Albright v. Royse

• Decision Date: 23 July 2021
• Docket Number: 2020-CA-0856-MR
• Parties: WILLIAM "SCOTT" ALBRIGHT APPELLANT v. BRIAN ROYSE APPELLEE
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

WILLIAM "SCOTT" ALBRIGHT APPELLANT v. BRIAN ROYSE APPELLEE

No. 2020-CA-0856-MR

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

July 23, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-005732

BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT: Garry R. Adams Abigail V Lewis Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE: Mike O'Connell Jefferson County Attorney, Brendan R. Daugherty Assistant Jefferson County Attorney Louisville, Kentucky

BEFORE: CALDWELL, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

OPINION

JONES JUDGE

Appellant, William "Scott" Albright ("Albright"), appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court's order granting the Appellee, Brian Royse's ("Royse"), motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), and request for fees and costs under KRS^[1] 503.085(3). Following review of the record, all applicable law, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. Background

Albright owned a firearm store in the Louisville Metropolitan area. On July 8, 2015, two brothers, Kyle and Cameron Pearson, were engaged in an altercation outside of the store. The two brothers were arguing over a gun Kyle had stolen from Cameron two days prior. While bystanders were present, a couple of shots were fired into the pavement. After observing the situation from the inside of his store, Albright exited the store and made his way to the area where Kyle and Cameron were arguing. With his firearm at the ready, Albright instructed Kyle to put down his weapon. Immediately thereafter, Cameron tackled Kyle to ground and the two wrestled for control of Kyle's firearm at which time Kyle's gun discharged firing close to where Albright was crouched. Albright returned fire, shooting both Kyle and Cameron. Kyle survived his injuries but Cameron died from the gunshot wound inflicted by Albright.

Louisville Metro Police Department ("LMPD") arrived on the scene shortly after Albright discharged his weapon. Surveillance video was recovered from several of the surrounding businesses, and LMPD officers requested Albright to accompany them back to the station for additional questioning. Albright complied and spent approximately three hours answering questions at the police station. After the questioning was completed, lead detective Brian Royse told Albright he was free to leave. According to Albright, Royse told him that the facts did not warrant prosecution because it was clear that Albright had acted in self-defense. Specifically, Albright alleges that Royse said: "This was justified. There is no reason to charge you. This is self-defense. Self-defense is my recommendation. You are free to leave."

Approximately two months later, on September 24, 2015, the Jefferson County Grand Jury delivered an indictment of Albright for the murder of Cameron Pearson and the assault in the first degree of Kyle Pearson after two minutes and nine seconds of testimony. Albright filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to KRS 503.085 arguing that he was immune from criminal prosecution.^[2] The trial court granted Albright's motion and dismissed the indictment; we affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Commonwealth v. Albright, No. 2016-CA-001352-MR, 2018 WL 1770328 (Ky. App. Apr. 13, 2018). The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

On September 18, 2019, Albright filed suit against Royse in Jefferson Circuit Court, bringing claims of malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the prosecution against him, and attorney's fees and court costs under KRS 503.085(3). In lieu of an answer, Royse moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to CR^[3] 12.02(f). The circuit court entered a memorandum and order granting the motion to dismiss on June 9, 2020. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Our standard of review on a motion to dismiss is as follows:

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "admits as true the material facts of the complaint." So a court should not grant such a motion "unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved . . . ." Accordingly, "the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true." This exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the trial court to make findings of fact; "rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?" Since a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court's determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.

Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnotes and citations omitted). CR 12.02(f) is properly utilized to dismiss a claim when a litigant would fail to succeed under any set of facts that could be provided in support of relief. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Ky. App. 2002).

Kentucky requires pleadings filed in its courts to contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. CR 8.01. Kentucky has long utilized a notice pleading standard to do so. Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the use of the notice pleading standard in Russell v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 610 S.W.3d 233 (Ky. 2020).

"Kentucky is a notice pleading jurisdiction, where the 'central purpose of pleadings remains notice of claims and defenses.'" Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Ky. 2013) (citing Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Ky. 1995)). In accordance with Kentucky Civil Rule 8.01(1), "[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (a) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (b) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." As interpreted by this Court, "[i]t is not necessary to state a claim with technical precision under this rule, as long as a complaint gives a defendant fair notice and identifies the claim." Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005) (citing Cincinnati, Newport, & Covington Transp. Co. v. Fischer, 357 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1962)).

Importantly, "[w]e no longer approach pleadings searching for a flaw, a technicality upon which to strike down a claim or defense, as was formerly the case at common law." Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky. 1989). When reviewing a complaint to determine whether it states a cause of action, it "should be liberally construed." Morgan v. O'Neil, 652 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Ky. 1983). Our liberal pleading standard was recently demonstrated when we held that a complaint "couched in general and conclusory terms, complied with CR 8.01(1)." KentuckyOne Health, Inc. v. Reid, 522 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Ky. 2017).

Applying Kentucky's well-established notice pleading principles, we hold Appellant's complaint alleged a sufficient cause of action to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. We refuse to mandate a heightened pleading standard and, therefore, reiterate Kentucky's requirement of bare-bones, notice pleading.

Here, Biosense asserts a complaint must include the specific federal regulations violated in order to survive a judgment on the pleadings; we disagree. Although Biosense appears to cite federal cases supporting this position, those cases were evaluated under the more stringent, federal pleading standard. Biosense does not cite any Kentucky cases on our pleading standard; and notably, Kentucky's pleading standard is more lenient. See Combs v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 934 F.Supp.2d 915, 923 (E.D. Ky. 2013). Combs clarified "the [United States Supreme Court] altered the federal pleading standard by making it more stringent for plaintiffs," and held "Kentucky's pleading standard is more lenient than the federal rules." Id.

As we have held, "[t]he federal rules of procedure . . . are applicable to the proceedings in federal court and are not to be applied to practice or procedure in state courts." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991). In Kentucky, "[i]t is vital that we not sever litigants from their right of trial, if they do in fact have valid issues to try, just for the sake of efficiency and expediency." Id.

Id. at 240-41.

Federal courts utilize a much more stringent, plausible pleading standard, wherein federal courts require "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The circuit court, confusingly, cited to both pleading standards. It stated specifically:

"It is not necessary to state a claim with technical precision under this rule, as long as a complaint gives a defendant fair notice and identifies the claim." Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005), citing, Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Transp. Co. v. Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1962). "But the simplification and liberality extend to the manner of stating a case are not so great as to obviate the necessity of stating the elements of a cause of action or defense, as the case may be." Johnson v. Coleman, 288 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1956). "The basic elements thereof must fairly be shown., i.e., (a) a primary right of the plaintiff, and (b) a wrong of the defendant which breaches the right and

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