory construction that, where an administrative agency is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the mandate of a statute which contains words of broad and indefinite meaning, courts accord persuasive weight to administrative construction and follow the same, unless the construction is palpably erroneous.

4. The phrase "negotiating and administering an agreement," as it appears in HRS Chapter 89, describes a complex, comprehensive ongoing process of union representation of all employees in the bargaining unit.

5. In order to make out a prohibited practice under HRS § 89-13(b), a conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent to violate the provisions of HRS Chapter 89 must be proven.

Jared H. Jossem (Roger W. Fonseca and Gregory M. Sato, Honolulu, with him on briefs; Torkildson, Katz, Jossem & Loden, Honolulu, of counsel), for appellants.

T. Anthony Gill, Honolulu (Thomas P. Gill on the brief; Gill, Park, Park & Kim, Honolulu, of counsel) for appellee HSTA.

Glenn D. Choy for appellee HPERB.

Before LUM, C.J., NAKAMURA, PADGETT and HAYASHI, JJ., and Circuit Judge GREIG assigned by reason of vacancy.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

The Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board (HPERB), concluding that no wilful violations of HRS § 89-13 had been committed by the Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA), dismissed the prohibited practice complaints brought by thirteen public school teachers. HPERB's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the complaints were affirmed by the First Circuit Court, and the teachers have sought further judicial review of the administrative decision. After a thorough examination of the record, we likewise arrive at a decision that HPERB's findings and its construction of applicable statutory provisions are not clearly erroneous.

I.

Under the system for collective bargaining in the public sector authorized by HRS Chapter 89, public employees are accorded "the right of self-organization and the right to form, join, or assist any employee organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively." ¹ But employees are also free "to refrain from any or all ... activities [related to collective bargaining], except to the extent of making ... payment of service fees to an exclusive representative [of an appropriate bargaining unit] as provided in section 89-4." ²

The thirteen teachers who have appealed belong to Bargaining Unit 5, which has been designated an appropriate unit for collective bargaining pursuant to HRS § 89-6, and HSTA has been chosen by a majority of the members therein as the exclusive representative of the unit. Although twelve of the thirteen teachers did not belong to the employee organization during relevant times, all of them were nevertheless subject to the payroll deductions for "reasonable service fees necessary to defray the costs for ... services rendered [by HSTA] in negotiating and administering ... [the collective-bargaining] agreement" on behalf of the bargaining unit. See note 2 supra.

On January 13, 1978, each appellant filed a prohibited practice complaint with HPERB, alleging HSTA had, since July 1976, ³ improperly expended moneys received as service fees for partisan political and union membership purposes in violation of HRS § 89-13(b)(1) and 89-13(b)(4). ⁴ The specific remedy sought was either reimbursement or credit for any portion of the service fees disbursed in violation of HRS § 89-13.

The hearing on the complaints commenced shortly thereafter. After conducting several sessions, HPERB continued the case in order to consider HSTA's Petition for Modification of Service Fee, which sought an increase in the service fees payable by employees in Bargaining Unit 5 for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1978. ⁵ The requested raise in fees was approved in November of 1978, and the Board subsequently resumed the continued hearing. HPERB Decision 129, the subject of this appeal, was issued on June 13, 1980. The decision, a fifty-two page document, consisted of detailed findings of fact and lengthy conclusions of law. Though HPERB found "HSTA made expenditures out of service fees during the subject period in program areas clearly outside the scope of permissible service fee expenditures," it nonetheless concluded

that no prohibited practices as described in Subsection 89-13(b)(1) and (4), HRS, have occurred for the reasons that no willful violations of Complainant employees' rights have occurred such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(1), and no unreasonable expenditures of service fee monies have willfully been undertaken such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(4).

HPERB therefore dismissed the complaints.

An appeal of the decision to the circuit court followed, and the court upon review of the record affirmed the decision in all respects. A timely request for further judicial review was perfected.

The questions posed on the appeal to this court are: (1) whether HPERB erred in concluding HSTA's legislative and Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) lobbying efforts during the relevant period were confined to areas directly related to teachers' working conditions and therefore were chargeable to HSTA's service fee account; (2) whether HPERB erred in holding certain articles and editorials that appeared in various issues of the organization's news organ, Teacher Advocate, were political news items rather than candidate endorsements and therefore chargeable to the service fee account; (3) whether HPERB incorrectly interpreted the term "wilfully" as it appears in HRS § 89-13(b); and (4) whether HPERB erred in concluding certain expenditures made by HSTA did not amount to violations of HRS § 89-13(b)(1) and 89-13(b)(4) because they were not made with "conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent" to violate HRS Chapter 89.

II.

Judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative tribunals like HPERB is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which in pertinent part provides that:

Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are:

....

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

HRS § 91-14(g). Under the clearly erroneous test articulated above, a reviewing court will not disturb agency findings and conclusions unless it is left, after examining the record, with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." DeFries v. Association of Owners, 57 Haw. 296, 302, 555 P.2d 855, 859 (1976); see also Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Agsalud, 65 Haw. 146, 148, 648 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1982); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 34, 636 P.2d 158, 163 (1981); In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 629, 594 P.2d 612, 616-17 (1979); In re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utility Co., 60 Haw. 166, 186, 590 P.2d 524, 538 (1978).

We have further acknowledged that "[i]n order to preserve the function of administrative agencies in discharging their delegated duties and the function of this court in reviewing agency determinations, a presumption of validity is accorded to decisions of administrative bodies acting within their sphere of expertise." In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. at 630, 594 P.2d at 617. Judicial deference to agency expertise has also been a guiding precept where the interpretation and application of broad or ambiguous statutory language by an administrative tribunal are the subject of review. For we have recognized the wisdom of

a well established rule of statutory construction that, where an administrative agency is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the mandate of a statute which contains words of broad and indefinite meaning, courts accord persuasive weight to administrative construction and follow the same, unless the construction is palpably erroneous. Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 [85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616] (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 [53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796] (1933).

Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 424, 653 P.2d 420, 426 (1982) (quoting Waikiki Resort Hotel v. City & County, 63 Haw. 222, 242-43, 624 P.2d 1353, 1368 (1981)).

The voluminous record proffered for our scrutiny discloses the circuit court was indeed mindful of the standard for judging agency determinations.

III.

Appellants, however, urge the circuit court nevertheless erred in affirming HPERB's decision that HSTA's expenditures for lobbying, other...