Air Transport Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles

• Citation: 844 F. Supp. 550
• Decision Date: 15 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. CV 93-4539 AWT.,CV 93-4539 AWT.
• Parties: AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

844 F. Supp. 550

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 93-4539 AWT.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

February 15, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald L. Olson, William D. Temko, Mark B. Helm, Stuart N. Senator, Munger, Tolles & Olson, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiffs.

James K. Hahn, City Atty., Gary R. Netzer, Sr. Asst. City Atty., Breton K. Lobner, Asst. City Atty., City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Airports, Haley J. Fromholz, Harold J. McElhinny, Laurie D. Zelon, Gregory B. Koltun, Morrison & Foerster, Ronald N. Wilson, Harold G. Becks, Laura J. Barns, Wilson & Becks, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant City of Los Angeles.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TASHIMA, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of a dispute over landing fees at the Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX"). Plaintiffs are numerous domestic and international air carriers who operate out of LAX, and their trade association, the Air Transport Association of America (collectively plaintiffs or the "Airlines"). Defendants are the local governmental agencies responsible for setting the landing fees, the City of Los Angeles, its Department of Airports and Board of Airport (collectively the "City").

In June, 1993, the City increased commercial passenger aircraft landing fees at LAX from $.51 per 1,000 pounds of gross maximum aircraft weight to $1.56 per 1,000 pounds, effective July 1, 1993. The Airlines refused to pay these increased fees and commenced this action contesting their legality. The Airlines allege in their First Amended Complaint that: (1) the fees are unreasonable and thus violate the Anti-Head Tax Act ("AHTA"), 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513; (2) the fees unreasonably burden interstate and foreign commerce and are not justified by legitimate State or local concerns, thus violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 3; (3) the fees violate the Chicago Convention and numerous Bilateral Air Service Agreements; (4) the City's threat to deny airport privileges to airlines who refuse to pay the increased fees intrudes into an area preempted by the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA") and other federal laws, thus violating the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2; and (5) the unreasonable landing fees and the manner in which the City is attempting to enforce them have the effect of depriving plaintiffs of rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the Constitution, treaties and federal law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Airlines seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

The City has moved to dismiss the entire First Amended Complaint pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.

DISCUSSION

I. First Claim for Relief: The Anti-Head Tax Act

In their first claim for relief the Airlines allege that the increased landing fees violate the AHTA. The AHTA, which is a part of the FAA, provides:

(a) No State (or political subdivision thereof ...) shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom ...

(b) ... nothing in this section shall prohibit a State (or political subdivision thereof ...) owning or operating an airport from levying or collecting reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities.

49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(a) and (b). The Airlines argue that the landing fees proposed by the City violate the AHTA because they are "unreasonable."

The City contends that this claim fails to state a claim because the AHTA does not provide for a private right of action. The City argues that the dispute should be resolved initially by administrative proceedings before the Secretary of Transportation (the "Secretary").

There is no explicit grant of a private right of action in the AHTA. The Airlines argue, however, that the AHTA contains an implied private right of action.¹ They invoke the Supreme Court's analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), in support of their claim.²

In Cort, the Court adopted a four-part test to determine whether a private right of action should be implied under a federal statute: First, is the plaintiff one of a class for whose "especial" benefit the statute was enacted? Second, is there clear legislative intent either to create or deny such a private right? Third, is it consistent with the underlying principles of the legislative scheme to imply a private remedy? And fourth, is the action traditionally relegated to state law such that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. Since Cort, the Court has repeatedly held that the most important of these criteria is legislative intent. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2489, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24, 100 S.Ct. 242, 249, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); Suter v. Artist M., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1370, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).

On the issue of legislative intent, the Airlines first note that the AHTA was passed in response to the Supreme Court's holding in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 92 S.Ct. 1349, 31 L.Ed.2d 620 (1972). In Evansville, the Court upheld a state imposed fee as reasonable in the face of a Commerce Clause challenge. Finding this type of regulation a potential burden on the airline industry, Congress passed the AHTA, outlawing head taxes and unreasonable fees imposed by state and local authorities. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 9-10, 104 S.Ct. 291, 292-93, 78 L.Ed.2d 10 (1983). The Airlines argue that this history suggests that the AHTA was passed in order to strengthen the Airlines' position to challenge airport fees and, thus, that it must be interpreted in that light.

The Airlines contend that it would be inconsistent with a strengthening of the airlines' position to deny them a private right of action under the AHTA. They submit that this is particularly true given that they previously had a cause of action under the Commerce Clause, as Evansville held. Thus, they argue, interpreting the AHTA to deny them a private right of action weakens their ability to challenge fees and, therefore, is inconsistent with the intent behind the legislation. On this basis, they contend that under the most important prong of the Cort analysis, a private right of action must be implied.

Moving to the remaining Cort factors, the Airlines argue that the entire test is fulfilled. First, the airlines receive an "especial" benefit under the Act via the benefits accrued by air travellers, and through the prohibition of excess fees on the carriage of persons or the sale of air transportation. Second, the private right of action would also further the purposes of the Act. Because state and local fees would probably be passed on to customers who might be unable to challenge them, airlines are in a better position to enforce the AHTA, acting as "surrogates" for their customers. Finally, the Airlines argue that the area is one ripe for federal action because the Act itself is an explicit curtailment of state power in the area. The Airlines contend that all of these factors support the conclusion that an implied right of action exists under the AHTA.³

The City's response to these arguments is persuasive. While agreeing that the Cort analysis is appropriate to determine the existence of a private right of action, the City disagrees with the Airlines' interpretation of the legislative intent behind the AHTA.

First, the City counters the Evansville argument. While Congress may have passed the AHTA to strengthen the Airlines' claim in the face of the Evansville holding, there is no reason to conclude that administrative review, rather than immediate federal court review, is inconsistent with that goal. Having a federal forum in which to enforce the statute is what matters. In fact, as discussed below, the Secretary is probably in a better position than the district courts to protect the Airlines' rights against undue or discriminatory taxation through a uniform national program.

Second, the City argues that by placing the AHTA in the FAA, Congress intended for it to be subject to the FAA's exclusive remedial provisions, which generally do not include private rights of action.⁴ At the time the AHTA was placed within the statutory framework of the FAA, the FAA contained a comprehensive administrative enforcement scheme. The Secretary was authorized to conduct investigations, issue orders and promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the FAA. 49 U.S.C.App. § 1354(a), (b) and (c). The Act also authorizes any person to file a complaint with the Secretary for violation of the FAA. 49 U.S.C.App. § 1482(a). See, e.g., In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 407 (9th Cir.1983) (FAA "creates an extensive administrative enforcement scheme."). In turn, the administrative determinations of the Secretary under the FAA, are subject to judicial review by the courts of appeals. 49 U.S.C.App. § 1486(a). See, e.g., Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1992). The FAA provides for enforcement through the district courts primarily by the Secretary and rarely authorizes others to sue in the district court.⁵

Where an elaborate enforcement provision exists, it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize additional private remedies by implication. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). Further, an amendment to an act ...