ALEGENT HEALTH BERGAN MERCY MED. v. Haworth
Decision Date | 28 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. S-99-193.,S-99-193. |
Citation | 615 N.W.2d 460,260 Neb. 63 |
Parties | ALEGENT HEALTH BERGAN MERCY MEDICAL CENTER et al., appellees, v. Robert Wayne HAWORTH, Jr., Special Administrator of the Estate of Robert Wayne Haworth, Sr., deceased, appellant. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Robert Wayne Haworth, Jr., pro se.
Thomas J. Shomaker, of Sodoro, Daly & Sodoro, Omaha, for appellees Edward P. Huigens, M.D., and Critical Care Associates.
Brien M. Welch, of Cassem, Tierney, Adams, Gotch & Douglas, Omaha, for appellee Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Medical Center.
In this case, we are required to determine whether a wrongful death action alleging negligence on the part of health care providers who have elected to qualify under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act (NHMLA), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2801 et seq. (Reissue 1993 & Cum.Supp. 1996), is governed by the limitations provision of § 44-2828, which is a component of the NHMLA, or by the statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death actions set forth in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-810 (Reissue 1995). This question of law was presented but not reached in Healy v. Langdon, 245 Neb. 1, 511 N.W.2d 498 (1994), and is thus a matter of first impression.
Robert Wayne Haworth, Jr., is the duly appointed special administrator of the estate of Robert Wayne Haworth, Sr. (Haworth), who died on February 11, 1996. Exactly 2 years later, on February 11, 1998, the special administrator filed a notice of claim and proposed petition with the Nebraska Department of Insurance pursuant to § 44-2844. In his notice of claim, the special administrator requested that a medical review panel consider the allegations of professional negligence on the part of several health care providers who were named as defendants in the proposed petition, including Edward P. Huigens, M.D.; Critical Care Associates (Critical Care); and Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Medical Center (Alegent). The special administrator stated in his notice of claim that the proposed petition would be filed in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, "following completion of the medical review panel proceedings, if necessary."
In his proposed petition, the special administrator alleged that Haworth was transported to the emergency department of Bergan Mercy Hospital on the evening of January 21, 1996, with complaints of acute chest and upper abdominal pain with sweating and shortness of breath. He further alleged that Haworth was examined in the emergency department by Huigens, a physician affiliated with Critical Care, who performed certain tests and released Haworth several hours later on January 22, with a diagnosis of probable gastritis and instructions to see his own physician.
The special administrator alleged that Haworth died on February 11, 1996, of a heart attack resulting from coronary heart disease, and that his death was caused by the negligent failure of Alegent, Huigens, and Critical Care, as well as a physician and professional corporation who are not parties to this action, to correctly diagnose and treat Haworth's condition on January 21 and 22. The special administrator alleged that Huigens, Critical Care, and Alegent were qualified health care providers under the NHMLA and sought damages resulting from the wrongful death of Haworth "pursuant to provisions of Section 30-809 and Section 30-810."
On June 23, 1998, Alegent, Huigens, and Critical Care filed a petition in the district court for Douglas County, in which they alleged that more than 120 days had elapsed since the filing of the notice of claim and proposed petition and that no medical review panel had been designated in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 44-2840. They further alleged that the proposed causes of action against them were time barred prior to the filing of the notice of claim and proposed petition with the Director of Insurance pursuant to § 44-2828, which provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 25-213, any action to recover damages based on alleged malpractice or professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or failing to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failing to render professional services providing the basis for such action, except that if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier.
Alegent, Huigens, and Critical Care prayed for a declaratory judgment determining that the special administrator's claims were time barred and, in the alternative, requested the district court to appoint a medical review panel pursuant to § 44-2841(3).
In his answer, the special administrator did not dispute the allegation that the professional services at issue were rendered on or prior to January 22, 1996. However, he denied the allegation that his claims were barred by § 44-2828 and affirmatively alleged that the proposed petition "was timely filed with the Director of the Nebraska Department of Insurance on February 11, 1998." The special administrator moved the court for "a distinct and reasonable timetable upon which the parties are to come to agreement as to appropriate selections under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act" and for an order dismissing the petition seeking declaratory judgment on the statute of limitations issue.
Alegent, Huigens, and Critical Care filed motions for summary judgment with respect to the statute of limitations issue thus framed by the pleadings. At the hearing on the motions, the special administrator acknowledged that the proposed petition was filed pursuant to the NHMLA but contended that the applicable statute of limitations was not § 44-2828, but, rather, § 30-810, which provides that every wrongful death action as described in Neb. Rev.Stat. § 30-809 (Reissue 1995) "shall be commenced within two years after the death of such person." The district court sustained the motions for summary judgment and entered judgment for Alegent, Huigens, and Critical Care based upon its determination that § 44-2828 was the applicable statute of limitations and that pursuant thereto the causes of action asserted in the proposed petition were time barred at the time of its filing. After the special administrator's motion for new trial was overruled, he perfected this appeal and successfully petitioned to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals. See Neb. Rev.Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Reissue 1998).
The special administrator contends that the district court erred in finding that the applicable statute of limitations was that contained in the NHMLA, § 44-2828, as opposed to the 2-year period set forth in the wrongful death statute, § 30-810.
Summary judgment is proper where the facts are uncontroverted and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hood v. AAA Motor Club Ins. Assn., 259 Neb. 63, 607 N.W.2d 814 (2000); Neb. Account. & Disc. v. Citizens for Resp. Judges, 256 Neb. 95, 588 N.W.2d 807 (1999). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 259 Neb. 264, 609 N.W.2d 368 (2000); Neill v. Hemphill, 258 Neb. 949, 607 N.W.2d 500 (2000); Knoll v. Board of Regents, 258 Neb. 1, 601 N.W.2d 757 (1999).
A motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Schwarz v. Platte Valley Exterminating, 258 Neb. 841, 606 N.W.2d 85 (2000); Streeks v. Diamond Hill Farms, 258 Neb. 581, 605 N.W.2d 110 (2000).
The determination of which statute of limitations applies is a question of law. Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999); Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 255 Neb. 977, 588 N.W.2d 565 (1999); Jorgensen v. State Nat. Bank & Trust, 255 Neb. 241, 583 N.W.2d 331 (1998). In connection with questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the court below. Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 259 Neb. 100, 608 N.W.2d 177 (2000); Maryott v. Oconto Cattle Co., 259 Neb. 41, 607 N.W.2d 820 (2000); Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, supra.
The NHMLA was enacted by the Nebraska Legislature in 1976. See 1976 Neb. Laws, L.B. 434. The legislative findings and intent are specifically set forth in § 44-2801, which provides:
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