Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 36272
| Decision Date | 13 June 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 36272,36272 |
| Citation | 62 Wn.2d 319,382 P.2d 639 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | ALDERWOOD WATER DISTRICT, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. POPE & TALBOT, INC., a Washington corporation, and the Silver Lake Water District, a municipal corporation, Respondents. |
Cooper & Cooper, Leslie R. Cooper, Everett, for appellant.
Jordan & Britt, Everett, for Silver Lake Water Dist.
Howe, Davis, Riese & Jones, Seattle, for Pope & Talbot, Inc.
Alderwood Water District and Silver Lake Water District are adjoining municipal corporations, created in compliance with RCW Title 57, and possessing the powers therein conferred by the legislature. Pope & Talbot, Inc., is the entrepreneur of a residential real estate development known as Silver Acres No. 7, which is completely within the geographical boundaries of the Alderwood Water District. Water mains were installed in the Silver Acres development by Pope and Talbot. Subsequently, these water mains were connected with the facilities of the Silver Like Water District.
The Alderwood Water District initiated this action to enjoin the Silver Lake Water District from supplying water to Silver Acres and to enjoin Silver Acres from receiving such water. Both defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion, and a judgment of dismissal was entered. This appeal followed.
The question presented is whether a municipal water district of this state can directly furnish water to the inhabitants of an area located outside the boundaries of such district but within the boundaries of another water district. 1
An easy solution to that question could be formulated by merely citing, out of context, some language from a statute and then proceeding to consider that language as though it existed in a vacuum. For example, a portion of RCW 57.08.045 could be cited and emphasized: '* * * a water district may provide water services to property owners outside the limits of the water district.' 2 After parroting the above quoted language, we could mechanically conclude that water districts have the authority to distribute water to individuals outside the boundaries or geographical limits of the district; and that, since there is no geographical or other limitation explicitly imposed upon that authority, one water district can supply water to property owners or persons within the boundaries of another district. However, such a conclusion would sanction the 'raiding' of one water district by another, which potentially might well be inimical to an orderly and economically well-planned development and utilization of public water service in rapidly expanding suburban residential areas.
In some Washington cases reference is made to a general rule that there cannot be two municipal corporations exercising the same functions in the same territory at the same time. Although this socalled general rule has been virtually emasculted by the case law of this state, it continues to serve as a touchstone in the sense that it expresses a public policy against duplication of public functions, and that such duplication is normally not permissible unless it is provided for in some manner by statute. 3 In a sense, the 'general rule' should alert courts, in situations akin to that of the instant case, to the necessity of closely examining in toto statutory provisions conferring authority upon the potentially competing municipal corporations.
On numerous occasions this court has indicated that a statute should be construed as a whole in order to ascertain legislative purpose, and thus avoid unlikely, strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal reading. That the spirit or the purpose of legislation should prevail over the express but inept language is an ancient adage of the law. Evston v. Studd (England, 1574), 2 Plowden 460, 464:
'* * * intent of statutes is more to be regarded and pursued than the precise letter of them, for oftentimes things, which are within the words of statutes, are out of the purview of them, which purview extends no further than the intent of the makers of the act, and the best way to construe an act of Parliament is according to the intent rather than according to the words * * *'
The statutory provisions governing the formation, dissolution, procedures and powers of water districts...
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Roberts v. Dudley
...intended to both protect small employers and subject them to liability in the same statute. See Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963) ("On numerous occasions this court has indicated that a statute should be construed as a whole in order to a......
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...549, 560, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973); In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash.2d 430, 438, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972); Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963); State v. Lake City Bowlers' Club, 26 Wash.2d 292, 295, 173 P.2d 783 (1946); Am. Prods. Co. v. Villwoc......
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...a related statute. Our long-held rules of statutory interpretation preclude such logic. See, e.g., Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963) (statutory interpretation should "avoid unlikely, strained or absurd consequences which could result from......
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