Commissioner of Ins. v. Equity General Ins. Co.

Decision Date06 June 1963
Citation346 Mass. 233,191 N.E.2d 139
PartiesCOMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE v. EQUITY GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY. (Petition of Trailways of New England, Inc.)
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Edward F. Hennessey, Boston, for Trailways of New England, Inc.

Edward T. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Commissioner of Insurance.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

Trailways of New England, Inc. (Trailways) filed this petition in the ancillary receivership of the insurance company (Equity), a Florida corporation, for an order that the commissioner, as ancillary receiver, be directed 'to retain within the Commonwealth the $20,000 deposit of Equity * * * originally placed with the Treasurer and Receiver-General under the 'retaliatory laws', so-called [G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 175, § 159], and to pay from * * * [that] deposit only such claims as have been brought by citizens or residents of * * * Massachusetts for matters arising within * * * Massachusetts.' A single justice reserved the case without decision for the determination of the full court upon the pleadings and stipulations of 'all * * * material facts.'

Trailways, a Massachusetts corporation, held a public liability automobile policy issued by Equity which was in effect from November 1, 1959, to September 1, 1960. Since then Trailways had paid and become obligated to pay various claims of injured persons and has pending against it several similar claims, all arising out of injuries covered by Equity's policy. Equity wrote multiple insurance lines including fire insurance. It qualified to do business in Massachusetts in 1957 and made its deposit of $20,000 in accordance with c. 175, § 159. 1 Florida Sts. (1955) §§ 631.01-631.09, then required each fire insurance company before being admitted to do business in Florida (§ 631.01) to make a deposit (§ 631.06) with the Florida insurance commissioner in bonds or cash of $20,000 or to file a surety bond in the same amount. Section 631.09 provided that '[u]pon the bonds so deposited * * * the holders of all policies of * * * [the] insurer who are citizens or residents of this state at such time, or who hold policies issued upon property in this state, shall have a lien for the amount due them, respectively * * * in consequence of such policies, for losses, return premiums or equitable values, and shall be entitled to be paid ratably out of the proceeds of said bonds (if such proceeds be not sufficient to pay all of said policyholders).' See Fla.Sts. (1961) § 624.0210, as amended by Fla.Laws of 1961, c. 61-166, § 1, F.S.A. (under which the deposit would have been at least $50,000 'for the protection of the insurer's policyholders or its policyholders and creditors who are citizens or residents of this state [Florida] or who hold policies issued upon property in this state'). See also fn. 7, infra.

On September 23, 1960, the Florida insurance commissioner was appointed domiciliary receiver of Equity. On October 28, 1960, the then Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance was appointed Equity's ancillary receiver here. Within the time prescribed in the ancillary proceedings Trailways filed with the ancillary receiver proofs of claim, 'directed solely' against the $20,000 deposit, claiming that it was the owner of 'special deposit claims' within the meaning of the statutory provisions applicable to the liquidation of domestic and foreign insurers, G.L. c. 175, §§ 180A-180L, inserted by St.1939, c. 472, § 3, which were in major part based upon the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, in force with some variations in Massachusetts 2 and in Florida. See Fla.Laws of 1959, c. 205, now Fla.Sts. (1961) c. 631.211. The most pertinent provisions of c. 175, §§ 180A-180L, are summarized in the margin. 3

No written objections to Trailways' claims have been filed with the ancillary receiver and no decision has been rendered on them. Trailways, however, has been informed by attorneys for the ancillary receiver that all proofs of claim 4 are being forwarded to the domiciliary (Florida) receiver of Equity and that leave of this court will be sought 'for permission to forward to the Florida [r]eceiver the * * * deposit of * * * $20,000 * * * after deducting * * * various expenses * * * [of] the [a]ncillary [r]eceiver.'

1. Although the various public and private groups which considered the draft uniform statute (see fn. 2, supra) may have viewed with some disfavor special deposits for the benefit of particular classes of policyholders and claimants, we find nothing in the statute as enacted to suggest that special deposits are not to be applied in accordance with the statutes under which they were created. Sections 180A, 180E, 180I, and 180J of the Massachusetts act provide expressly for the enforcement of special deposit claims. See fns. 3 and 4, supra. Accordingly, if Equity made what was really a special deposit for the benefit of Massachusetts policyholders, then Trailways may prove claims to be satisfied from that deposit ratably with other similar claims in accordance with §§ 180E and 180J. 5

2. General Laws c. 175, § 159, 'simply comples the imposition upon a foreign insurance company * * * of 'obligations and prohibitions' of like kind and to the same extent as those imposed in the State of the company's origin upon Massachusetts companies doing business there.' See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 325 Mass. 386, 388-389, 90 N.E.2d 668, 669. 'As a general rule rataliatory statutes are strictly construed.' See Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 328 Mass. 404, 410, 104 N.E.2d 140, 143 (which held that, if the failure of another State to furnish an appellate remedy to Massachusetts insurance companies doing business there came within § 159 at all, then § 159 would require denial of a similar remedy in Massachusetts to insurance companies from that State only so long as the denial in that State remained in force). See also Akers Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commn., 344 Mass. 359, 182 N.E.2d 476 (which discusses the somewhat analogous problem of reciprocal tax exemptions). Beyond the statements quoted above, there has been little pertinent interpretation of § 159.

We assume, as one text writer has suggested, that the 'ultimate object [of a retaliatory or reciprocal statute] is not to punish foreign corporations * * * or match * * * the foreign state in placing [burdens] upon corporations * * * but to induce * * * [a] foreign state to show the same consideration to corporations of the enacting state doing business therein as is shown to corporations of such foreign state doing business in the enacting state.' Couch, Insurance 2d, § 21.92. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 354 Ill. 398, 405-406, 188 N.E. 436, 91 A.L.R. 788. To accomplish this objective, a statute like c. 175, § 159, requires Massachusetts courts and administrative authorities (1) to look at the statute law of the other State concerned and (2) to subject corporations from that State to the same requirements (interpreting the relevant statutes reasonably) which a Massachusetts corporation doing business there would be obliged to bear under the statutes of that State. With respect to deposits, the language of § 159 in terms has expressed this general policy at least since St.1854, c. 453, § 34, through various statutory revisions which need not be quoted. 6 We think that the character and application of Equity's deposit under § 159 are to be determined by Florida's statutory requirements (applicable to Massachusetts insurance companies) which gave rise to Equity's deposit here. This means that the deposit will have the same characteristics as would the deposit of a Massachusetts fire insurance company, writing multiple lines of insurance, then made under Fla.Sts. (1955) §§ 631.01-631.09. 7 The present statute (Fla.Sts. [1961] § 624.0210, as amended by Fla.Laws of 1961, c. 61- 166, §§ 1, 3) appears to be much the same in substance as Fla.Sts. (1955) § 631.09.

The Florida courts have treated a deposit there by a foreign insurance company, under the Florida statutes already mentioned and their predecessors, as a deposit for the benefit of all or specified Florida policyholders, and thus within (see fn. 3, supra) the term 'special deposit.' See Kelly v. Knott, 120 Fla. 580, 589-592, 163 So. 64, revd. (on the question of the priority of Federal claims against the fund) sub nom. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (where at pp. 548-549, 56 S.Ct. 902, at pp. 904-905, 80 L.Ed. 1321, the Florida construction of the statute is discussed), Id., Withers v. Knott, 127 Fla. 241, 168 So. 416. In Bohlinger v. Higginbotham, 70 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.), it appears to have been assumed that the security of the Florida deposit 'is given to all Florida policy holders.' 8 Various cases assume that such deposits under an Ohio statute are for the benefit of the residents of the State where the deposit is made. See Re Application concerning Southern Surety Co., 282 N.Y. 54, 60-61, 24 N.E.2d 845, 127 A.L.R. 497; Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am. v. Stowell, 172 Ohio St. 167, 173, 174 N.E.2d 536; State ex rel. Bohlinger v. Annat, 123 N.E.2d 71, 75 (Ohio C.P.). Cf. Langdeau v. Narragansett Ins. Co., R.I., 179 A.2d 110, 112, 113, dealing with a somewhat different type of statute construed to permit a general deposit by a domiciliary company for the benefit of all policyholders.

In McMurray v. Commonwealth, 249 Mass. 574, 144 N.E. 718, this court considered the nature of a deposit made pursuant to St.1907, c. 576, § 99 (now G.L. c. 175, § 185, as amended), which was stipulated (p. 581, 144 N.E. p. 719) to have been made with the Treasurer and Receiver General, in order to comply with the laws of various other States, 'for the benefit of all the policy holders and creditors of * * * [an] insurance company,' organized in Massachusetts, and then...

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