Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hosp. v. TERC
| Decision Date | 15 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. S-99-1398.,S-99-1398. |
| Citation | 620 N.W.2d 90,260 Neb. 905 |
| Parties | CREIGHTON ST. JOSEPH REGIONAL HOSPITAL, Appellant, v. NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW COMMISSION and Douglas County Board of Equalization, Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
William E. Peters, of Peters & Chunka, P.C., Lincoln, for appellant.
James S. Jansen, Douglas County Attorney, James R. Thibodeau, and, on brief, Timothy J. Buckley, Omaha, for appellee Douglas County Board of Equalization.
In this appeal from the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC), we are presented with the following issues: (1) Whether the filing fee provided for in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-5013 (Cum.Supp.2000), which states that a "person filing an appeal with [TERC] shall pay a filing fee of twenty-five dollars," must be paid in order to confer jurisdiction upon TERC; (2) whether TERC had the authority to adopt a rule stating that if the filing fee does not accompany the appeal, the appeal will not be accepted by TERC; (3) whether TERC had the authority to adopt a so-called "mailbox rule," whereby TERC will accept appeals so long as they are postmarked within the statutorily prescribed time for filing appeals; and (4) whether TERC has the equitable power to adopt a "doctrine of unique circumstances," which allows TERC to accept appeals that have been filed outside the statutory filing period because of the appellant's reliance on an erroneous statement by TERC that such appeals would be accepted. For the reasons that follow, we answer all of these issues in the negative and dismiss the appeal.
Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital (St. Joseph) owns certain real property located in Douglas County. St. Joseph's parent company is Tenant Corporation, which "out sources" its property tax work to a property tax consultant in Texas. In 1998, St. Joseph received an unfavorable determination from the Douglas County Board of Equalization on a valuation protest it filed for 1998. St. Joseph's tax consultant postmarked and sent St. Joseph's appeal to TERC on August 25, 1998, but did not include the $25 filing fee set forth in § 77-5013, and as required by a rule adopted by TERC which states that if the filing fee does not accompany the petition, the petition will not be accepted by TERC. See 442 Neb.Admin.Code, ch. 5, § 001.05 (1999). After receiving the petition with no filing fee, TERC apparently attempted to contact St. Joseph's tax consultant, and on September 3, TERC mailed the appeal form back to St. Joseph's tax consultant in Texas. St. Joseph's tax consultant subsequently sent a completed appeal form, accompanied by a check for the filing fee, with a letter explaining why the appeal should be continued. TERC accepted the appeal form on September 16.
At a hearing on St. Joseph's appeal, TERC raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Following the hearing, on November 10, 1999, TERC issued an order dismissing St. Joseph's appeal for "want of jurisdiction." TERC first determined that it had the power to promulgate its so-called "mailbox rule," whereby TERC views appeals that have been postmarked within the statutory filing period as properly "filed." See 442 Neb.Admin.Code, ch. 5, § 001.03 (1999). TERC cited its statutory power to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for notice and hearing in cases as authority for its adoption of this rule.
Second, TERC addressed the fact that the TERC appeal form for 1998 misstated the deadline for filing an appeal with TERC. The form stated that appeals cannot be filed after August 25, 1998. However, the statutory deadline for filing appeals to TERC in 1998 was August 24. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-1510 (Cum.Supp. 2000). Because TERC had misstated the filing deadline on its own appeal form, TERC invoked what it termed as the "doctrine of unique circumstances." The doctrine is based on estoppel principles and would apparently allow untimely filings to be considered by TERC if the untimeliness was due to reliance on TERC's misstatement of the filing deadline. TERC based its decision to invoke such doctrine on Kansas case law and on its power to consider decisions of the county boards of equalization in equity.
Finally, TERC determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, concluding that the filing fee, provided for in § 77-5013 and in TERC's formally adopted rules, "is a prerequisite to conferring subject matter jurisdiction upon the Commission." It is from this determination that St. Joseph appeals.
St. Joseph assigns that TERC erred in (1) finding that the payment of the $25 fee was jurisdictional and (2) dismissing the case.
Appellate review of a Tax Equalization and Review Commission decision shall be conducted for error on the record. Mid City Bank v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 260 Neb. 282, 616 N.W.2d 341 (2000). The meaning of a statute is a question of law, and a reviewing court is obligated to reach its conclusions independent of the determination made by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission. See, State v. Hernandez, 259 Neb. 948, 613 N.W.2d 455 (2000); Baker's Supermarkets v. State, 248 Neb. 984, 540 N.W.2d 574 (1995).
The filing fee associated with appeals from county boards of equalization to TERC is currently provided for by § 77-5013 and a rule adopted by TERC, 442 Neb.Admin.Code, ch. 5, § 001.05. We have not previously addressed whether the filing fee in § 77-5013 is jurisdictional, nor have we addressed whether the rule TERC adopted is valid. Section 77-5013 states, in relevant part, the following: "The person filing an appeal with the commission shall pay a filing fee of twenty-five dollars...." We first address whether the statute establishes the filing fee as necessary to confer jurisdiction on TERC. If the statute does not, we must determine whether TERC has the authority to adopt a rule which effectively makes the filing fee jurisdictional, stating that petitions "filed without the filing fee will not be accepted by the Commission." See 442 Neb.Admin.Code, ch. 5, § 001.05.
In reading a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. American Employers Group v. Department of Labor, 260 Neb. 405, 617 N.W.2d 808 (2000). The components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter may be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature so that different provisions of the act are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. State ex rel. AMISUB v. Buckley, 260 Neb. 596, 618 N.W.2d 684 (2000); Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Haworth, 260 Neb. 63, 615 N.W.2d 460 (2000). In ascertaining what the Legislature intended when it enacted § 77-5013, we begin by considering the statutory provisions regarding how appeals are to be taken to TERC.
In order to appeal a matter to TERC from a county board of equalization, § 77-1510 states:
Appeals may be taken from any action of the county board of equalization to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission in accordance with the Tax Equalization and Review Commission Act. The appeal shall be filed within thirty days after adjournment of the board which, for actions taken pursuant to section 77-1502, shall be deemed to be July 25 of the year in which the action is taken. After an appeal has been initiated, the county board of equalization shall have no power or authority to compromise, settle, or otherwise change the action it has taken with respect to such assessment, and exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the Tax Equalization and Review Commission, except that the county board of equalization may offer to confess judgment pursuant to section 77-1510.01.
Section 77-5013 provides for filing fees and states, in relevant part, that "[t]he person filing an appeal with the commission shall pay a filing fee of twenty-five dollars...." St. Joseph contends that the plain language of § 77-5013 does not render the filing fee jurisdictional and that if the Legislature had intended to make it jurisdictional, it would have explicitly done so as it has done in other appeal statutes.
Indeed, prior to the enactment of the TERC act, the Legislature had explicitly established filing fees as jurisdictional in other appeal statutes. In appeals from county court to district court, the Legislature explicitly stated that depositing the filing fee "shall perfect the appeal and give the district court jurisdiction of the matter appealed." Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-2729(2) (Reissue 1995). We affirmed that the language of this statute explicitly established the filing fee as jurisdictional in State v. Hunter, 234 Neb. 567, 451 N.W.2d 922 (1990). See, also, Rorick Partnership v. Haug, 228 Neb. 364, 422 N.W.2d 365 (1988).
With respect to appeals from a district court ruling, the Legislature provided:
[A]n appeal shall be deemed perfected and the appellate court shall have jurisdiction of the cause when such notice of appeal has been filed and such docket fee deposited in the office of the clerk of the district court ... and no step other than the filing of such notice of appeal and the depositing of such docket fee shall be deemed jurisdictional.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1912(3) (Reissue 1995). The Legislature was clear in making the filing fee jurisdictional in this statute. With respect to § 25-1912, this court has long held that "the Legislature intended that the filing of the notice of appeal and the depositing of the docket fee `in the office of the clerk of the district court' are both mandatory and jurisdictional."...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
CINCINNATI INS. v. BECKER WAREHOUSE, S-00-767.
...subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte. Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). Becker argues that because Swank's and Armour's lawsuits against Becker have not yet established th......
-
Werner v. Cnty. of Platte
...Stewart, supra note 30. 47. See, § 13–911; Henery, supra note 1. 48. See, e.g., Henery, supra note 1; Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). 49. See, e.g., Village of Hallam v. L.G. Barcus & Sons, 281 Neb. 516, 798 N.W.2d 109 (2011). 50. See ......
-
City of Omaha v. Kum & Go, LLC
...the agency the power to make rules and regulations concerning the details of the legislative purpose. Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000); County Cork v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 250 Neb. 456, 550 N.W.2d 913 (1996). See, also, County ......
-
Wasikowski v. Nebraska Quality Jobs Bd.
...have jurisdiction does not constitute an admission subjecting them to the consequences of such. See Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). However, because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment under the APA, ......