Alomari v. Overseas Ship Holding Grp. Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 11-12300 |
| Parties | Nasser Alomari, Plaintiff, v. Overseas Ship Holding Group, Inc, OSG Ship Management, Inc., and OSG Bulk Ships, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Sean F. Cox
Plaintiff Nasser Alomari ("Nasser" or "Plaintiff") filed this personal injury action against his former employer, OSG Ship Management, Inc. ("Management"), and related defendants, Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. ("Shipholding"), and OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. ("Bulk") (together, "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges negligence and unseaworthiness under general maritime law and under the Jones Act, as well as breach of implied warranty of seaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. The matter is currently before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.1 The parties have briefed the issues and the Court heard oral argument on November 3, 2011. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shallGRANT Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants' other motions are moot.
Plaintiff is a citizen of the City of Dearborn, Michigan. Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. ("Shipholding") is a Delaware corporation. Shipholding does not own the vessel at issue, and did not employ Plaintiff at the time of his injury. OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. ("Bulk") is a New York corporation. Like Shipholding, Bulk neither owns the vessel, nor employed Plaintiff at the time of his injury. OSG Ship Management, Inc. ("Management") is also a Delaware corporation, and has its principle office in Florida. Management employed Plaintiff at the time of his injury, but does not own the vessel on which Plaintiff was injured.
The only facts of Plaintiff's underlying injury that are presently before the Court are those submitted by Plaintiff in his complaint and response brief to Defendants' motion. The facts are as follows:
On or about July 15, 2010, Plaintiff was employed as a Steward Assistant with Management, aboard the M/V Overseas Los Angeles, which is chartered by Overseas Los Angeles, LLC. (Def's Br., Doc. No. 7, Ex. D). That day, Plaintiff was carrying a 70 or 80 lb bucket of food waste from the galley to the storage room so that it could be disposed of before the ship reached California. As Plaintiff climbed down a steep ladder that led to the storage room, he felt a sharp pain in his lower back. Upon arriving in California, Plaintiff visited a medical clinic and was told that he was "fit for duty," but doctors recommended "no heavy lifting."
Plaintiff returned to work and aggravated his injury a few days later. On July 21, 2010,Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbo sacral disc disease and was told that he was "not fit for duty."
On May 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed his complaint. (Doc. No. 1). On June 20, 2011, Defendants' filed their motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
When bringing an action in federal court, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936)). Where, as here, a district court "relies solely on written submissions and affidavits to resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, rather than resolving the motion after either an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery, the burden on the plaintiff is 'relatively slight,' Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d. 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988), and 'the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists to survive dismissal.'" Air Products and Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007). "In that instance, the pleadings and affidavits submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the district court should not weigh 'the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal." Id.
Defendants also bring their motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c). Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, and admission on file together with the affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) negligence and unseaworthiness under general maritime law and under the Jones Act; (2) breach of implied warranty of seaworthiness; and (3) failure to provide maintenance and cure benefits under the Jones Act.
Defendants assert a number of grounds for dismissal in their motion. First, Defendants contend that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction because Defendants lack sufficient minimum contacts to the State of Michigan and therefore do not fall within the scope of Michigan's long-arm statute. Second, Defendants contend that venue is improper, or should be transferred to a more convenient forum. Third, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for improper service of process because Plaintiff did not personally serve Defendants. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because Defendants either were not Plaintiff's employer at the time of his injury, or did not own the vessel on which Plaintiff was injured - characteristics which Defendants believe are fatal to Plaintiff's claim under the Jones Act.I. This Court Does Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants.
As stated above, Defendants contend that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
Personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant provided there are sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant in the forum state and that maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "Depending on the type of minimum contacts in a case, personal jurisdiction can be specific or general." Air Products, 503 F.3d at 550. Specific (or limited) personal jurisdiction arises from a defendant's activities in the state or if those activities had an in-state effect. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002). General personal jurisdiction requires the defendant to have carried on "a continuous and systematic part of its general business" in Michigan. Neogen, 282 F.3d at 889.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would support general personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Thus, the Court must look to whether specific (or limited) personal jurisdiction applies and whether Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts in Michigan.
In determining whether a district court has personal jurisdiction over a moving defendant the court must: 1) determine whether any of Michigan's relevant long-arm statutes authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant; and, if so, 2) determine whether the exercise of that jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process.
Plaintiff asserts that this Court has specific or limited jurisdiction over Defendants basedon the Michigan long-arm statute. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' tortious conduct has had an in-state effect and also that Defendants publicize their companies as global companies, thus purposefully availing themselves to residents of Michigan.2 The Court does not agree. Michigan's long-arm statute, MCL § 600.705, provides, in pertinent part:
M.C.L. § 600.705. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have transacted any business within the state. Therefore, the Court must look to subsection (2) of § 600.705.
The Michigan Supreme Court has construed Michigan's long-arm statute to bestow the broadest possible grant of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 199-200 (1971). "[W]here a state's long-arm statute extends to the constitutional limits of the Due Process Clause, the two inquiries are merged; courts must only determine whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant violates the Due Process Clause." Walker Motorsport, Inc. v. Henry Motorsport, Inc., 110 F.3d 66 at * 2 (Table) (6th Cir.1...
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