Allen v. State

• Decision Date: 25 November 1992
• Citation: 611 So.2d 1188
• Parties: Alonza James ALLEN v. STATE of Alabama. CR 91-765.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 1188

611 So.2d 1188

Alonza James ALLEN v. STATE of Alabama.

CR 91-765.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 25, 1992.

D. John Harrison, Opelika, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Randall McNeill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Alonza James Allen, was convicted for the murder of Jeannie Griffin. He was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and was ordered to pay $11,724.25 in restitution. Two issues are raised in this appeal from that conviction.

I

The appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for murder.

The State's evidence established that Jeannie Griffin died as a result of injuries received when the automobile in which she was a passenger collided with a vehicle driven by the appellant. The collision occurred on Highway 165 in Russell County around 5:20 on the afternoon of April 26, 1991. It is undisputed that the appellant's automobile crossed the center line of the two-lane highway and struck the vehicle occupied by Ms. Griffin and driven by her friend, Delilah Piniella.

Alabama State Trooper Ben Menefee testified on direct examination that "yaw marks" on the highway indicated that the appellant's car had entered Ms. Piniella's lane at an angle. He acknowledged on cross-examination that these marks also indicated that, prior to the collision, the appellant's car had gone off the highway onto the shoulder, which was some four to six inches below the highway surface, and that the appellant "came back on the pavement by jerking his wheels." R. 181. Both Robert Perry, who had been travelling behind the appellant for ten to twelve minutes and who witnessed the collision, and Ms. Piniella testified that they did not see the appellant's car go off of the highway onto the shoulder. Mr. Perry testified that, before the collision, the appellant swerved across the center line, went back in his own lane, then veered across the center line and struck Ms. Piniella's car. R. 84. Ms. Piniella stated that, when she first noticed it, the appellant's car was "weaving in the lane just a little bit, but still staying on its own side of the road," and then, suddenly, "the car was all over the place" and the collision occurred. R. 60-61.

Trooper Menefee acknowledged on cross-examination that the appellant and Clarence Hunter, a passenger in the appellant's car, told him at the scene of the collision that their vehicle was run off the road by "an 18-wheeler, a semi." R. 170. He also acknowledged that an individual who stopped at the scene of the collision stated that "he had been run off the road by a truck north of where the accident occurred." Id. However, Trooper Menefee stated that the appellant, Mr. Hunter, and the third individual all gave him different descriptions of the truck. Further, Mr. Perry testified that there was no tractor-trailer truck that ran the appellant off the road and Ms. Piniella stated that there had been no tractor-trailer truck travelling in front of her vehicle.

Trooper Menefee stated that when he arrived at the scene of the collision around 5:45 p.m., the appellant "had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage about his person. He was swaying as he was standing. And he also had glassy, bloodshot eyes." R. 117-18. According to Trooper Menefee, the appellant unsatisfactorily performed several field sobriety tests. Based on his observations and the appellant's performance of the field sobriety tests, Trooper Menefee formed the opinion that the appellant "was under the influence of alcohol," and he arrested the appellant for driving under the influence. R. 126. An Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test revealed that the appellant's blood alcohol content was .163%.

The appellant testified in his own behalf and admitted that he had consumed three beers between the time he left his place of employment at 2:45 p.m. and the time of the collision. However, he stated that he was not "drunk" and that his ability to operate his vehicle was not impaired. The appellant presented evidence that his knee had been fractured in the collision and he contended that he failed the field sobriety tests due to this injury and the resulting pain. However, the appellant's testimony conflicted with Trooper Menefee's as to whether the appellant had informed Menefee of any injury at the scene of the collision.

The appellant also testified that, immediately before the collision with Ms. Piniella's car, an oncoming tractor-trailer truck had veered into his lane, and that he had been forced to move to the right in order to avoid a collision with the truck. According to the appellant, in his attempt to avoid the oncoming truck both of the tires on the right side of his vehicle went onto the shoulder, which was lower than the surface of the highway. The appellant testified that when he attempted to return to the highway after the truck had passed by, "the right front tire ... got caught on the side, on the drop-off on the road" and that he "snatched [the steering wheel] back" and "it kind of throwed the car at a 45 degree angle." R. 297. The appellant's car then traveled into the oncoming lane and struck the vehicle occupied by Ms. Griffin and Ms. Piniella. Clarence Hunter, a friend of the appellant's who was riding with the appellant at the time of the collision, also testified to this version of the events.

The appellant was charged with the form of murder generally referred to as either "reckless," "universal malice" or "depraved heart" murder. This form of murder is defined in Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(2): "A person commits the crime of murder if ... [u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another person." One of the elements the prosecution must prove under the clear language of § 13A-6-2(a)(2) is "conduct which manifests an extreme indifference to human life." King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 407 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove "that he acted with 'extreme indifference to human life.' " Appellant's brief at 21. We disagree.

This Court has, on several occasions, addressed the question of the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a prosecution for reckless murder involving a defendant who was driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 593 So.2d 145, 148 (Ala.Cr.App.1991); Patterson v. State, 518 So.2d 809, 815-16 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Smith v. State, 460 So.2d 343, 346 (Ala.Cr.App.1984); Slaughter v. State, 424 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Jolly v. State, 395 So.2d 1135, 1137-41 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). It does not appear that we have previously specifically addressed the element of "manifesting extreme indifference to human life" in that regard, although we made a brief reference to the matter in Jordan v. State, 486 So.2d 482, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), affirmed on other grounds, 486 So.2d 485 (Ala.1986). We note that § 13A-6-2(a)(2) "reflects the judgment that there is a kind of reckless homicide that cannot fairly be distinguished in grading terms from homicides committed purposely or knowingly." Model Penal Code, Commentaries § 210.2 at 21. Stated another way, the conduct condemned by § 13A-6-2(a)(2) is that which is culpably equivalent to intentional murder. Consequently, while "[w]hat amounts to 'extreme indifference' depends on the circumstances of each case, ... some shocking, outrageous, or special heinousness must be shown." King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 407 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (emphasis added). For example, § 13A-6-2(a)(2) "embrace[s] those homicides caused by ... driving an automobile in a grossly wanton manner." Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1172 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), cert. quashed, 413 So.2d 1172 (Ala.1982) (emphasis added).

Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) also requires the State to prove that the defendant engaged in reckless conduct.

"Recklessness, as defined in [§ 13A-2-2(3) ] presupposes an awareness of the creation of substantial homicidal risk, a risk too great to be deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's conduct serves. Since risk, however, is a matter of degree and the motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation, some formula is needed to identify the case where recklessness may be found and where it should be assimilated to purpose or knowledge for purposes of grading. Under [our statutory scheme], this judgment must be made in terms of whether the actor's conscious disregard of the risk, given the circumstances of the case, so far departs from acceptable behaviour that it constitutes a 'gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.' Ordinary recklessness in this sense is made sufficient for a conviction of manslaughter under [§ 13A-6-3(a)(1) ]. In a prosecution for murder, however, [§ 13A-6-2(a)(2) ] calls for the further judgment whether the actor's conscious disregard of the risk, under the circumstances, manifests extreme indifference to the value of human life. The significance of purpose or knowledge as a standard of culpability is that, cases of provocation or other mitigation apart, purposeful or knowing homicide demonstrates precisely such indifference to the value of human life. Whether recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference is not a question, it is submitted, that can be further clarified. It must be left directly to the trier of fact under instructions which make it clear that recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or knowledge should be treated as murder and that less extreme recklessness should be punished as manslaughter."

Model Penal Code, Commentaries § 210.2 at 21-22 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).

Where we have previously found the evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction for reckless murder, the defendant was...