Alexander v. General Motors Corp., A95A1400

• Decision Date: 04 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. A95A1400,A95A1400
• Citation: 466 S.E.2d 607,219 Ga.App. 660
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,540 ALEXANDER v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 607

466 S.E.2d 607

219 Ga.App. 660, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,540

ALEXANDER v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

No. A95A1400.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Dec. 4, 1995.

Reconsideration Denied Dec. 20, 1995.

Certiorari Granted April 25, 1996.

Products liability. Fulton State Court. Before Judge Shoob.

Kenneth F. Dunham, Dovre C. Jensen, Jr., Margaret N. Paton, L. Lynn Hogue, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lord, Bissell & Brook, Terry R. Howell, Corliss L. Worford, Atlanta, for appellee.

ANDREWS, Judge.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of General Motors dismissing the portion of Alexander's products liability action based on a theory of strict liability, and Alexander appeals. The action arose out of an automobile accident in which Alexander claims his injuries were caused by a defectively designed or manufactured driver's seat in his General Motors car. Alexander, who was a Georgia resident, purchased the car in Georgia but was driving the car in Virginia, while stationed there with the United States Army, when the accident occurred. In granting partial summary judgment to General Motors, the trial court accepted General Motors' contentions that: (1) the strict liability cause of action was a tort claim; (2) since the accident and injuries at issue occurred in Virginia, the Georgia rule of lex loci delicti required the application of Virginia substantive law to the strict liability tort claim, and (3) since Virginia law did not recognize recovery on the basis of strict liability, Alexander's strict liability tort claim must be dismissed.

The trial court correctly concluded that Alexander's strict liability claim pursuant to OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1) sounded in tort (Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 560, 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980)), and that the Georgia rule of lex loci delicti governs the decision as to whether Virginia or Georgia substantive law applies to the strict liability claim. Lloyd v. Prudential Securities, 211 Ga.App. 247, 248, 438 S.E.2d 703 (1993). Under the rule of lex loci delicti, tort cases are governed by the substantive law of the place where the tort or wrong occurred (id. at 248, 438 S.E.2d 703), and in torts of a transitory nature the place of the wrong is the place where the last event occurred necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged tort. See Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga.App. 378, 380, 210 S.E.2d 854 (1974); Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises, 172 Ga.App. 902, 903-904, 324 S.E.2d 738 (1984). Here, the last event necessary to make General Motors liable on the products liability claim was the failure of the allegedly defective driver's seat resulting in Alexander's ejection from the car during the accident which occurred in Virginia. Accordingly, under the Georgia rule of lex loci delicti, Virginia substantive law applies.

However, Georgia recognizes a public policy exception to the rule of lex loci delicti. "Even if an application [of the rule of lex loci delicti] renders the law of another state applicable, the forum, within constitutional limits, is not required to give the law of another state extra-territorial effect. That is only done as a matter of courtesy or comity, which will not be enforced if the law of the other state contravenes the public policy of the forum. See OCGA § 1-3-9; Commercial Credit Plan v. Parker, 152 Ga.App. 409 (263 SE2d 220) (1979)." Federal Ins. Co. v. Nat. Distrib. Co., 203 Ga.App. 763, 765-766, 417 S.E.2d 671 (1992); see also Karimi v. Crowley, 172 Ga.App. 761, 762, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984); Roadway Express v. Warren, 163 Ga.App. 759, 761, 295 S.E.2d 743 (1982). Accordingly, the issue is whether the public policy exception applies in this case.

Under the public policy exception to the rule of lex loci delicti, Georgia will not apply the substantive law of the place where the tort was committed if application of the foreign law "contravenes our established public policy, or the recognized standards of civilization and good morals; and this exception on account of the contravention of public policy of the State is sometimes invoked where the foreign statute is designed to redress an injury, but prescribes a form of redress which is radically dissimilar to anything existing in our own system of jurisprudence." Southern R. Co. v. Decker, 5 Ga.App. 21, 25, 62 S.E. 678 (1908). The substantive law of the place where the tort was committed and where the action arose will be applied by Georgia courts even where Georgia law recognizes a cause of action not available in the foreign jurisdiction, "provided the enforcement of the lex delicti would not seriously contravene the established policy of the forum." Id. at 29, 62 S.E. 678. The burden is on the party seeking to establish the public policy exception. Id. at 29, 62 S.E. 678.

Here, even though Virginia products liability law differs from Georgia law, there is no radical dissimilarity by which application of Virginia law would seriously contravene the public policy of Georgia. As set forth in the complaint and in his appellate brief, Alexander claims that either a manufacturing or a design defect in the driver's seat of the car caused his injuries and that the manufacturer, General Motors, is liable on a theory of strict liability for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. See Wood v. Hub Motor Co., 110 Ga.App. 101, 105, 137 S.E.2d 674 (1964). Alexander also sought recovery on a negligence theory.

As adopted in Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 51-1-11(b), "the doctrine of strict liability puts a burden on the manufacturer who markets a new product to take responsibility for injury to members of the consuming public for whose use and/or consumption the product is made." Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745, 353 S.E.2d 340 (1987). Although Virginia has not adopted a strict liability theory in products liability cases (see Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55, 57 n. 4 (1988)), "[u]nder Virginia law, recoveries for personal injuries caused by defective products can be made as breach of an implied warranty of merchantability or under a tort theory of negligent design.... The warranty cause of action has two elements: (1) the goods were 'unreasonably dangerous' either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the manufacturer's control. [Cits.] A product is 'unreasonably dangerous' if defective (1) in assembly or manufacture, (2) if imprudently designed, or (3) if not accompanied by adequate warnings about its hazardous properties. [Cits.]." Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1114 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law).

Despite the absence of a separate strict liability cause of action, "the warranty liability under Virginia law for personal injuries caused by defective products is the functional equivalent of strict liability under the Restatement[, Second, Torts, § 402A] formulation." American Law of Products Liability 3d, § 16:22. "[I]t is well established that warranty liability under Virginia law for personal injuries caused by defective products is the functional equivalent of strict tort [liability] under the Restatement formulation. [Cits.]" Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1045 n. 6 (4th Cir.1983); see also Abbot, supra at 1114 (Virginia warranty cause of action for personal injuries caused by defective products is similar to strict liability in tort under the Restatement version). Although Georgia's statutory version of strict liability differs from the Restatement § 402A version to which Virginia's warranty liability has been compared, both share a common public policy designed to shift the burden of loss caused by defective products from the victim to the manufacturer, and both do so by focusing not on whether the manufacturer negligently failed to use due care but on whether the marketed product was defective. See Maleski, Ga. Products Liability (2d ed.), §§ 2-2, 2-3; Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994) (focusing on a risk utility analysis to determine whether a product was defectively designed).

Virginia products liability law is not radically dissimilar to Georgia law but rather pursues a similar public policy by somewhat different methods. Since Virginia law does not contravene Georgia public policy, the public policy exception is not applicable, and Virginia substantive law applies in this case under the rule of lex loci delicti. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted partial summary judgment in favor of General Motors to the extent Alexander sought to recover under Georgia's version of strict liability.

Judgment affirmed.

BEASLEY, C.J., BIRDSONG, P.J., and JOHNSON and SMITH, JJ., concur.

McMURRAY and POPE, P.JJ., and BLACKBURN and RUFFIN, JJ., dissent.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent as I find no compelling reason for Virginia law to displace Georgia's policy of holding manufacturers strictly liable in tort for injuries proximately caused by defective products placed on the market in this State. In this vein, I believe the majority dodges the controlling issue, i.e., weighing Georgia's interest in applying OCGA § 51-1-11(b) against application of the lex loci delictus, and instead applies what I view to be a flawed premise and conclusion that Phillip Alexander, Jr. is no worse off via application of Virginia law because "there is no radical dissimilarity by which application of Virginia law would seriously contravene the public policy of Georgia." Indeed, the majority's logic inaccurately suggests that the trial court gave Alexander leave to amend his complaint for recovery based on a theory of implied warranty. In fact, the trial court excluded Alexander's breach of warranty claims, along with his strict liability claim under OCGA § 51-1-11(b), and...