Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur
Decision Date | 22 December 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 8701,8701 |
Citation | 628 S.W.2d 94 |
Parties | SUPERIOR OIL COMPANY, Appellant, v. The CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, Texas et al., Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jesse R. Pierce, Houston, for appellant.
Robert Keith, Thomas H. Walston, Beaumont, George Wikoff, City Atty., Port Arthur, for appellee.
Appellant, Superior Oil Company, filed this suit against the City of Port Arthur, attacking the validity of an annexation ordinance and to enjoin the City from attempting to collect any ad valorem taxes from appellant on its property in question, and in the alternative seeking a declaration that the "discriminatory failure of Defendants to include Plaintiff's property in an industrial district is an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection of the laws" and that "Plaintiff is entitled to have its property taxed on the same basis as property included in industrial districts by the City...." The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, upholding the validity of the questioned annexation ordinance.
The City of Port Arthur, a home rule city, by the process of several sequential annexation ordinances, annexed an area extending three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico, encompassing a drilling platform, five oil, gas, and mineral leases (leased from the State) and various other production facilities owned by appellant. The last of such ordinances, Ordinance No. 79-116, adopted December 10, 1979, annexed the territory in which appellant's property is situated. An area of a mile in width and 101/2 miles in length, extending into the Gulf of Mexico, has been annexed by seven separate ordinances. The City began its southward expansion and annexation in 1969. Originally, it did so to permit it to buttress levies in order to prevent property damage to city residents from rising water and storms.
In reaching its present boundary lines, the City annexed southward down the Sabine River until it reached the mouth thereof, then proceeded in a southwesterly direction along the Texas coastline, and then out into the Gulf of Mexico to the three marine league line. This was done by separate annexation ordinances, all of which complied with the provisions of the Municipal Annexation act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 970a (1963). Appellant attacks the validity of the last ordinance No. 79-116.
Appellant, by its fourth, fifth, and sixth points of error complain of the granting of the motion for summary judgment upon the grounds that the annexation ordinance, and the tax assessed against its property, was void "because it constituted a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States," and that the annexation ordinance is void "because it was done solely for purposes of taxation."
Appellant has grouped these three points under its argument, and we will consider them in the same manner. The sole argument made under the three points is that the Annexation Ordinance No. 79-116 is void because the annexed area, within which appellant's property is located, was annexed solely for taxation purposes, and the City cannot provide any municipal services to the annexed territory. We disagree and, accordingly, overrule these points of error.
The City of Port Arthur enacted the questioned annexation ordinance pursuant to and in full compliance with the provisions of Article 970a. Appellant's only complaint is that the annexation and taxation of its property violates the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. These contentions do not present a justiciable matter under such constitutional amendment, and cannot form a basis for rendering void the annexation of appellant's property.
The United States Supreme Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907), held that annexation of territory by political subdivisions of the states does not present a justiciable matter under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court states (at 178-9, 28 S.Ct. at 46):
Although the Hunter decision has been limited in some voting right cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the case is still viable today. In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 99 S.Ct. 383, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978), the Supreme Court stated:
"(W)e think that the (Hunter) case continues to have substantial constitutional significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that states have in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them."
On numerous occasions, the Hunter decision has been applied to municipal annexations. The courts have consistently held that annexations do not present a justiciable matter under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 226 F.Supp. 456, 458-9 (S.D.Tex.1964), affirmed, 343 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 837, 86 S.Ct. 85, 15 L.Ed.2d 80 (1965), the Court states: See Detroit Edison Company v. East China Township School Dist. # 3, 247 F.Supp. 296 (E.D.Mich.1965), affirmed 378 F.2d 225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932, 88 S.Ct. 296, 19 L.Ed.2d 284 (1967); Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975, 88 S.Ct. 476, 19 L.Ed.2d 467 (1967); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978).
This has also been the holding of the courts of Texas. See Winship v. City of Corpus Christi, 373 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.), dism'd w.o.j. and cert. denied, 379 U.S. 646, 85 S.Ct. 612, 13 L.Ed.2d 551 (1965); Carter v. Hamlin Hospital District, 538 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984, 97 S.Ct. 1680, 52 L.Ed.2d 378 (1977); City of Pasadena v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Wichita Falls v. State ex rel. Vogtsberger, 533 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.1976). In State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex. 450, 303 S.W.2d 780, 782 (1957), appeal dism'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 603, 78 S.Ct. 533, 2 L.Ed.2d 523 (1958), our Supreme Court states:
Appellant's attack upon the validity of the annexation ordinance in the case at bar for the reason that the annexation was for the sole purpose of raising revenue and not offering municipal services has been rejected in numerous cases. Texas courts have consistently held that they will not look to the purposes of an annexation to determine its validity. Assuming appellant established that its property was within an area annexed by the City solely for purposes of raising additional revenue, we find such fact would not render the annexation ordinance void. In City of Wichita Falls v. State ex rel. Vogtsberger, supra at 929, our Supreme Court states: "Traditionally, the courts of this State have not scrutinized the purpose of annexation ordinances or the use or character of the occupation of the annexed territory." See also, Carter v. Hamlin Hospital District, supra; State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, supra; Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Tex. 635 (1882).
Appellant relies on Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 239 U.S. 478, 36 S.Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392 (1916). However, our Texas Supreme Court in State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, supra at 783, distinguished the Myles case by stating:
"A valid distinction is to be made, however, between a special tax or assessment to finance special improvements designed to benefit property or persons located within the particular taxing district, and on the other hand an ad valorem tax on all property within the taxing jurisdiction of the general welfare of the entire community.... (I)t is constitutionally sufficient if taxes are uniform and are for public purposes in which the City has an interest. (Morton Salt Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 177 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1949) ).
Based upon the foregoing authorities, we hold the City's Ordinance No. 79-116 is not void, and we follow the long established rule that the determination of the boundaries of a municipality, as to the grounds of attack made by appellant in the case at bar, is ordinarily a political function, entirely within the power of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Tex.
...there was no reversible error in the court of civil appeals' decision of December 22, 1981. Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This has brought the state court proceedings to a The United States Supreme Court has recentl......
-
Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin
...Natural Resource Code to limit annexation into the Gulf to one marine league (3.41 miles). Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dism'd, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 25, 74 L.Ed.2d 40 (1982); 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 803, 1981......
-
Save Our Aquifer v. City of San Antonio
...F.2d 162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 837, 86 S.Ct. 85, 15 L.Ed.2d 80 (1965); see also Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing state cases holding * Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 580 (Tex.) (recogniz......
-
Lee v. City of Harlingen
...207 U.S. 161; Spectrum Stores, 632 F.3d at 948; Hammonds, 343 F.2d at 163-4; see also Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed for want of federal question, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 25, 74 L.Ed.2d 40 (1982). Acc......