Akers Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Com'n

Decision Date10 May 1962
Citation344 Mass. 359,182 N.E.2d 476
PartiesAKERS MOTOR LINES, INC. v. STATE TAX COMMISSION.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Samuel Hoar, Jr., Boston, for taxpayer.

Edward J. McCormack, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Herbert E. Tucker, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State Tax Commission.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK, and SPIEGEL, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

The appellant (Akers) is a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Gastonia in that State. It appealed on May 6, 1958, to the Appellate Tax Board (the board) from the refusal of the State Tax Commission to abate motor vehicle excises assessed for the year 1957 upon five tractors and forty-eight semitrailers used in interstate commerce and owned by Akers. These tractors and semitrailers were registered in Massachusetts. The excises have been paid. The board rendered a decision for the commission. It denied three requests for rulings of law made by Akers. Akers appealed.

The question presented by the denial of Akers' requests for rulings 1 is whether in the circumstances, certain Massachusetts and North Carolina statutes grant reciprocal exemptions with respect to the registration and taxation of Akers' five motor vehicles and forth-eight semitrailers, mentioned above. General Laws c. 60A, § 1 (as amended through St.1956, c. 328, § 1), provides, in part, 'Except as hereinafter provided, there shall be assessed * * * in each calendar year on every motor vehicle and trailer registered under chapter ninety, for the privilege of such registration, an excise measured by the value thereof.' Section 1 also provides for a reciprocal examption from this excise with respect to 'the registration * * * by a * * * corporation which does not have a principal place of business in this commonwealth, of any motor vehicle or trailer to be customarily kept in another state; provided, such motor vehicle or trailer is also registered in such other state during the period when registered in this commonwealth, and if such other state does not impose an excise, privilege or property tax or fee in lieu of or in addition to a registration fee, or does not impose a registration fee at a rate greater than that required for registration in this commonwealth, upon motor vehicles or trailers, as the case may be, customarily kept in this commonwealth and registered * * * by a * * * corporation having its principal place of business in this commonwealth' 2 (emphasis supplied).

In addition to the facts already stated, the following facts, alleged in Akers' petition, were admitted by the State Tax Commission. Akers is an 'interstate motor freight common carrier * * * with operating authority extending between points in Massachusetts * * * and points in Georgia.' It has no intrastate operating authority within Massachusetts. The five tractors and forty-eight semitrailers were registered in North Carolina during the period in 1957 when also registered in Massachusetts. Proper applications for abatement of the excises were filed by Akers. The commission's answer reveals that the applications were denied by the commission, on the ground that the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation had determined that North Carolina was a State which did not fall within the language of the reciprocal exemption granted by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.

At the hearing before the board, it was agreed that the tractors and semitrailers were customarily kept in North Carolina and principally garaged there. The board took notice under its rules of § 20-83 of Part 6 of the motor vehicle laws of North Carolina. See N.C.Gen.St. (1953 Recompilation), c. 20. It was stipulated 'that the registration fees of North Carolina are higher than the registration fees of * * * Massachusetts' (North Carolina,--tractors $246, semitrailers $102; Massachusetts,--tractors $150, semitrailers $15). At the hearing also there was introduced in evidence, subject to the exception of the commission, a certified copy of a regulation, promulgated on November 10, 1955, by the registrar of motor vehicles of the Commonwealth, determining that in certain States 'motor vehicles and trailers duly registered under the laws and owned by residents of this [C]ommonwealth are granted [certain] privileges' and that, therefore, under G.L. c. 90, § 3 (as amended through St.1953, c. 463, §§ 2, 3, see footnote 3, infra) motor vehicles or trailers owned by nonresidents and duly registered in those States are granted by Massachusetts similar privileges of operation without registration under c. 90. As to North Carolina, the relevant privileges granted by that State were said to be 'Commercial vehicles: Interstate, unlimited; intrastate, must be registered.'

It would have been desirable for the board to make findings and to prepare an opinion in a case which the presiding member recognized was likely to come to this court. It was not required to do so, however, for Akers did not request the board to make findings and a report within ten days after the decision. See G.L. c. 58A, § 13 (as amended through St.1957, c. 522). Accordingly, we cannot ascertain with precision what facts, not established by the pleadings or admitted by the commission, the board found to be true. Nevertheless, we need not remand the case for proper findings, as we might do under G.L. c. 30A, § 14(8), inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1. Enough has been established to permit decision of the case on the merits, for the board was not free to disbelieve (in the complete absence of contradictory evidence) documentary evidence of the existence of certain North Carolina statutes, of a regulation of the Massachusetts registrar of motor vehicles, and of a written opinion or ruling of the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. See Barrett v. Brooks Hosp. Inc., 338 Mass. 754, 757-758, 157 N.E.2d 638. See also Druzik v. Board of Health of Haverhill, 324 Mass. 129, 139, 85 N.E.2d 232; Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 645, 162 N.E.2d 19; Northeastern Malden Barrel Co. Inc. v. Binder, 341 Mass. 710, 713-714, 172 N.E.2d 123; Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 342 Mass. 537, 538, 174 N.E.2d 363.

1. Although the determination by the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation (see footnote 2, supra) of the States which afford to Massachusetts motor vehicle tax reciprocity is said by c. 60A, § 1, to be 'final,' it is subject to review at least for errors of law. See Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn. v. Chilton Club, 318 Mass. 285, 287-288, 61 N.E.2d 335. The board properly adopted this view in its rulings.

2. So far as here pertinent, G.L. c. 90, § 3 (as amended through St.1953, c. 463, §§ 2, 3), is set out in the margin. 3

The North Carolina statutes, brought to our attention by Akers' brief, are § 20-88(b) of the motor vehicle laws (N.C.Gen.St. [1953 Recompilation] c. 20) which (as amended through St.1955, c. 554, § 8) imposes fees according to a schedule 'for the registration and licensing of trucks * * * and semi-trailers,' and § 20-83, reading 'Nonresidents of this State * * * will be exempt from the provisions * * * as to the registration of motor vehicles * * * to the same extent as like exemptions are granted residents of this State under [l]aws of another state * * *. The [c]ommissioner shall determine what exemptions the nonresident vehicle operators of the several states * * * are entitled to under the provisions of this section, and * * * publish rules and regulations for making effective the provisions of this section * * *.' In connection with these assessments an inquiry about the applicable North Carolina statutes was presented under date of May 9, 1958, by tax counsel in behalf of the Massachusetts State Tax Commission to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. This inquiry stated essentially the facts of the present case. The North Carolina department, under date of May 13, 1958, replied, referring to § 20-83, as stated in the margin. 4 The exchange of correspondence was in evidence. The signer of the letter, Miss Foy Ingram, director of registration in the North Carolina department, testified in person before the board, and, in substance, confirmed what was said in the letter of May 13, 1958.

From the uncontradicted documentary evidence, it is established that, prior to the inquiry made on May 9, 1958, in behalf of the Massachusetts commission, as a matter of administrative practice, (a) North Carolina, and its department of motor vehicles in 1957 would not have required registration by a Massachusetts corporation of vehicles and trailers owned by it when operated within North Carolina only on an interstate basis similar to Akers' 1957 operations in Massachusetts, and (b) without such registration, no taxes or fees of any type would have been imposed in 1957 by North Carolina with respect to such vehicles and trailers. Akers, in effect, contends that these facts are sufficient to bring Akers' vehicles and trailers, although registered in Massachusetts, within the reciprocal exemption provisions of G.L. c. 60A, § 1, already quoted. The commission contends that exemptions from taxation are to be construed strictly and that Akers has the burden (see Norwood v. Norwood Civic Assn., 340 Mass. 518, 525, 165 N.E.2d 124) of showing that it is within the reciprocal exemption. See OLD COLONY TRUST CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF CORPS. & TAXN., MASS., 180 N.E.2D 97.A The scope of the reciprocal exemption contained in c. 60A, § 1, in these circumstances has not been decided, although there was some discussion of the exemption in O'Brien v. State Tax Comn., 339 Mass. 56, 64, 66-70, 158 N.E.2d 146. Cf. Rummel v. Peters, 314 Mass. 504, 514-516, 51 N.E.2d 57 (decided before certain statutory amendments in force in 1957).

Reciprocal exemptions, perhaps, may be more liberally interpreted than other tax exemptions. Their purpose is to permit persons from State A to receive tax...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 10 Enero 1964
    ...case bring the 1951 irrevocable trust within the clear purport of the exception to, or exemption (cf. Akers Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commn., 344 Mass. 359, 365, 182 N.E.2d 476, and cases cited) from taxability under G.L. c. 65, § 1, as amended. We hold that 'full consideration in mone......
  • Commissioner of Ins. v. Equity General Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 6 Junio 1963
    ...insurance companies from that State only so long as the denial in that State remained in force). See also Akers Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commn., 344 Mass. 359, 182 N.E.2d 476 (which discusses the somewhat analogous problem of reciprocal tax exemptions). Beyond the statements quoted ab......
  • Kearney v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 14 Enero 1976
    ...v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commn., 345 Mass. 228, 235--236, 186 N.E.2d 593 (1962). Contrast Akers Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commn., 344 Mass. 359, 362--363, 182 N.E.2d 476 (1962). The board is to give Kearney reasonable notice (preferably in writing) in advance of the rehearing of ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT