Albrecht v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0023.,01-0023.
• Parties: Terry ALBRECHT, Individually and as Guardian and Conservator of Sara Albrecht, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

648 N.W.2d 87

Terry ALBRECHT, Individually and as Guardian and Conservator of Sara Albrecht, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 01-0023.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 17, 2002.

James L. Kramer and Neven J. Mulholland of Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, P.C., Fort Dodge, for appellant.

Thomas P. Branigan, Terrence E. Haggerty and Andrea L. Laginess of Bowman and Brooke LLP, Detroit, Michigan, and William H. Habhab, Fort Dodge, for appellee.

TERNUS, Justice.

This products liability suit is before us on appeal because the parties dispute whether the statute of repose set forth in Iowa Code section 614.1(2A) (1999) is extended for minors pursuant to Iowa Code section 614.8(2). The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, ruling that the extension provision did not apply and, therefore, the statute of repose barred the plaintiff's suit against the defendant manufacturer. We agree with the district court's interpretation of the relevant statutes and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On December 15, 1999, seventeen-year-old Sara Albrecht was injured when the car she was driving collided with another vehicle. Her father, Terry Albrecht, acting as his daughter's conservator and guardian, filed suit against the manufacturer of the car, General Motors Corporation (GM). The petition asserted that GM was liable for Sara's injuries because the seat belt Sara was wearing at the time of the accident allegedly failed.

In its answer, GM raised Iowa Code section 614.1(2A) as an affirmative defense. This statute, in general terms, requires that any products liability claim be brought with fifteen years of the product's initial purchase. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2A).

Relying on the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, GM filed a motion to dismiss. Albrecht resisted. Although he did not dispute that more than fifteen years had elapsed since the automobile in question was first purchased, he claimed that section 614.1(2A) did not apply to minors. Albrecht relied on Iowa Code section 614.8(2), which extends limitations periods for minors until one year after they attain the age of majority. See id. § 614.8(2). (It was undisputed that suit was filed within one year after Sara reached the age of majority.) GM responded that the extension provision applied only to the two-year statute of limitation for personal injuries, see id. § 614.1(2), not to section 614.1(2A)'s statute of repose.

The district court granted GM's motion to dismiss. Noting that statutes of repose were different from statutes of limitation, the court held that section 614.8(2) did not apply to statutes of repose. Albrecht appealed.

II. Applicable Legal Principles.

A. Scope of Review. We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Pa. Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Iowa 2002). "A motion to dismiss is sustainable only when it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the claims asserted." Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Iowa 1994). For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the facts alleged in the pleading sought to be dismissed. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d at 810. Accordingly, a statute-of-repose defense is properly raised by a motion to dismiss only when the necessary facts appear on the face of the petition. Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa 1989).

B. Principles of statutory interpretation. Because the propriety of dismissal in this case rests on the applicability of various provisions of chapter 614, we are guided by principles of statutory interpretation.

"The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature." We presume that when the legislature enacts a statute that it intends "[a] just and reasonable result." Accordingly, the court interprets statutes so as to avoid absurd results. In addition, we "construe statutes that relate to the same or a closely allied subject together so as to produce a harmonious and consistent body of legislation."

State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).

Unless a statute is ambiguous, we will apply the statute "in accordance with its plain meaning." Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman v. Miller, 543 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Iowa 1996). "Ambiguity exists if reasonable minds may differ or may be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute." State v. Green, 470 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1991). "Ambiguity may arise from specific language used in a statute or when the provision at issue is considered in the context of the entire statute or related statutes." Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002). To resolve an ambiguity, the court considers "the objects sought to be accomplished [and] the evils sought to be remedied." Green, 470 N.W.2d at 18. We then choose "a reasonable construction that will effectuate the statute's purpose rather than one that will defeat it." Id.

III. Discussion.

We commence our analysis with a discussion of two matters of importance: (1) the distinction between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose; and (2) the evolution of limitations periods in chapter 614. We think an understanding of these matters will be helpful in resolving the dispute in this case. After that discussion, we will address the merits of the issue before us.

A. Statutes of limitation and repose. Historically, our court did not distinguish between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose. E.g., Wilber v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Iowa 1991)

(stating that statutes of limitations "are statutes of repose"); Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Iowa 1991) (stating that a statute of limitation "`is a statute of repose'" (citation omitted)); Grand Lodge of Iowa of the Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Osceola Lodge No. 18, 178 N.W.2d 362, 372 (Iowa 1970) (stating that "[l]imitation acts are statutes of repose"); Boehnke v. Roenfanz, 246 Iowa 240, 247, 67 N.W.2d 585, 590-91 (1954) (using terms interchangeably). We first noted that statutes of limitation and statutes of repose were not the same in 1993. In Bob McKiness Excavating & Grading, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 507 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 1993), we said:

"Statutes of repose are different from statutes of limitation, although they have comparable effects." A statute of limitations bars, after a certain period of time, the right to prosecute an accrued cause of action.

By contrast, a statute of repose "terminates any right of action after a specified time has elapsed, regardless of whether or not there has as yet been an injury."

A statute of repose period begins to run from the occurrence of some event other than the event of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action and, therefore, bars a cause of action before the injury occurs.

Under a statute of repose, therefore, the mere passage of time can prevent a legal right from ever arising.

Bob McKiness Excavating, 507 N.W.2d at 408 (citations omitted). See generally 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 7, at 456 (2000) ("A true statute of limitations prescribes a time period within which an action must be brought upon claims or rights to be enforced, and should be distinguished from ... statutes of repose." (Emphasis added.)).

To summarize, a statute of limitations runs from the accrual of a cause of action, whereas a statute of repose runs from a different, earlier date typically related to an act of the defendant. Id. § 9, at 458, § 31, at 471. They are fundamentally different insofar as a statute of limitations sets forth the time within which an accrued claim must be asserted in court, in contrast to a statute of repose that operates to prevent a cause of action from even accruing. Id. § 12, at 459 ("[W]hile a statute of limitation merely limits the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit after a cause of action accrues, a statute of repose extinguishes a cause of action after a fixed period of time ..., regardless of when the cause of action accrued."). In other words, a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, not the right, see Schulte, 465 N.W.2d at 287,

whereas a statute of repose affects the right itself, extinguishing existing rights or preventing rights from arising.

Although the purposes underlying statutes of limitation and statutes of repose are similar, they are not identical. Both types of statutes "are designed to prevent the trial of stale claims because evidence gathering is usually made more difficult by the passage of time." Fisher v. McCrary-Rost Clinic, P.C., 580 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1998). In addition, statutes of repose "reflect the legislative conclusion that a point in time arrives beyond which a potential defendant should be immune from liability for past conduct." 51 Am. Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 18, at 463. Such statutes "avoid the difficulties in proof and recordkeeping that suits involving older claims impose ... and protect certain classes of persons ... from claims that are virtually indefensible after the passage of time." Id.

B. Legislative evolution of statutes of limitation and repose in Iowa. Before the 1975 enactment of a special provision dealing with medical malpractice claims, section 614.1 contained various limitation periods that ran from the accrual of the cause of action. See Iowa Code § 614.1 (1975). This statute stated that "[a]ctions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared." Id. (emphasis added). It then, in eight subsections, listed categories of injuries and the time periods for commencement of suit. See id.

In 1975, the legislature added a subsection to this statute that addressed medical malpractice claims and varied from the previous pattern. See 1975 Iowa Acts ch. 239, §...